The Paradox of Yield Curve: Why is the Fed Willing to Flatten the Curve but Not Control It?

From long experience, Fed technicians knew that the Fed could not control money supply with the precision envisioned in textbooks.” Marcy Stigum


By Elham Saeidinezhad – In the last decade, monetary policy wrestled with the problem of low inflation and has become a tale of three cities: interest rate, asset purchasing, and the yield curve. The fight to reach the Fed’s inflation target started by lowering the overnight federal funds rate to a historically low level. The so-called “zero-lower bound restriction” pushed the Fed to alternative policy tools, including large-scale purchases of financial assets (“quantitative and qualitative easing”). This policy had several elements: first, a commitment to massive asset purchases that would increase the monetary base; second, a promise to lengthen the maturity of the central banks’ holdings and flatten the yield curve. However, in combination with low inflation (actual and expected), such actions have translated into persistently low real interest rates at both the yield curve’s long and short ends, and at times, the inversion of the yield curve. The “whatever it takes” large-scale asset purchasing programs of central banks were pushing the long-term yields into clear negative territory. Outside the U.S., and especially in Japan, central banks stepped up their fight against deflation by adopting a new policy called Yield Curve Control, which explicitly puts a cap on long-term rates. Even though the Fed so far resisted following the Bank of Japan’s footsteps, the yield curve control is the first move towards building a world that “Money View” re-imagines for central banking. Yield curve control enables the Fed to assume its “dealer of last resort role” role to increase its leverage over the yield curve, a private dealer territory, without creating repeated dislocations in the private credit market. 

To understand this point, let’s start by translating monetary policy’s evolution into the language of Money View. In the traditional monetary policy, the Fed uses its control of reserve (at the top of the hierarchy of money) to affect credit expansion (at the bottom of the hierarchy). It also controls the fed funds rate (at the short end of the term structure) in an attempt to influence the bond rate of interest (at the long end). When credit is growing too rapidly, the Fed raises the federal fund’s target to impose discipline in the financial market. In standard times, this would immediately lower the money market dealers’ profit. This kind of dealer borrows at an overnight funding market to lend in the lend in term (i.e., three-month) market. The goal is to earn the liquidity spread.

After the Fed’s implementation of contractionary monetary policy, to compensate for the higher financing cost, money market dealers raise the term interest rate by the full amount (and perhaps a bit more to compensate for anticipated future tightening as well). This term-rate is the funding cost for another kind of dealer, called security dealers. Security dealers borrow from the term-market (repo market) to lend to the long-term capital market. Such operations involve the purchase of securities that requires financing. Higher funding cost implies that security dealers are willing to hold existing security inventories only at a lower price, and increasing long-term yield. This chain of events sketches a monetary policy transmission that happens through the yield curve. The point to emphasize here is that in determining the yield curve, the private credit market, not the Fed, sets rates and prices. The Fed has only some leverage over the system.

After the GFC, as the rates hit zero-lower bound, the Fed started to lose its leverage. In a very low-interest-rate condition, preferences shift in favor of money and against securities. One way to put it is that the surplus agents become reluctant to” delay settlement” and lower their credit market investment. They don’t want promises to pay (i.e., holding securities), and want money instead. In this environment, to keep making the market and providing liquidity, money market, and security dealers, who borrow to finance their short and long-term inventories, respectively, should be able to buy time. During this extended-time period, prices are pushed away from equilibrium. Often, the market makers face this kind of trouble and turn to the banks for refinancing. After GFC, however, the very low-interest rates mean that banks themselves run into trouble.

In a normal crisis, as the dealer system absorbs the imbalances due to the shift in preferences into its balance sheet, the Fed tried to do the same thing and take the problem off the balance sheet of the banking system. The Fed usually does so by expanding its balance sheet. The Fed’s willingness to lend to the banks at a rate lower than they would lend to each other makes it possible for the banks to lend to the dealers at a rate lower than they would otherwise charge. Putting a ceiling on the money rate of interest thus indirectly puts a floor on asset prices. In a severe crisis, however, this transmission usually breaks down. That is why after the GFC, the Fed used its leverage to put a floor on asset prices directly by buying them, rather than indirectly by helping the banks to finance dealers’ purchases.

The fundamental question to be answered is whether the Fed has any leverage over the private dealing system when interest rates are historically low. The Fed’s advantage is that it creates reserves, so there can be no short squeeze on the Fed. When the Fed helps the banks, it expands reserves. Hence the money supply grows. We have seen that the market makers are long securities and short cash. What the Fed does is to backstop those short positions by shorting cash itself. However, the Fed’s leverage over the private dealer system is asymmetric. The Fed’s magic mostly works when the Fed decides to increase elasticity in the credit market. The Fed has lost its alchemy to create discipline in the market when needed. When the rates are already very low, credit contraction happens neither quickly nor easily if the Fed increases the rates by a few basis points. Indeed, only if the Fed raises the rates high enough, it can get some leverage over this system, causing credit contraction. Short of an aggressive rate hike, the dealer system increases the spread slightly but not enough to not change the quantity of supplied credit. In other words, the Fed’s actions do not translate automatically into a chain of credit contraction, and the Fed does not have control over the yield curve. The Fed knows that, and that is why it has entered large-scale asset purchasing programs. But it is the tactful yet minimal purchases of long-term assets, rather than massive ones, that can restore the Fed’s control over the yield curve. Otherwise, the Fed’s actions could push the long-term rates into negative territory and lead to a constant inversion of the yield curve.

The yield curve control aims at controlling interest rates along some portion of the yield curve. This policy’s design has some elements of the interest rate policy and asset purchasing program. Similar to interest rate policy, it targets short-term interest rates. Comparable with the asset purchasing program, yield curve control aim at controlling the long-term interest rate. However, it mainly incorporates essential elements of a “channel” or “corridor” system. This policy targets longer-term rates directly by imposing interest rate caps on particular maturities. Like a “corridor system,” the long-term yield’s target would typically be set within a bound created by a target price that establishes a floor for the long-term assets. Because bond prices and yields are inversely related, this also implies a ceiling for targeted maturities. If bond prices (yields) of targeted maturities remain above (below) the floor, the central bank does nothing. However, if prices fall (rise) below (above) the floor, the central bank buys targeted-maturity bonds, increasing the demand and the bonds’ price. This approach requires the central bank to use this powerful tool tactfully rather than massively. The central bank only intervenes to purchase certain assets when the interest rates on different maturities are higher than target rates. Such a strategy reduces central banks’ footprint in the capital market and prevents yield curve inversion- that has become a typical episode after the GFC.

The “paradox of the yield curve” argues that the Fed’s hesitation to adopt the yield curve control to regulate the longer-term rates contradicts its own reasoning behind the introduction of a corridor framework to control the overnight rate. Once the FOMC determines a target interest rate, the Fed already sets the discount rate above the target interest rate and the interest-on-reserve rate below. These two rates form a “corridor” that will contain the market interest rate; the target rate is often (but not always) set in the middle of this corridor. Open market operations are then used as needed to change the supply of reserve balances so that the market interest rate is as close as possible to the target. A corridor operating framework can help a central bank achieve a target policy rate in an environment in which reserves are anything but scarce, and the central bank has used its balance sheet as a policy instrument independent of the policy interest rate.

In the world of Money View, the corridor system has the advantage of enabling the Fed to act as a value-based dealer, or as Mehrling put it, “dealer of last resort,” without massively purchasing assets and constantly distorting asset prices. The value-based dealer’s primary role is to put a ceiling and floor on the price of assets when the dealer system has already reached their finance limits. Such a system can effectively stabilize the rate near its target. Stigum made clear that standard economic theory has no perfect answer to how the Fed gets leverage over the real economy. The question is why the Fed is willing to embrace the frameworks that flatten the yield curve but is hesitant to adopt the “yield curve control,” which explicitly puts a cap on long-term rates.

Elham Saeidinezhad is Term Assistant Professor of Economics  at Barnard College, Columbia University. Previously, Elham taught at UCLA, and served as a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Is the New Chapter for the Monetary Policy Framework Too Old to Succeed?

Bagehot, “Money does not manage itself.”


By Elham Saeidinezhad – In this year’s Jackson Hole meeting, the Fed announced a formal shift away from previously articulated longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent towards achieving inflation that averages 2 percent over time. The new accord aims at addressing the shortfalls of the low “natural rate” and persistently low inflation. More or less, all academic debates in that meeting were organized as arguments about the appropriate quantitative settings for a Taylor rule. The rule’s underlying idea is that the market tends to set the nominal interest rate equal to the natural rate plus expected inflation. The Fed’s role is to stabilize the long-run inflation by changing the short-term federal funds rate whenever the inflation deviates from the target. The Fed believes that the recent secular decline in natural rates relative to the historical average has constrained the federal funds rate. The expectation is that the Fed’s decision to tolerate a temporary overshooting of the longer-run inflation to keep inflation and inflation expectations centered on 2 percent following periods when inflation has been persistently below 2 percent will address the framework’s constant failure and restore the magic of central banking. However, the enduring problem with the Taylor rule-based monetary policy frameworks, including the recent one, is that they want the Fed to overlook the lasting trends in the credit market, and only focus on the developments in the real economy, such as inflation or past inflation deviations, when setting the short-term interest rates. Rectifying such blind spots is what money view scholars were hoping for when the Fed announced its intention to review the monetary policy framework.

The logic behind the new framework, known as average inflation targeting strategy, is that inflation undershooting makes achieving the target unlikely in the future as it pushes the inflation expectations below the target. This being the case, when there is a long period of inflation undershooting the target, the Fed should act to undo the undershooting by overshooting the target for some time. The Fed sold forecast (or average) targeting to the public as a better way of accomplishing its mandate compared to the alternative strategies as the new framework makes the Fed more “history-dependent.” Translated into the money view language, however, the new inflation-targeting approach only delays the process of imposing excessive discipline in the money market when the consumer price index rises faster than the inflation target and providing excessive elasticity when prices are growing slower than the inflation target.

From the money view perspective, the idea that the interest rate should not consider private credit market trends will undermine central banking’s power in the future, as it has done in the past. The problem we face is not that the Fed failed to follow an appropriate version of Taylor rule. Rather, and most critically, these policies tend to abstract from the plumbing behind the wall, namely the payment system, by disregarding the credit market. Such a bias may have not been significant in the old days when the payment system was mostly a reserve-based system. In the old world, even though it was mostly involuntarily, the Fed used to manage the payment system through its daily interventions in the market for reserves. In the modern financial system, however, the payment system is a credit system, and its quality depends on the level of elasticity and discipline in the private credit market.

The long dominance of economics and finance views imply that modern policymakers have lost sight of the Fed’s historical mission to manage the balance between discipline and elasticity in the payment system. Instead of monitoring the balance between discipline and elasticity in the credit market, the modern Fed attempts to keep the bank rate of interest in line with an ideal “natural rate” of interest, introduced by Knut Wicksell. In Wicksellians’ world, in contrast to the money view, securing the continuous flow of credit in the economy through the payment system is not part of the Fed’s mandate. Instead, the Fed’s primary function is to ensure it does not choose a “money rate” of interest different from the “natural rate” of interest (profit rate capital). If lower, then the differential creates an incentive for new capital investment, and the new spending tends to cause inflation. If prices are rising, then the money rate is too low and should be increased; if prices are falling, then the money rate is too high and should be decreased. To sum up, Wicksellians do not consider private credit to be intrinsically unstable. Inflation, on the other hand, is viewed as the source of inherent instability. Further, they see no systemic relation between the payment system and the credit market as the payment system simply reflects the level of transactions in the real economy.

The clash between the standard economic view and money view is a battle between two different world views. Wicksell’s academic way of looking at the world had clear implications for monetary policy: set the money rate equal to the natural rate and then stand back and let markets work. Unfortunately, the natural rate is not observable, but the missed payments and higher costs of borrowing are. In the money view perspective, the Fed should use its alchemy to strike a balance between elasticity and discipline in the credit market to ensure a continuous payment system. The money view barometer to understand the credit market cycle is asset prices, another observable variable. Since the crash can occur in commodities, financial assets, and even real assets, the money view does not tell us which assets to watch. However, it emphasizes that the assets that are not supported by a dealer system (such as residential housing) are more vulnerable to changes in credit conditions. These assets are most likely to become overvalued on the upside and suffer the most extensive correction on the downside. A central bank that understands its role as setting interest rates to meet inflation targets tends to exacerbate this natural tendency toward instability. These policymakers could create unnaturally excessive discipline when credit condition is already tight or vice versa while looking for a natural rate of interest.

Elham Saeidinezhad is Term Assistant Professor of Economics  at Barnard College, Columbia University. Previously, Elham taught at UCLA, and served as a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Is Monetary Policy Divorcing from Money Market and Uniting with Capital Market?

“The pronouncements and actions of the Federal Reserve Board on monetary policy are a charade.” Fischer Black


By Elham Saeidinezhad – As the US Department of Treasury builds the points along the yield curve, the bank reserves are losing relevance in explaining short-term money market rates’ behavior. Central banks assume that they can create a close link between the best form of money (reserve) and monetary policy. They use the supply of reserves precisely to achieve the target interest rate. Since the 2008-09 Great Financial Crisis (GFC), however, the relationship between money and monetary policy has become unstable. After the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, the Fed’s actions more than doubled the supply of bank reserves, from approximately $1.5 trillion in March to more than $3 trillion in June. In theory, such a massive increase in the supply of reserves should reduce the money market rates. Yet, short-term money market rates have been surprisingly steady, despite the enormous increase in reserves during the great lockdown. Fed economists recognize the over-supply of short-term US Treasury bills (a money market instrument) as the leading cause of the puzzling behavior in money market rates and call it “friction.” 

However, for the Money View scholars, dividing the money market from the capital market, assuming that prices in each market are solely determined by its supply and demand flow, has never been an effective way of understanding interest rates. In the Money View world, similar to Fischer Black’s CAPM, the arbitrage condition implies that both the quantity and the price of money are ultimately determined by private dealers borrowing and lending activities that connect different markets rather than the stance of monetary policy alone. Dealers engage in “yield spread arbitrage,” in which they identify apparent mispricing (i.e., temporary fluctuations in supply or demand) at one segment of the yield curve, and takes a position. Dealers take “positions,” which means they speculate on how prices of assets with similar risk structure but different term-to-maturity, will change. In the meantime, they hedge interest rate exposures by taking an opposite position at another segment of the yield curve.

The point to emphasize is that short-term money markets and long-term capital markets are, in fact, not separate. As a result, prices in each market are not solely determined by the flow of supply and demand in that particular market. By taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunity, the dealers act as “porters” of liquidity from one market to another and connect prices in different markets in the process. The instruments that allow the dealers to transfer liquidity and solidify markets are repos and reverse repos, where capital market assets are used as collaterals to borrow from the money market, or vice versa. The Money View’s strength in understanding price dynamics comes from its ability, and willingness, to understand the dealers whose business connects different points of the yield curve and determines the effectiveness of the monetary policy.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, two separate but equally essential developments (aka distortions) occurred along the yield curve. In the long-term capital market, the Treasury has introduced a new class of safe assets, a 20-year Treasury bond, with a high yield (corresponding to the lowest accepted bid price) of 1.22 percent. Effectively, the US Treasury added a new point to the long-term end of the yield curve. In the short-term money market, the Fed injected a massive amount of reserves to reduce money market rates. The standard view suggests that such an increase in the supply of reserves would reduce the money market rates. The idea is that banks are the only institutions that hold these extra reserves. Due to balance sheet constraints, such as banks’ regulatory requirements, higher reserve holding implies higher banks’ costs. Therefore, banks reduce their short-term rates to signal their willingness to lend. In practice, however, short-term rates remained unchanged.

This dynamic in money market rates can be explained by the recent developments in the Treasury market, a segment of the capital market, and actions of the dealers who took advantage of the consequent arbitrage opportunity along the yield curve, i.e., the high spread between the short-term money market and the long-term risk-free Treasury rates. The dealers increased demand in the short-term money market both for hedging, and financing the newly issued Treasury bonds, put upward pressure on short-term rates. In contrast, the Fed’s activities put downward pressure on these rates. Observe that an increase in private demand for short-term funding (due to yield spread arbitrage) and an increase in the supply of reserves by the Fed (due to monetary policy) have opposing effects on short-term rates. Thus, it should not be surprising that despite the excessive reserve supply after the pandemic, the money market rates have remained stable. Understanding this kind of arbitrage along the yield curve is essential in understanding the behavior of short-term rates and the monetary policy’s effectiveness.

What is missing in this literature, but emphasized in the Money View framework, is acknowledging the hybridity between the money market and the capital market. The close link between the US Treasury market and the money market is a feature of the shadow banking or the new market-based finance. It is no friction. More importantly, the dealers’ search for “arbitrage” opportunities implies that individual securities markets are not separate. Speculators are joining the different markets into a single market. In doing so, they bring about a result that is no part of their intention, namely liquidity. As the Treasury creates an additional risk-free, liquid, point along the yield curve, it creates more arbitrage opportunities. Such developments make the yield curve an even more critical tool of examining the monetary policy effects. In the meantime, the traditional framework of supply and demand for bank reserves to control the short-term money market rate is losing its pertinence.

Elham Saeidinezhad is Term Assistant Professor of Economics  at Barnard College, Columbia University. Previously, Elham taught at UCLA, and served as a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

What Can Explain the Tale of Two FX Swap Rates in the Offshore Dollar Funding Market?

This Piece is part of the Stable Funding Series, by Elham Saeidinezhad


Mary Stigum once said, “Don’t fight the Fed!” There is perhaps no better advice that someone can give to an investor than to heed these words.

After the COVID-19 crisis, most aspects of the dollar funding market have shown some bizarre developments. In particular, the LIBOR-OIS spread, which used to be the primary measure of the cost of dollar funding globally, is losing its relevance. This spread has been sidelined by the strong bond between the rivals, namely CP/CD ratio and the FX swap basis. The problem is that such a switch, if proved to be premature, could create uncertainty, rather than stability, in the financial market. The COVID-19 crisis has already mystified the relationship between these two key dollar funding rates – CP/CD and FX swap basis- in at least two ways. First, even though they should logically track each other tightly according to the arbitrage conditions, they diverged markedly during the pandemic episode. Second, an unusual anomaly had emerged in the FX swap markets, when the market signaled a US dollar premium and discount simultaneously.  For the scholars of Money View, these so-called anomalies are a legitimate child of the modern international monetary system where agents are disciplined, or rewarded, based on their position in the hierarchy. This hierarchy is created by the hand of God, aka the Fed, whose impact on nearly all financial assets and the money market, in particular, is so unmistakable. In this monetary system, a Darwinian inequality, which is determined by how close a country is to the sole issuer of the US dollar, the Fed, is an inherent quality of the system.

Most of these developments ultimately have their roots in dislocations in the banking system. At the heart of the issue is that a decade after the GFC, the private US Banks are still pulling back from supplying offshore dollar funding. Banks’ reluctance to lend has widened the LIBOR-OIS spread and made the Eurodollar market less attractive. Money market funds are filling the void and becoming the leading providers of dollar funding globally. Consequently, the CP/CD ratio, which measures the cost of borrowing from money market funds, has replaced a bank-centric, LIBOR-OIS spread and has become one of the primary indicators of offshore dollar funding costs.

The market for offshore dollar funding is also facing displacements on the demand side. International investors, including non-US banks, appear to utilize the FX swap market as the primary source of raising dollar funding. Traditionally, the bank-centric market for Eurodollar deposits was the one-stop-shop for these investors. Such a switch has made the FX swap basis, or “the basis,” another significant thermometer for calculating the cost of global dollar funding. This piece shows that this shift of reliance from banks to market-based finance to obtain dollar funding has created odd trends in the dollar funding costs.

Further, in the world of market-based finance, channeling dollars to non-banks is not straightforward as unlike banks, non-banks are not allowed to transact directly with the central bank. Even though the Fed started such a direct relationship through Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility or MMLF, the pandemic revealed that there are attendant difficulties, both in principle and in practice. Banks’ defiance to be stable providers of the dollar funding has created such irregularities in this market and difficulties for the central bankers.

The first peculiar trend in the global dollar funding is that the FX swap basis has continuously remained non-zero after the pandemic, defying the arbitrage condition. The FX swap basis is the difference between the dollar interest rate in the money market and the implied dollar interest rate from the FX swap market where someone borrows dollars by pledging another currency collateral. Arbitrage suggests that any differences between these two rates should be short-lived as there is always an arbitrageur, usually a carry trader, inclined to borrow from the market that offers a low rate and lend in the other market, where the rate is high. The carry trader will earn a nearly risk-free rate in the process. A negative (positive) basis means that borrowing dollars through FX swaps is more expensive (cheaper) than borrowing in the dollar money market.

Even so, the most significant irregularity in the FX swap markets had emerged when the market signaled a US dollar premium and a discount simultaneously.  The key to deciphering this complexity is to carefully examine the two interest rates that anchor FX swap pricing. The first component of the FX swap basis reflects the cost of raising dollar funding directly from the banks. In the international monetary system, not all banks are created equal. For the US banks who have direct access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities and a few other high-powered non-US banks, whose national central banks have swap lines with the Fed, the borrowing cost is close to a risk-free interest rate (OIS). At the same time, other non-US banks who do not have any access to the central bank’s dollar liquidity facilities should borrow from the unsecured Eurodollar market, and pay a higher rate, called LIBOR.

As a result, for corporations that do not have credit lines with the banks that are at the top of the hierarchy, borrowing from the banking system might be more expensive than the FX swap market. For these countries, the US dollar trades at a discount in the FX swap market. Contrarily, when banks finance their dollar lending activities at a risk-free rate, the OIS rate, borrowing from banks might be less more expensive for the firms. In this case, the US dollar trades at a premium in the FX swap market. To sum up, how connected, or disconnected, a country’s banking system is to the sole issuer of the dollar, i.e., the Fed, partially determines whether the US dollar funding is cheaper in the money market or the FX swap market.

The other crucial interest rate that anchors FX swap pricing and is at the heart of this anomaly in the FX swap market is the “implied US dollar interest rate in the FX swap market.”  This implied rate, as the name suggests, reflects the cost of obtaining dollar funding indirectly. In this case, the firms initially issue non-bank domestic money market instruments, such as commercial papers (CP) or certificates of deposits (CDs), to raise national currency and convert the proceeds to the US dollar. Commercial paper (CP) is a form of short-term unsecured debt commonly issued by banks and non-financial corporations and primarily held by prime money market funds (MMFs). Similarly, certificates of deposit (CDs) are unsecured debt instruments issued by banks and largely held by non-bank investors, including prime MMFs. Both instruments are important sources of funding for international firms, including non-US banks. The economic justification of this approach highly depends on the active presence of Money Market Funds (MMFs), and their ability and willingness, to purchase short-term money market instruments, such as CPs or CDs.

To elaborate on this point, let’s use an example. Let us assume that a Japanese firm wants to raise $750 million. The first strategy is to borrow dollars directly from a Japanese bank that has access to the global dollar funding market. Another competing strategy is to raise this money by issuing yen-denominated commercial paper, and then use those yens as collateral, and swap them for fixed-rate dollars of the same term. The latter approach is only economically viable if there are prime MMFs that are able and willing, to purchase that CP, or CD, that are issued by that firm, at a desirable rate. It also depends on FX swap dealers’ ability and willingness to use its balance sheet to find a party wanting to do the flip side of this swap. If for any reason these prime MMFs decide to withdraw from the CP or CD market, which has been the case after the COVID-19 crisis, then the cost of choosing this strategy to raise dollar funding is unequivocally high for this Japanese firm. This implies that the disruptions in the CP/CD markets, caused by the inability of the MMFs to be the major buyer in these markets, echo globally via the FX swap market.

On the other hand, if prime MMFs continue to supply liquidity by purchasing CPs, raising dollar funding indirectly via the FX swap market becomes an economically attractive solution for our Japanese firm. This is especially true when the regional banks cannot finance their offshore dollar lending activities at the OIS rate and ask for higher rates. In this case, rather than directly going to a bank, a borrower might raise national currency by issuing CP and swap the national currency into fixed-rate dollars in the FX swap market. Quite the contrary, if issuing short-term money market instruments in the domestic financial market is expensive, due to the withdrawal of MMFs from this market, for instance, the investors in that particular region might find the banking system the only viable option to obtain dollar funding even when the bank rates are high. For such countries, the high cost of bank-lending, and the shortage of bank-centric dollar funding, is an essential threat to the monetary stability of the firms, and the domestic monetary system as a whole.

After the COVID-19 crisis, it is like a tug of war emerged between OIS rates and the LIBORs as to which type of interest rate that anchor FX swap pricing. Following the pandemic, the LIBOR-OIS spread widened significantly and this war was intensified. Money View declares the winner, even before the war ends, to be the bankers, and non-bankers, who have direct, or at least secure path to the Fed’s balance sheet. Marcy Stigum, in her seminal book, made it clear not to fight the Fed and emphasized the powerful role of the Federal Reserve in the monetary system! Time and time again, investors have learned that it is fruitless to ignore the Fed’s powerful influence. Yet, some authors put little effort into trying to gain a better understanding of this powerful institution. They see the Fed as too complex, secretive, and mysterious to be readily understood. This list of scholars does not include Money View scholars. In the Money View framework, the US banks that have access to the Fed’s balance sheet are at the highest layer of the private banking hierarchy. Following them are a few non-US banks that have indirect access to the Fed’s swap lines through their national central bank. For the rest of the world, having access to the world reserve currency only depends on the mercy of the Gods.

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

If banks are Absent from the Wholesale Money Market, what exactly is their function?

In Search of More Stable Liquidity Providers

By Elham Saeidinezhad | The COVID-19 crisis has revealed the resiliency of the banking system compared to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). At the same time, it also put banks’ absence from typically bank-centric markets on display. Banks have already demonstrated their objection to passing credit to small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs). In doing so, they rejected their traditional role as financial intermediaries for the retail depositors. This phenomenon is not surprising for scholars of “Money View”. The rise of market-based finance coincides with the fading role of banks as financial intermediaries. Money View asserts that banks have switched their business model to become the lenders and dealers in the interbank lending and the repo market, both wholesale markets, respectively. Banks lend to each other via the interbank lending market, and use the proceeds to make market in funding liquidity via the repo market.

Aftermath the COVID-19 crisis, however, an episode in the market for term funding cast a dark shadow over such doctrine. The issue is that it appears that interbank lending no longer serves as the significant marginal source of term funding for banks. Money Market Funds (MMFs) filled the void in other wholesale money markets, such as markets for commercial paper and the repo market. After the pandemic, MMFs curtailed their repo lending, both with dealers and in the cleared repo segment, to accommodate outflows. This decision by MMFs increased the cost of term dollar funding in the wholesale money market. This distortion was contained only when the Fed directly assisted MMFs through Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility or MMLF. Money View emphasizes the unique role of banks in the liquidity hierarchy since their liabilities (bank deposits) are a means of payment. Yet, such developments call into question the exact role of banks, who have unique access to the Fed’s balance sheet, in the financial system. Some scholars warned that instruments, such as the repo, suck out liquidity when it most needed. A deeper look might reveal that it is not money market instruments that are at fault for creating liquidity issues but the inconsistency between the banks’ perceived, and actual significance, as providers of liquidity during a crisis.

There are two kinds of MMFs: prime and government. The former issue shares as their liabilities and hold corporate bonds as their assets while the latter use the shares to finance their holding of safe government debts. By construction, the shares have the same risk structure as the underlying pool of government bonds or corporate bonds. In doing so, the MMFs act as a form of financial intermediaries. However, this kind of intermediation is different from a classic, textbook, one. MMFs mainly use diversification to pool risk and not so much to transform it. Traditional financial intermediaries, on the other hand, use their balance sheet to transform risk- they turn liquid liabilities (overnight checkable deposits) into illiquid assets (long term loans). There is some liquidity benefit for the mutual fund shareholder from diversification. But such a business model implies that MMFs have to keep cash or lines of credit, which reduces their return. 

To improve the profit margin, MMFs have also become active providers of liquidity in the market for term funding, using instruments such as commercial paper (CP) and the repo. Commercial paper (CP) is an unsecured promissory note with a fixed maturity, usually three months. The issuer, mostly banks and non-financial institutions, promises to pay the buyer some fixed amount on some future date but pledges no assets, only her liquidity and established earning power, guaranteeing that promise. Investment companies, principally money funds and mutual funds, are the single biggest class of investors in commercial paper. Similarly, MMFs are also active in the repo market. They usually lend cash to the repo market, both through dealers and cleared repo segments. At its early stages, the CP market was a local market that tended, by investment banking standards, to be populated by less sophisticated, less intense, less motivated people. Also, MMFs were just one of several essential players in the repo market. The COVID-19 crisis, however, revealed a structural change in both markets, where MMFs have become the primary providers of dollar funding to banks.

It all started when the pandemic forced the MMFs to readjust their portfolio to meet their cash outflow commitments. In the CP market, MMFs reduced their holding of CP in favor of holding risk-free assets such as government securities. In the repo market, they curtailed their repo lending both to dealers and in the cleared segment of the market. Originally, such developments were not considered a threat to financial stability. In this market, banks were regarded as the primary providers of dollar funding. The models of market-based finance, such as the one provided by Money View framework, tend to highlight banks’ function as dealers in the wholesale money market, and the main providers of funding liquidity. In these models, banks set the price of funding liquidity and earn an inside spread. Banks borrow from the interbank lending market and pay an overnight rate. They then lend the proceeds in the term-funding market (mostly through repo), and earn term rate. Further, more traditional models of bank-based financial systems depict banks as financial intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. Regardless of which model to trust, since the pandemic did not create significant disturbances in the banking system, it was expected that the banks would pick up the slack quickly after MMFs retracted from the market.

The problem is that the coronavirus casts doubt on both models, and highlights the shadowy role of banks in providing funding liquidity. The experience with the PPP loans to SMEs shows that banks are no longer traditional financial intermediaries in the retail money market. At the same time, the developments in the wholesale money market demonstrate that it is MMFs, and no longer banks, who are the primary providers of term funding and determine the price of dollar funding. A possible explanation could be that on the one hand, banks have difficulty raising overnight funding via the interbank lending market. On the other hand, their balance sheet constraints discourage them from performing their function as money market dealers and supply term funding to the rest of the financial system. The bottom line is that the pandemic has revealed that MMFs, rather than large banks, had become vital providers of US dollar funding for other banks and non-bank financial institutions. Such discoveries emphasize the instability of funding liquidity in bank-centric wholesale and retail money markets.

The withdrawals of MMFs from providing term funding to banks in the CP markets, and their decision to decease their reverse repo positions (lending cash against Treasuries as collateral) with dealers (mostly large banks), translated into a persistent increase of US dollar funding costs globally. Even though it was not surprising in the beginning to see a tension in the wholesale money market due to the withdrawal of the MMFs, the Fed was stunned by the extent of the turbulences. This is what caused the Fed to start filling the void that was created by MMFs’ withdrawal directly by creating new facilities such as MMLF. According to the BIS data, by mid-March, the cost of borrowing US funding widened to levels second only to those during the GFC even though, unlike the GFC, the banking system was not the primary source of distress. A key reason is that MMFs have come to play an essential role in determining US dollar funding both in a secured repo market and an unsecured CP market. In other words, interbank lending no longer serves as a significant source of funding for banks. Instead, non-bank institutional investors such as MMFs constitute the most critical wholesale funding providers for banks. The strength of MMFs, not the large, cash-rich, banks, has, therefore, become an essential measure of bank funding conditions. 

The wide swings in dollar funding costs, caused by MMFs’ withdrawal from these markets, hampered the transmission of the Fed’s rate cuts and other facilities aimed at providing stimulus to the economy in the face of the shock. With banks’ capacity as dealers were impaired, and MMFs role was diminished, the Fed took over this function of dealer of last resort in the wholesale money market. Interestingly, the Fed acted as a dealer of last resort via its MMLF facility rather than assuming the role of banks in this market. The goal was to put an explicit floor on the CP’s price and then directly purchase three-month CP from issuers via Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). These operations also have broader implications for the future of central bank financial policies that might include MMFs rather than banks. The Fed’s choice of policies aftermath the pandemic was the unofficial acknowledgment that it is MMFs’ role, rather than banks’, that has become a crucial barometer for measuring the health of the market for dollar funding. Such revelation demands us to ask a delicate question of what precisely the banks’ function has become in the modern financial system. In other words, is it justifiable to keep providing the exclusive privilege of having access to the central bank’s balance sheet to the banks?

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Is the Government’s Ambiguity about the Secondary Market a Terminal Design Flaw at the Heart of the PPP Loans?

The COVID-19 crisis has created numerous risks for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The only certainty for SMEs has been that the government’s support has been too flawed to mitigate the shock. The program’s crash is not an accident. As mentioned in the previous Money View blog, one of the PPP loan design flaws is the government’s reliance on banks to act traditionally and intermediate credit to SMEs. Another essential, yet not well-understood design flaw at the heart of the PPP loan program is its ambiguity about the secondary market. The structure I propose to resolve such uncertainty focuses on the explicit government guarantee for the securitization of the PPP loans, similar to the GSE’s role in the mortgage finance system.

Such flaws are the byproduct of the central bank’s tendency to isolate shadow banking, and its related activities, from traditional banking. These kinds of bias would not exist in the “Money View” framework, where shadow banking is a function rather than an entity. “Money market funding of capital market lending” is a business deal that can happen in the balance sheet of any entity- including banks and central banks. One way to identify a shadow banker from a traditional banker is to focus on their sources and uses of finance. A traditional banker is simply a credit intermediary. Her alchemy is to facilitate economic growth by bridging any potential mismatch between the kind of liabilities that borrowers want to issue (use of finance) and the nature of assets that creditors want to hold (source of funding). Nowadays, the mismatch between the preferences of borrowers and the preferences of lenders is increasingly resolved by “price changes” in the capital market, where securities are traded, rather than by traditional intermediation. Further, banks are reluctant to act as a financial intermediary for retail depositors as they have already switched to their more lucrative role as money market dealers.

Modern finance emphasizes that no risk is eliminated in the process of “credit intermediation,” only transferred, and sometimes quite opaquely. Such a conviction gave birth to the rise of market-based finance. In this world, a shadow banker, sometimes a bank, uses its source of funding, usually overnight loans, to supply “term-funding” in the wholesale money market. In doing so, it acts as a dealer in the wholesale money market. Also, financial engineering techniques, such as securitization, by splitting the securitized assets into different tranches, allows a shadow banker to “enhance credit ” while transferring risks to those who can shoulder them. The magic of securitization enables a shadow banker to tap capital-market credit in the secondary market. Ignoring the secondary market is a fatal problem in the design of PPP loans.

To understand the government pandemic stimulus program for the SMEs, let’s start by understanding the PPP loan structure. The U.S. Treasury, along with financial regulators such as the Fed, adopted two measures to facilitate aid to SMEs under the CARES Act. First, the Fed announced the formation of the Paycheck Protection Program Loan Facility (the “PPPLF”). This program enables insured depository institutions to obtain financing from the Fed collateralized by Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans. The point to emphasize here is that the Fed, in essence, is the ultimate financier of such loans as banks could use the credits to SMEs as collateral to finance their lending from the Fed. Second, PPP loans are assigned a zero-percent risk-weight for purposes of U.S. risk-based capital requirements. This feature is essentially making PPP loans exempt from risk-based (but not leverage) capital requirements when held by a banking organization subject to U.S. capital requirements. 

Despite the promising appearance of such programs, the money is not flowing towards SMEs. One of the deadly flaws of this program is that it overlooks the importance of the secondary market. Specifically, ambiguity exists regarding the Small Business Administration (SBA)’s role in the secondary market due to the nature of the PPP loans and how they are regulated. The CARES Act provides that PPP loans are a traditional form of the SBA guaranteed loan. Such a statement implies that the PPP loans would not be 100% guaranteed in the secondary market as the SBA guaranteed loans are subject to certain conditions that should be satisfied by the borrower. First, the SBA wants to ensure that the entity claiming a right to payment from the SBA holds a valid title to the SBA loan. Second, the SBA requires the borrower to fulfill the PPP’s forgiveness requirements. Securitization requires the consent of the SBA. What is not mentioned in the CARES Act is that the SBA’s existing regulations restrict the ability of such loans to be transferred in the secondary market. Such restrictions block the credit to flow to the SMEs.

Under such circumstances, free transfer of PPPs in the secondary market could result in chaos when the PPP loans are later presented to the SBA by the holder for forgiveness or guarantee. Some might propose to ask for approval from the SBA before the securitization process. Yet, prior approval requirements for loan transfers, even though it might reduce the confusion mentioned above, hinder the ability to transfer newly originated PPP loans into the secondary market. Given that the PPP entails a massive amount of loans – $349 billion – to be originated in a short period, transfer restrictions could have a material impact on the ability to get much-needed funding to small businesses quickly. The program’s failure to notice such a conflict is a byproduct of the government’s tendency to ignore the role of the secondary market in the success of programs that aims at providing credit to retail depositors.

A potential solution would be for a government agency, such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), to guarantee the PPP loans in the secondary market in the same manner as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do for the mortgage loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (the GSEs) that purchase mortgages from banks and use securitization to enhance the flow of credit in the mortgage market. The GSEs help the flow of credit as they have a de facto subsidy from the government. The market believes that the government will step in to guarantee their debt if they become insolvent. For the case of the PPP loans, instead of banks keeping the loans on their balance sheet until the loan was repaid, the bank who made the loan to the SMEs (the originator) should be able to sell the loan to the SBA. The SBA then would package the PPP loans and sells the payment rights to investors. The point to emphasize here is that the government both finance such loans in the primary market- the Fed accepts the PPP loans as collateral from banks- and ensures the flow of credit by securitizing them in the secondary market. Such a mechanism provides an unambiguous and ultimate guarantee for the PPP loans in the credit market that the government aims at offering anyways. This kind of explicit government guarantee could also help the smooth flow of credit to SMEs, which has been the original goal of the government in the first place.

Money View, through its recognition of banks as money market dealers in market-based finance and originators of securitized assets, could shed some light on the origins of those complications. Previously in the Money View blog, I proposed a potential solution to circumvent banks and directly injecting credit to the SMEs, through tools such as central bank digital currencies (CBDC). In this piece, the proposal is to adopt the design of the mortgage finance system to provide unambiguous government support and resolve the perplexities regarding marketing PPP loans in the secondary market. Until this confusion is resolved, banking entities with regulatory or internal funding constraints may be unwilling to originate PPP loans without a clear path for obtaining financing or otherwise transferring such credits into the secondary market. Such failures come at the expense of retail depositors, including small businesses.

Acknowledgment: Writing this piece would not be possible without a fruitful exchange that I had with Dr. Rafael Lima Sakr, a Teaching Fellow at Edinburgh Law School.

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Can Central Bank Digital Currency Contain COVID-19 Crisis by Saving Small Businesses? (Part 2)


This piece is a follow up to our previous Money View article on the banking system during the COVID-19 crisis.


By Elham Saeidinezhad and Jack Krupinski |The COVID-19 crisis created numerous financial market dislocations in the U.S., including in the market for government support. The federal government’s Paycheck Protection Program offered small businesses hundreds of billions of dollars so they could keep paying employees. The program failed to a great extent. Big companies got small business relief money. The thorny problem for policymakers to solve is that the government support program is rooted in the faith that banks are willing to participate in. Banks were anticipated to act as an intermediary and transfer funds from the government to the small businesses. Yet, in the modern financial system, banks have already shifted gear away from their traditional role as a financial intermediary between surplus and deficit agents. Part l used the “Money View” and a historical lens to explain why banks are reluctant to be financial intermediaries and are more in tune with their modern function as dealers in the wholesale money markets. In Part ll, we are going to propose a possible resolution to this perplexity. In a monetary system where banks are not willing to be financial intermediaries, central banks might have to seriously entertain the idea of using central bank digital currency (CBDC) during a crisis. Such tools enable central banks to circumvent the banking system and inject liquidity directly to those who need it the most, including small and medium enterprises, who have no access to the capital market.

The history of central banking began with a simple task of managing the quantity of money. Yet, central bankers shortly faced a paradox between managing “survival constraint” in the financial market and the real economy. On the one hand, for banks, the survival constraint in the financial market takes the concrete form of a “reserve constraint” because banks settle net payments using their reserve accounts at the central bank. On the other hand, according to the monetarist idea, for money to have a real purchasing power in terms of goods and services, it should be scarce. Developed by the classical economists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the quantity theory of money asserted that the quantity of money should only reflect the level of transactions in the real economy.

The hybridity between the payment system and the central bank money created such a practical dilemma. Monetarist idea disregarded such hybridity and demanded that the central bank abandon its concern about the financial market and focus only on controlling the never-materializing threat of inflation. The monetarist idea was doomed to failure for its conjectures about the financial market, and its illusion of inflation. In the race to dominate the whole economy, an efficiently functioning financial market soon became a pre-condition to economic growth. In such a circumstance, the central bank must inject reserves or else risk a breakdown of the payments system. Any ambiguity about the liquidity problems (the survival constraint) for highly leveraged financial institutions would undermine central banks’ authority to maintain the monetary and financial stability for the whole economy. For highly leveraged institutions, with financial liabilities many times larger than their capital base, it doesn’t take much of a write-down to produce technical insolvency.

This essential hybridity, and the binding reality of reserve constraint, gave birth to two parallel phenomena. In the public sphere, the urge to control the scarce reserves originated monetary policy. The advantage that the central bank had over the financial system arose ultimately from the fact that a bank that does not have sufficient funds to make a payment must borrow from the central bank. Central bankers recognized that they could use this scarcity to affect the price of money, the interest rate, in the banking system. It is the central bank’s control over the price and availability of funds at this moment of necessity that is the source of its control over the financial system. The central bank started to utilize its balance sheet to impose discipline when there was an excess supply of money, and to offer elasticity when the shortage of cash is imposing excessive discipline. But ultimately central bank was small relative to the system it engages. Because the central bank was not all-powerful, it must choose its policy intervention carefully, with a full appreciation of the origins of the instability that it is trying to counter. Such difficult tasks motivated people to call central banking as the “art,” rather than the “science”.

In the private domain, the scarcity of central bank money significantly increased the reliance on the banking system liabilities. By acting as a special kind of intermediary, banks rose to the challenge of providing funding liquidity to the real economy. Their financial intermediation role also enabled them to establish the retail payment system. For a long time, the banking system’s major task was to manage this relationship between the (retail) payment system and the quantity of money. To do so, they transferred the funds from the surplus agents to the deficit agents and absorbed the imbalances into their own balance sheets. To strike a balance between the payment obligations, and the quantity of money, banks started to create their private money, which is called credit. Banks recognized that insufficient liquidity could lead to a cascade of missed payments and the failure of the payment system as a whole.

For a while, banks’ adoption of the intermediary role appeared to provide a partial solution to the puzzle faced by the central bankers. Banks’ traditional role, as a financial intermediary and providers of indirect finance, connected them with the retail depositors. In the process, they offered a retail payment- usually involve transactions between two consumers, between consumers and small businesses, or between two small to medium enterprises. In this brave new world, managing the payment services in the financial system became analogous to the management of the economy as a whole.

Most recently, the COVID-19 crisis has tested this partial equilibrium again. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak, both the Fed and the U.S. Treasury coordinated their fiscal and monetary actions to support small businesses and keep them afloat in this challenging time. So far, a design flaw at the heart of the CARES Act, which is an over-reliance on the banking system to transfer these funds to small businesses, has created a disappointing result. This failure caught central bankers and the governments by surprise and revealed a fatal flaw in their support packages. At the heart of this misunderstanding is the fact that banks have already switched their business models to reflect a payment system that has been divided into two parts: wholesale and retail. Banks have changed the gear towards providing wholesale payment-those made between financial institutions (e.g., banks, pension funds, insurance companies) and/or large (often multinational) corporations- and away from retail payment. They are so taken with their new functions as dealers in the money market and originators of asset-backed securities in the modern market-based finance that their traditional role of being a financial intermediary has become a less important part of their activities. In other words, by design, small businesses could not get the aid money as banks are not willing to use their balance sheets to lend to these small enterprises anymore.

In this context, the broader access to central bank money by small businesses could create new opportunities for retail payments and the way the central bank maintains monetary and financial stability. Currently, households and (non-financial) companies are only able to use central bank money in the form of banknotes. Central bank digital currency (CBDC) would enable them to hold central bank money in electronic form and use it to make payments. This would increase the availability and utility of central bank money, allowing it to be used in a much more extensive range of situations than physical cash. Central bank money (whether cash, central bank reserves or potentially CBDC) plays a fundamental role in supporting monetary and financial stability by acting as a risk-free form of money that provides the ultimate means of settlement for all sterling payments in the economy. This means that the introduction of CBDC could enhance the way the central bank maintains monetary and financial stability by providing a new form of central bank money and new payment infrastructure. This could have a range of benefits, including strengthening the pass-through of monetary policy changes to the broader economy, especially to small businesses and other retail depositors, and increasing the resilience of the payment system.

This increased availability of central bank money is likely to lead to some substitution away from the forms of payment currently used by households and businesses (i.e., cash and bank deposits). If this substitution was extensive, it could reduce the reliance on commercial bank funding, and the level of credit that banks could provide as CBDC would automatically give access to central bank money to non-banks. This would potentially be useful in conducting an unconventional monetary policy. For example, the COVID-19 precipitated increased demand for dollars both domestically and internationally. Small businesses in the U.S. are increasingly looking for liquidity through programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) so that those businesses can keep workers employed. In the global dollar funding market, central banks swap lines with the Fed sent dollars into other countries, but transferring those dollars to end-users would be even easier for central banks if they could bypass the commercial banking system.

Further, CBDC can be used as intraday liquidity by its holders, whereas liquidity-absorbing instruments cannot achieve the same, or can do so only imperfectly. At the moment, there is no other short-term money market instrument featuring the liquidity and creditworthiness of CBDC. The central bank would thus use its comparative advantage as a liquidity provider when issuing CBDC. The introduction of CBDC could also decrease liquidity risk because any agent could immediately settle obligations to pay with the highest form of money.

If individuals can hold current accounts with the central bank, why would anyone hold an account with high st commercial banks? Banks can still offer other services that a CBDC account may not provide (e.g., overdrafts, credit facilities, etc.). Moreover, the rates offered on deposits by banks would likely increase to retain customers. Consumer banking preferences tend to be sticky, so even with the availability of CBDC, people will probably trust the commercial banking system enough to keep deposits in their bank. However, in times of crisis, when people flee for the highest form of money (central bank money), “digital runs” on banks could cause problems. The central bank would likely have to increase lending to commercial banks or expand open market operations to sustain an adequate level of reserves. This would ultimately affect the size and composition of balance sheets for both central banks and commercial banks, and it would force central banks to take a more active role in the economy, for better or worse.

As part 1 pointed out, banks are already reluctant to play the traditional role of financial intermediary. The addition of CBDC would likely cause people to substitute away from bank deposits, further reducing the reliance on commercial banks as intermediaries.  CBDC poses some risks (e.g., disintermediation, digital bank runs, cybersecurity), but it would offer some new channels through which to conduct unconventional monetary policy. For example, the interest paid on CBDC could put an effective floor on money market rates. Because CBDC is risk-free (i.e., at the top of the money hierarchy), it would be preferred to other short-term debt instruments unless the yields of these instruments increased. While less reliance on banks by small businesses would contract bank funding, banks would also have more balance sheet freedom to engage in “market-making” operations, improving market liquidity. More importantly, it creates a direct liquidity channel between the central banks, such as the Fed, and non-bank institutions such as small and medium enterprises. Because central banks need not be motivated by profit, they could pay interest on CBDC without imposing fees and minimum balance requirements that profit-seeking banks employ (in general, providing a payment system is unprofitable, so banks extort profit wherever possible). In a sense, CBDC would be the manifestation of money as a public good. Everyone would have ready access to a risk-free store of value, which is especially relevant in the uncertain economic times precipitated by the COVID-19. 


Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Jack Krupinski is a student at UCLA, studying Mathematics and Economics. He is pursuing an actuarial associateship and is working to develop a statistical understanding of risk. Jack’s economic research interests involve using the “Money View” and empirical methods to analyze international finance and monetary policy.

In a World Where Banks Do Not Aspire to be Intermediaries, Is It Time to Cut Out the Middlemen? (Part I)

“Bankers have an image problem.”

Marcy Stigum

By Elham Saeidinezhad | Despite the extraordinary quick and far-reaching responses by the Fed and US Treasury, to save the economy following the crisis, the market sentiment is that “Money isn’t flowing yet.” Banks, considered as intermediaries between the government and troubled firms, have been told to use the liberated funds to boost financing for individuals and businesses in need. However, large banks are reluctant, and to a lesser extent unable, to make new loans even though regulators have relaxed capital rules imposed in the wake of the last crisis. This paradox highlights a reality that has already been emphasized by Mehrling and Stigum but erred in the economic orthodoxy.

To understand this reluctance by the banks, we must preface with a careful look at banking. In the modern financial system, banks are “dealers” or “market makers” in the money market rather than intermediaries between deficit and surplus agents. In many markets such as the UK and US, these government support programs are built based on the belief that banks are both willing and able to switch to their traditional role of being financial intermediaries seamlessly. This intermediation function enables banks to become instruments of state aid, distributing free or cheap lending to businesses that need it, underpinned by government guarantees.  This piece (Part l) uses the Money View and a historical lens to explain why banks are not inspired anymore to be financial intermediaries. In Part ll, we are going to propose a possible resolution to this perplexity. In a financial structure where banks are not willing to be financial intermediaries, central banks might have to seriously entertain the idea of using central bank digital currency (CBDC) during a crisis. Such tools enable central banks to circumvent the banking system and inject liquidity directly to those who need it the most.

Stigum once observed that bankers have, at times, an image problem. They are seen as the culprits behind the high-interest rates that borrowers must pay and as acting in ways that could put the financial system and the economy at risk, perhaps by lending to risky borrowers, when interest rates are low. Both charges reflect the constant evolution in banks’ business models that lead to a few severe misconceptions over the years. The first delusion is about the banks’ primary function. Despite the common belief, banks are not intermediaries between surplus and deficit agents anymore. In this new system, banks’ primary role is to act as dealers in money market securities, in governments, in municipal securities, and various derivative products. Further, several large banks have extensive operations for clearing money market trades for nonbank dealers. A final important activity for money center banks is foreign operations of two sorts: participating in the broad international capital market known as the Euromarket and operating within the confines of foreign capital markets (accepting deposits and making loans denominated in local currencies). 

Structural changes that have taken place on corporates’ capital structure and the emergence of market-based finance have led to this reconstruction in the banking system. To begin with, the corporate treasurers switched sources of corporate financing for many corporates from a bank loan to money market instruments such as commercial papers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when rates were high, and quality-yield spreads were consequently wide, firms needing working capital began to use the sale of open market commercial paper as a substitute for bank loans. Once firms that had previously borrowed at banks short term were introduced to the paper market, they found that most of the time, it paid them to borrow there. This was the case since money obtained in the credit market was cheaper than bank loans except when the short-term interest rate was being held by political pressure, or due to a crisis, at an artificially low level.

The other significant change in market structure was the rise of “money market mutual funds.” These funds provide more lucrative investment opportunities for depositors, especially for institutional investors, compared to what bank deposits tend to offer. This loss of large deposits led bank holding companies to also borrow in the commercial paper market to fund bank operations. The death of the deposits and the commercial loans made the traditional lending business for the banks less attractive. The lower returns caused the advent of the securitization market and the “pooling” of assets, such as mortgages and other consumer loans. Banks gradually shifted their business model from a traditional “original and hold” to an “originate-to-distribute” in which banks and other lenders could originate loans and quickly sell them into securitization pools. The goal was to increase the return of making new loans, such as mortgages, to their clients and became the originators of securitized assets.

The critical aspect of these developments is that they are mainly off-balance sheet profit centers. In August 1970, the Fed ruled that funds channeled to a member bank that was raised through the sale of commercial paper by the bank’s holding company or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries were subject to a reserve requirement. This ruling eliminated the sale of bank holding company paper for such purposes. Today, bank holding companies, which are active issuers of commercial paper, use the money obtained from the sale of such paper to fund off-balance sheet, nonbank, activities. Off-balance sheet operations do not require substantial funding from the bank when the contracts are initiated, while traditional activities such as lending must be fully funded. Further, most of the financing of traditional activities happens through a stable base of money, such as bank capital and deposits. Yet, borrowing is the primary source of funding off-balance sheet activities.

To be relevant in the new market-based credit system, and compensate for the loss of their traditional business lines, the banks started to change their main role from being financial intermediaries to becoming dealers in money market instruments and originators of securitized assets. In doing so, instead of making commercial loans, they provide liquidity backup facilities on commercial paper issuance. Also, to enhance the profitability of making consumer loans, such as mortgages, banks have turned to securitization business and have became the originators of securitized loans. 

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Fed, along with US Treasury, has provided numerous liquidity facilities to help illiquid small and medium enterprises. These programs are designed to channel funds to every corner of the economy through banks. For such a rescue package to become successful, these banks have to resume their traditional financial intermediary role to transfer funds from the government (the surplus agents) to SMEs (the deficit agents) who need cash for payroll financing. Regulators, in return, allow banks to enjoy lower capital requirements and looser risk-management standards. On the surface, this sounds like a deal made in heaven.

In reality, however, even though banks have received regulatory leniency, and extra funds, for their critical role as intermediaries in this rescue package, they give the government the cold shoulder. Banks are very reluctant to extend new credits and approve new loans. It is easy to portray banks as villains. However, a more productive task would be to understand the underlying reasons behind banks’ unwillingness. The problem is that despite what the Fed and the Treasury seem to assume, banks are no longer in the business of providing “direct” liquidity to financial and non-financial institutions. The era of engaging in traditional banking operations, such as accepting deposits and lending, has ended. Instead, they provide indirect finance through their role as money market dealers and originators of securitized assets.

In this dealer-centric, wholesale, world, banks are nobody’s agents but profits’. Being a dealer and earning a spread as a dealer is a much more profitable business. More importantly, even though banks might not face regulatory scrutiny if these loans end up being nonperforming, making such loans will take their balance sheet space, which is already a scarce commodity for these banks. Such factors imply that in this brave new world, the opportunity cost of being the agent of good is high. Banks would have to give up on some of their lucrative dealing businesses as such operation requires balance sheet space. This is the reason why financial atheists have already started to warn that banks should not be shamed into a do-gooder lending binge.

Large banks rejected the notion that they should use their freed-up equity capital as a basis for higher leverage, borrowing $5tn of funds to spray at the economy and keep the flames of coronavirus at bay. Stigum once said that bankers have an image problem. Having an image problem does not seem to be one of the banks’ issues anymore. The COVID-19 crisis made it very clear that banks are very comfortable with their lucrative roles as dealers in the money market and originators of assets in the capital market and have no intention to be do-gooders as financial intermediaries. These developments could suggest that it is time to cut out banks as middlemen. To this end, central bank digital currency (CBDC) could be a potential solution as it allows central banks to bypass banks to inject liquidity into the system during a period of heightened financial distress such as the COVID-19 crisis.


Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory