Stability Archives

Why Inflation Targeting?

By Juan Ianni. Why does mainstream economics recommend the application of Inflation Targeting (IT) regimes? Is it because of its sophistication? Are there other ways of addressing inflation? Perhaps a historical analysis of the roots of what is now the dominant stabilization regime can shed light on these questions.

Although the concept “financialization” is still up to debate, some economists like Chesnais (2001) argue that, since 1970, capitalism has mutated toward a “financialized” model of accumulation. According to Fine (2013), financialization is the derivation of the use of money as a credit other than the use of money as capital. Other authors believe that financialization is the determining structure of other (political, social, economic) structures. Long story short, this would mean that changes in social relationships produce new economic (and non-economic) structures, which replicate the mode of production (or “the dominant structure”). But what does that mean?

The French school of regulation can answer that question. According to the theory they developed, every accumulation pattern (for instance, “financialized” capitalism) needs a mode of regulation. The latter consist of a set of institutions (or policies), which enable social and economic reproduction by solving conflicts (inherent to every accumulation pattern) between agents of the society. Therefore, institutions will appear, disappear and relate in a non-random way, structuring a certain institutional configuration related to the accumulation pattern.

Boyer and Saillard are two of the most influential theorist of the French school of regulation. In one of their articles (Boyer and Saillard, 2005), they identify five core conflicts between agents in every accumulation pattern. Nevertheless, two are enough to understand the emergence of Inflation Targeting regimes: the “wage-labor nexus” and the “valorization of wealth”. While the first conflict refers to the dispute over the economic surplus between the worker and the capitalist, the latter refers to the prevailing mode of accumulation and valorization of wealth.

In their opinion, financialized capitalism is characterized for having the “valorization of wealth” as the central conflict to solve (or stabilize) within a particular set of institutions. In the contrary, the “wage-labor nexus” is the “adjustment” conflict. This means that accumulation will no longer be led by an equal distribution of the production surplus between workers and entrepreneurs. On the contrary, financialized capitalism will ensure a way for wealth to be valued related to credit (and not capital), no matter how damaging that could be to workers.

With the gestation of financialized capitalism (along with its respective institutional configuration process) and the centrality of the “valorisation of wealth” conflict, the New Macroeconomic Consensus was established as a theoretical paradigm. In order to legitimize and deepen this institutional configuration, it propiated the emergence and propagation of Inflation Targeting regimes as a conceptual apparatus regarding anti-inflationary policy-mix.

As these regimes consider inflation as an exclusive consequence of an excess in aggregate demand, contractive monetary policies are “always needed”. In the case of IT, they must constantly ensure a positive real interest rate, which fits perfectly with the need of a way to value wealth. What is more, it decreases inflation by incrementing unemployment, which shows how the “wage-labour nexus” is the adjustment conflict.

However, it is well known that inflation is a multi-faceted problem. Empirical research shows that in addition to an excess in aggregate demand, inflation can be the consequence of the distributive conflict, international prices, inflationary inertia, etc. The way IT address this phenomena (setting a high real interest rate, increasing unemployment, and letting the exchange rate float) shows how it is the perfect piece for the financialized capitalism puzzle. However, since the existence of very close interconnections between the international monetary systems and the national financial markets (what Chesnais call the “financial globalization”), IT’s effectiveness has lowered.

In addition, when the main cause of inflation is not related to an excess in aggregate demand, IT’s efficiency falls. Vera (2014) argues that using IT demands a strong reliance on the unemployment channel (that is to say, to stop inflation, unemployment needs to increase), which has adverse side effects on both employment and income distribution.

Given these drawbacks, some economic schools have developed other tools to tackle inflation, which may be both more efficient and effective. To that end, a different policy mix in which real exchange rate targeting is combined with income distribution targeting can be structured. In this case, the nominal exchange rate could be set to sustain a balanced external sector, whilst income policies could preserve a more equitable distribution of income. Consequently, a low level of inflation is sustained while the “disciplinary effect” of unemployment is avoided.

In conclusion, Inflation Targeting is not the mainstream policy instrument because of its results or theoretical coherence; after all, it has needless consequences regarding employment and income distribution. The main cause of IT’s popularity is that it assures the reproduction of an institutional configuration related to the “dominant structure”: financialized capitalism. Explaining this process, in addition to noting alternative stabilization regimes, should motivate the design and application of economic policies more consistent with increasing employment and a more equitable income distribution.

About the Author: Juan Ianni just completed a bachelor’s degree in Economics, and has a an interest in political economy and macroeconomics. He is currently studying alternative political schemes to tackle inflation, which is a big challenge for his home country, Argentina.

PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future

By Hannah Temple.

It is difficult to get through a day without encountering the idea that we as a species and a planet are at some kind of a tipping point. Whether for environmental, economic or social factors (or a mix of them all) there is a growing collective of voices claiming that the fundamental ways in which we live our lives, often linked to the structures and incentives of capitalism, must change. And they must change both radically and soon if we are to protect the future of the human race. Paul Mason’s PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future adds another compelling voice to this increasingly hard-to-ignore din. However, what makes this book refreshingly different is the tangible picture it paints of our possible path to a “postcapitalist” world. Mason’s belief is that capitalism’s demise is in fact already happening, and it is happening in ways we both know and like.

The book starts by looking at Kondratieff waves– the idea developed by Nokolai Kondratieff in the 1920s that capitalist economies experience waves or cycles of prosperity and growth, followed by a downswing, characterised by regular recessions, and usually ending with a depression. This is then followed by another phase of growth, and so on and so on. Many people, especially those that benefit from the current economic model, argue that what we are experiencing currently is just another of these regular downswings and we all just have to hunker down and ride the wave until the going gets good again. Mason, however says that even a quick glance at whatever form of evidence takes your fancy (global GDP growth, interest rates, government debt to GDP, money in circulation, inequality, financialization, productivity), demonstrates that the 5th wave that we should currently be riding has stalled and is refusing to take off.

The shift from the end of one wave and the start of a new one is always associated with some form of societal adaptation. Usually this is through attacks on skills and wages, pressure on redistribution projects such as the welfare state, business models evolving to grab what profit there is. However, if this de-skilling and wage reduction is successfully resisted then capitalism is forced instead into more fundamental mutation- the development of more radically innovative technologies and business models that can restore dynamism based on higher wages rather than exploitation. The 1980s saw the first adaptation stage in the history of long waves where worker resistance collapsed. This allowed capitalism to find solutions through lower wages, lower-value models of production and increasing financialization and thus rebalance the entire global economy in favour of capital. “Instead of being forced to innovate their way out of the crisis using technology, the 1 per cent simply imposed penury and atomization on the working class.”

This failure to resist the will of capital and the subsequent emergence of an increasingly atomised, poor and vulnerable global population is part of Mason’s explanation for our stalled 5th wave. The other half of the explanation comes from the nature of our recent technological innovations. Mason contends that the technologies of our time are fundamentally different to those of previous eras in that they are based on information. This is significant in that information doesn’t work in the ways that printing presses or telephones or steam engines work. Information throws all the basic tenets of capitalism- supply and demand, ownership, prices, competition- on their heads. Information technology essentially works to produce things that are increasingly cheap or even free. Think of music- from £10 for a CD in 1997 to 95p for an iTunes track in 2007 to completely free via sharing sites like Spotify in 2017. Over time, Mason claims the market mechanism for setting prices for certain information-based goods will gradually drive them down and down until they reach essentially or even actually zero – eroding profits in the process.

Capitalism’s response to this shift has basically been to put up lots of walls and retreat to stagnant rentier activity rather than productivity or genuine innovation. Legal walls such as patents, tariffs and IP property rights are used to try to maintain monopoly status so that profits can continue to be earnt. Politics is following in the same path with some real walls as well as plenty of metaphorical ones in the form of disintegrating international agreements and partnerships, import tariffs, immigration caps and so on. “With info-capitalism a monopoly is not just some clever tactic to maximise profit, it is the only way an industry can run. Today the main contradiction in modern capitalism is between the possibility of free, abundant socially-produced goods and a system of monopolies, banks and governments struggling to maintain control over power and information”.

However, what seems to be part of the problem is, according to Mason, a critical part of the solution. These new sharing, or “information” technologies, have led to what Mason sees as an already emerging postcapitalist sector of the economy. Time banks, peer-to-peer lending, open-source sharing like Linux and Wikipedia and other technologies are not based on a profit-making motive and instead enable individuals to do and share things of value socially, outside of the price system. This peer-to-peer activity represents an indication of the potential of non-market economies and what our future might look like.

Mason argues that we have now reached a juncture at which there are so many internal and external threats facing our existing system- from climate change, migration, overpopulation, ageing population, government debts- that we are in a similar position to that faced by feudalism before it dissolved into capitalism. The only way forward entails a break with business as usual. Mason emphasises that it is important to remember that capitalism is not a “natural” state of being, nor has it gone on for such a long time. We live in a world in which its existence is seen to be unquestionable but we must take time to teach our brains how to imagine something new again. For Mason, in rather sci-fi fashion, this “something new” is called Project Zero.

Project Zero aims to harness to full capabilities of information technologies to:

– Develop a zero-carbon energy system
– Produce machines, services and products with zero marginal costs (profits)
– Reduce labour time as close as possible to zero

“We need to inject into the environment and social justice movements things that have for 25 years seemed the sole property of the right: willpower, confidence and design.”

Mason provides us with a comprehensive and exciting list of activities to be cracking on with to shape our new world. Some of his ideas are excitingly fresh and new such as the development of an open, accurate and comprehensive computer simulation of current economic reality using real time data to enable the planning of major changes. Others are more familiar such as the shifting of the role of the state to be more inventive and supportive of human wellbeing by coordinating infrastructure, reshaping markets to favour sustainable, collaborative and socially just outcomes and reducing global debts. He also supports the introduction of a universal basic income, the expansion of collaborative business models with clear social outcomes and the removal of market forces- particularly in the energy sector in order to act swiftly to counter climate change. He calls for the socialisation of the finance system. This would involve the nationalization of central banks, setting them explicit sustainability targets and an inflation target on the high side of the recent average to stimulate a “socially just form of financial repression”. It would also involve the restructuring of the banking system into a mixture of non-profit local and regional banks, credit unions and peer-to-peer lenders, a state-owned provider of financial services and utilities earning capped profits. Complex, financial activities should still be allowed but should be separate and well-regulated, rewarding innovation and punishing rent-seeking behaviour.

This push towards a system that rewards and encourages genuine innovation underlies most of Mason’s suggestions for our postcapitalist future. He contends that, if we continue down our current path, it will suffocate us and lead to a world of growing division, inequality and war. We already have systems for valuing things without prices. Working on optimising the technologies we have available to expand these systems, allowing us to live more sustainable, equal and happy lives, Mason argues, should be the key focus for us all.

This book review of Paul Mason’s PostCapitalism by Hannah Temple is originally posted at Rethinking Economics. 

Doughnut Economics – Grab a pencil, draw a doughnut!

Many of us know we need to rethink economics, but Kate Raworth actually did it. Envisioning the economy as a doughnut, two boundaries become clear. If we fall into the doughnut’s middle hole, human needs fail to be met. If we drop off of the outer edge, life is unsustainable.

You should be weary of people who seek to get the “first lick” on a young impressionable brain. Paul Samuelson knew that by writing a successful economics textbook, he could influence how students frame the economy, and thus the world. From the 50’s to the 70’s, his textbook was the most widely used in introductory economics courses. Today, that role has been given to Gregory Mankiw’s “Macroeconomics” (see the Open Syllabus Project). Both view the economy in the same narrow way, with the same simple pictures that don’t seem useful today. Raworth’s Doughnut Economics breaches the pattern and envisions a new economics, for a new generation with clearly defined challenges and scant tools to solve them.

For so many years, the principle goal of economics, and thus the economy, has been GDP growth. Growth for whom or through what means wasn’t nearly as important as just ensuring there was in fact growth. Raworth emphasizes the importance of framing, and if you ask an economist what picture they foresee for GDP, they often describe an upward exponential function.

Thankfully, many young students that I’ve met recognize that infinite growth is unsustainable. Hopefully, their generation can popularize a GDP graph in the shape of a sideways S, respecting the upper bound to growth we have to live within. Enter Raworth’s doughnut. In Raworth’s framework, the outside of the doughnut reflects an upper bound we can not pass based on environmental limits of our planet. The inside of the doughnut reflects a social foundation we can not let crack, the necessities for humanity to thrive.

The goal should no longer be growth, but ensuring we take care of our social foundation and respecting our environmental ceiling. Raworth calls this balanced space in the middle the safe and just space for humanity, and that’s the goal we should direct ourselves toward. We can not ignore who growth is leaving behind, or what damage this growth is doing to our planet. These bounds are the crucial factor for Kate’s “doughnut.” They can move us beyond a narrow single measure called GDP, to looking at all the interconnected measures that are so important for our livelihood.

Once we’ve moved beyond the single measure, we have to also abandon the single neoclassical narrative that espouses the godlike nature of “the market”. The market, the household, the state, and the commons all have a place in the big picture, and different challenges have to be faced by different actors. The neoclassical story tells us there is a “tragedy of the commons,” what if that story was actually the tragic one? Kate takes a stab at the characters of the old narrative, and offers us a new script for them.

EARTH, which is life-giving—so respect its boundaries

SOCIETY, which is foundational—so nurture its connections

THE ECONOMY, which is diverse—so support all of its systems

THE HOUSEHOLD, which is core—so value its contribution

THE MARKET, which is powerful—so embed it wisely

THE COMMONS, which are creative—so unleash their potential

THE STATE, which is essential—so make it accountable

FINANCE, which is in service—so make it serve society

BUSINESS, which is innovative—so give it purpose

TRADE, which is double-edged—so make it fair

POWER, which is pervasive—so check its abuse

The big picture story requires the next generation of economists to be savvy with systems thinking. The old economics used mechanical equilibrium thinking, where economies trend towards a static state. A new economics recognizes the flaws of this equilibrium thinking, recognizing like Minsky said that “stability is destabilizing.” A new framework for economics will recognize the different feedback loops that influence the economies stability.

The language of complexity, evolution and systems needs to infiltrate economics. We need to be thinking about how we can design a resilient economy, one that can resist shocks. We need to look at the big picture, understanding the sources and sinks of different resources. We have to know where our food comes from, ensuring it is distributed properly, and we have to know where our plastic is being disposed, ensuring it’s not destroying the planet. We have to get familiar with the language of stocks and flows, the stores of resources and also their movements. These will be our new tools.

Raworth’s story gives hope to the young economists that are bent on saving the dying planet we’ve inherited. Her vision for a new economics, and the new economy, align with the work we’ve been doing here at The Minskys. Even better though, she has produced a frame for which we can better espouse our ideas. We started out thinking about systems – the sources and sinks of money creation. We’ve recognized the physics envy of mainstream economics. We understand the need to nurture human nature, so maybe we should be studying the grants in the economy and not just monetary exchanges. Without this, we’ll fall inside the doughnut’s hole, where there is no paid maternity leave, and austerity all around. We’ve also thought about ways not to breach the doughnut’s bounds, with a Green Job Guarantee, Basic Income, or Community Currencies for example.

Raworth’s doughnut frames the important aspects of the economy, and is simple to use. Observe your local community! Do you see human needs not being nurtured? That means we’ve breached the inside of the doughnut. Do you see irresponsible damage being done to our home, the earth? Then we’ve breached the outside of the doughnut. We have to design solutions to keep us in the doughnut. We’re all economists now, because we have to be. The future is pretty bleak for humanity without a planet to stand on.

If you too wish to start thinking like a 21st century economist, be sure to check out the book in it’s entirety here. There are also a series of animated shorts here. After that, it’s as simple as grabbing a pencil and drawing a doughnut.

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 1

The global system has seen two major shocks in 2016: the Brexit vote and Trump. What these events have in common is their populist rhetoric that promised to bring back jobs. These elections have tapped into growing anxiety over job security, which has not been addressed by most governments and has given room for demagogues to tap into the anger of the people. They reflect a problem that transcends the boundaries of any single nation: the global economy has been in a slump for almost a decade. Governments need to create jobs, and public fiscal stimulus is the way to do so. To allow it, we must rethink that system.

To understand why we have to consider the international system in which nation states currently operate in. Its current characteristics present challenges for developed and developing economies alike. There are two important features to consider: first, the system creates a deflationary bias by requiring recessionary adjustments and hoarding of the international mean of payment (i.e. dollars). Second, it lacks mechanisms to offset the chronic surpluses and deficits between nations, thus breeding financial instability. In a nutshell, it leads to poor creation and distribution of demand that is managed through capital flows. Instead of propping up demand, the global economic system props up debt.

This post will be split into two parts. This first part will employ the theories of Hyman Minsky to explain the features of our current global economy. Next week, we will follow up to discuss an alternative system that would allow for a better distribution of demand among countries and would support emerging economies’ development by freeing them from the swings of international markets.

In his Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky addresses the ability of a company to honor its debt commitments. Companies can finance investment through previously retained earnings (internal funds) and/or by borrowing (external funds). If retained earnings prove to be insufficient, and the company comes more and more reliant on borrowed funds, the company’s balance sheet structure shifts from being stable to unstable. As presented in a previous post on this blog, Minsky described this process as moving from a stable “hedge” profile to a riskier “speculative” profile, and finally to a dangerous “Ponzi” profile.

Similarly, a country has three ways in which it can meet its debt commitments denominated in foreign currency: i) by obtaining foreign exchange through current account surpluses; ii) by using the stock of international reserves (obtained through previous current account surpluses); and iii) by obtaining access to foreign savings, i.e. borrowing. The first characterizes a hedge financial profile in which the cash inflows are sufficient to pay the foreign currency denominated liabilities. Any mismatch between inflows and outflows can be covered by reserves (its cushion of safety) or by borrowing; while the former can still characterize a hedge profile – as long as the cushion of safety is big enough to cover the shortfall for the necessary period of time – the latter is said to be speculative. In other words, the country borrows to cover a mismatch with the expectation that future revenues will be used to meet those debt obligations.

A situation in which further rounds of borrowing are necessary to meet those commitments is by definition a Ponzi scheme. It can only be sustained over time if it manages to keep fooling investors to continue to lend. Once a greater fool is not found and financial flows are reversed, the economy collapses in a Fisher-type debt deflation: as assets are liquidated to meet those financial obligations, their prices fall and the debt burden becomes increasingly heavier. The case of a country is different from a company, where outflows are often accurately expected, and it commonly leads to massive capital flight, currency devaluation, fall in public bond prices and increase in its premiums (i.e. interest rate payments). This last point illustrates the implications of accumulating foreign liabilities – reserves included – and implies the growth of negative net financial flows from borrowers to creditors through debt servicing. In general, from developing to developed countries.

The adjustment process punishes the borrower much harder than the lender. Greece presents a clear example. For the borrowing country, the standard imposed remedy is austerity: curtail of imports and public expenditure in order to forcefully meet those debts. Or, more often, to stir up enough confidence and access additional financial resources from private investors; in other words, continuing the Ponzi financing. Even in a case where interest payments on the borrowed funds are lower than the rate of capital inflow, the stock of debt would still expand, increasing financial fragility. A development strategy dependable on increasing usage of foreign savings is thus not feasible.

Of course, economic development is an extremely broad subject and we sure don’t want to commit the mistake of suggesting a “one-size-fits-it-all” policy a la neoliberal disciples. Nonetheless, a common issue for many developing economies is the lack of complexity and variety of its production structure – heavily dependent on primary goods – and the low price-elasticity of demand for its exports, which means that shifts in prices (exchange rate) do not do much to stimulate exports (increasing demand). As such, price adjustments might not always work as expected. This is one of the rationales behind the familiar “import substitution industrialization” strategy that tragically seems to have become the case for the UK and US.

These common characteristics affect the ability of emerging economies to face both up- and downswings of the international economy with countercyclical policies. While international liquidity is abundant in booming periods, it becomes extremely scarce during the slumps. Both capital floods and flights can be domestically disruptive for a developing economy, affecting its employment and output level, solvency, and – ultimately, its sovereign power. With scarce demand and international liquidity, the indebted economy falls into the debt-deflation spiral: it has to incur in a recession big enough to collapse imports at a faster rate than exports thus generating surpluses to clear off debt.

It should be clear that besides being completely inefficient – as opposed to the argument commonly used by “free-the-capital” defenders – the current economic system does little to stimulate demand. It is quite the contrary. Notwithstanding, after almost 10 years after the financial crisis, the world economy is still suffering the consequences of economic “freedom,” and the fighting tool has focused excessively on monetary rather than fiscal policy. Instead of cooperation, we are prone to have currency wars, protectionism, “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies and chronic debt accumulation.

These points of criticism are not novel, but they do deserve more of our attention. The same applies to their solutions, which are the focus of Part 2 of this article.

In the Spotlight: Pavlina Tcherneva

If I ask you to picture an economist, chances are you’ll visualize an older white male who makes you feel bad for failing to understand mysterious diagrams. Those certainly exist. But so does Pavlina Tcherneva. Chair and Associate Professor of the Economics Department at Bard College, Pavlina spearheads the group of faculty that convinced me (daughter of graphic-designer-dad and dancer-mom) to get a degree in Economics, and then another.

Pavlina’s Work in a Nutshell
Pavlina is comfortable in many unconventional territories of economics. She can tell you why the government should be your backup employer, why the federal budget really need not balance, and what money really is. Besides the US and her native Bulgaria, she’s consulted policy makers in Argentina, China, Canada, and the UK. Her work has been recognized by a wide range of people; most recently by Bernie Sanders, who used her graph to illustrate his point on inequality.

Current Research
Pavlina’s current research focuses on the “Job Guarantee” policy, which recommends the government acts like an employer of last resort by directly employing those people looking for work during economic slowdowns. In 2006, she spent her summer in the libraries of Cambridge, examining the original writings of Keynes. She offered a fresh interpretation of his approach to fiscal policy, and got a prize for it, too. Today, she investigates what the policy can do for economic growth, the unemployed, and in particular: women and youth.

Path to the Present
If you’re feeling inspired, take note: Being like Pavlina doesn’t happen overnight. In her case, it began with winning a competition that sent her to the US as an exchange student. She then earned a BA in math and economics from Gettysburg College, and a PhD in Economics from the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Her undergraduate honors thesis was a math model of how a monopoly currency issuer can use its price setting powers to produce long-run full employment with stable prices.

As a college student, she helped organize a conference in Bretton Woods around this idea, which became the inaugural event of what has become known as Modern Monetary Theory. Then, there were a few years of teaching at UMKC and Franklin and Marshall, and a subsequent move to the Levy Economics Institute and Bard College several years ago. In the midst of all that, she was a two-time grantee from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) in New York. Today, Pavlina lives in the Hudson Valley, together with her husband and daughter.

Eager for more?
If you’re curious about the Job Guarantee policy, here is both a 15 minute video, and a 150 page book. To understand Pavlina’s take on the Federal Budget, this article goes a long way. And to figure out what’s the deal with money, read this chapter of her book. Her work on inequality was featured in the New York Times, NPR, and other major media outlets. She has articles published by INET, Huffington Post, and over a dozen works on the SSRN.

Can we Learn from Minsky Before the Next Crisis?

Earlier this month I had a conversation with a regional manager from a major insurance company. She explained to me the many aspects of her industry: the commission based salaries, strategies to sell life insurance to one year-old children, and how to retain employees. To be honest, I don’t find insurance to be the most riveting topic out there, but I did have a question I wanted answered: What does her company do with the money their clients pay for their insurance packages? Her response surprised me for its candor, she said:

“You know, insurance companies don’t make their money from premiums and things like that anymore. Most profits come from investing in the stock market.”

We truly are in the era, as Minsky called it, of money manager capitalism. What this means is that insurance companies are no longer in the business of insurance, they are just another player in the financial markets; the only thing that differs is how they get their capital. Combine that with the fact that many of their employees have their entire pay check dependent on commissions and we have companies that are trying to sell as many policies as possible – sometimes to people who do not need it or can’t afford it – in order to have more capital for financial investments.

If that sounds familiar it is because those are the kind of practices (while obviously not the only one) that led to the Great Recession and specifically to the crash of insurance giant AIG (which was bailed out with 182 billion dollars). It is, to say the least, disheartening to see that those practices are still in place by insurers and elsewhere, but it is hardly surprising. To know why we must turn to Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis.

minsky (1) — Illustration: Heske van Doornen

The Hypothesis is possibly the most notable part of Minsky’s extensive work, it is indeed brilliant in its accuracy and simplicity. Nevertheless, it seems to escape from the spotlight of economics and politics in an counter-cyclical manner: every time the economy does well, people seem to forget about it – but during the crisis his book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy went from costing less than 20 dollars, to over 800 (that is, if you could find it). Another example, The Economist had only mentioned him once while Minsky was alive, but since the 2007 crisis his ideas have appeared in over 30 of their articles. As the British newspaper puts it, “it remained until 2007, when the subprime-mortgage crisis erupted in America. Suddenly, it seemed that everyone was turning to his writings as they tried to make sense of the mayhem.” Therein lies the irony, it is exactly when the economy is booming that we should pay the most attention to the Financial Instability Hypothesis.

In short, Minsky postulated that stability is destabilizing, as Oscar Valdes-Viera has awesomely explained before in this blog. In his post, Oscar tells us to be skeptical of politicians who say the economy is doing well; that is when individuals and institutions are moving from hedge, to speculative, to Ponzi positions. In most cases, economic actors will become eerie of risk after a crisis and shun from risky investments such as CDOs. It seems, however, that this aversion to risk has not happened. One can speculate many reasons for this behavior, among which is the bailing-out of so called “Too-Big-to-Fail ” organizations.

As such, it is clear that although Minsky’s popularity increased during the last crisis, the people making important financial decision did not learn from his work. The problem of irresponsible behavior and borderline fraudulent financial innovations still remain. It is time to enact on a less popular, although still important, part of Minsky’s work: the “Big Bank”. That bank, naturally, is the Fed and it plays a number of roles: it sets interest rates, it regulates and supervises banks, and it acts as lender of last resort. However, as Randall Wray explains in a 2011 paper, “most Fed policy over the postwar period involved reducing regulation and supervision, promoting the natural transition to financial fragility.”

Case and point, the SEC and the IRS had their budget severely cut in 2014 and do not currently have the capacity effectively regulate the financial industry. To make matters worse, shadow banks and traditional banks – as demonstrated anecdotally by my conversation with the insurance agency manager – still intermingle in financial innovations. Common sense dictates that after the 2008 crisis companies should have reset to the more sustainable and safer hedge position, but it seems that many financial actors went right back to the more unsustainable speculative position after the crash. One could also have expected that financial jobs would decline in popularity post-2008, but the opposite has occurred; finance as an industry now takes 25% of corporate profits, but only makes up 4% of jobs in the US. The rising importance of the finance industry has other adverse effects besides increasing the possibility of crisis, it means that companies are not investing in producing real output for they can earn more by playing the markets.

Hence is the place in which we found the economy: misguided policy has created a weak regulatory environment where irresponsible risk-taking is ‘insured’ by the precedent set by bail outs, and where even the highest ever levels of liquidity do not lead to real investment and a strong economy. This bad omens have inspired many economists to declare that a crisis is coming. Add to that the fact that recently Minsky has been featured in mainstream media sources like The Economist, and that his seminal book in financial instability was recently the number one best seller on Amazon for Public Finance, and one has reason to feel a bit uneasy about the coming year.

The Job Guarantee: The Coolest Economic Policy You’ve Never Heard Of

When you think of economic issues what are the first things that come to mind? Poverty, inequality, unemployment, inflation, and crisis are all common answers to the question. Wouldn’t it be great if there was a policy that could address all of those issues (and more) in a cost-effective manner? In this piece I will give a very brief introduction to Job Guarantee (JG) schemes, the proverbial economic silver bullet.

Hyperboles aside, Job Guarantee proposals (which may come in many different names such as Employer of Last Resort, or Public Service Employment) are a remarkably good way to address many of the social economic problems current faced by populations all over the world. Ideas about JG programs date back to as early as the 1600s, they have been implemented in many nations during a variety of different stages of the business cycle – and usually to a great deal of success.

Simply put, JG is a direct public employment policy where all of those people who are willing and able to work are guaranteed a job given that these individuals meet some basic employability requirements. Most proponents of JG establish that these jobs should pay a basic, fixed, uniform wage plus full medical coverage and free child care (the latter can be provided by JG workers themselves). The goal of the program should be to ensure that all full-time JG workers are able to obtain a living standard that is above a reasonable poverty threshold. Thus, this sort of program go a long way in addressing poverty. Furthermore, it would also target another major economic problem, the stagnation of real wages and the currently low minimum wage granted to US workers. The JG wage would instantly become the minimum wage for the entire economy: workers in other sectors that are receiving less than the JG wage would be very compelled to take one of those guaranteed jobs, and employers would have to raise their salary offers in order to keep their workforce. Finally, the wages would also act as price anchor, which improves upon the stability of the economy.

The first question I usually get when telling someone about the Job Guarantee is “yeah but, how can we afford it?!” Questions about the deficit and national debt have been put to rest previously on this blog (see here), hence I shall focus on other questions regarding its affordability. For starters, it has been shown elsewhere that JG is remarkably cheaper and more effective than other proposals, such as Basic Income and Negative Income Tax, in achieving lower poverty and unemployment rates (see here, and in many pieces by Rutger’s Phillip Harvey). Secondly, the newly employed JG workers would bring in savings in many different ways: they would get out of unemployment insurance, food-stamps, and other such programs; they will pay income tax, medicare and social security tax, as well as more consumption related taxes; and the government would spend less on issues that are related to poverty, such as higher crime rates. In addition, employment multipliers would make it so the JG program would not have to employ the entire unemployed population. The extra consumption and production related to the JG will create indirect and induced jobs which will represent a significant portion of the job creation from the program. Finally, yours truly is among a number of economists who have modeled the implementation of a a JG for the US and found that eliminating unemployment at a living wage would cost just around 1% of the American GDP.

At this point many say something like “but employing everyone while raising the minimum wage has to be inflationary!” the answer to which is a simple “nope”. First, we have to bear in mind that in the current system the economy’s most precious resource – workers – is being wasted in unemployment, while under a JG program it will be put to use. Orthodox economic thought claims that millions of people need to be unemployed in order to contain inflation, that it is financially “sound” to a tenth of the population in idleness for an unknown period of time. It comes from the idea that the economy is always operating at full capacity, which then brings the inflation problem to being a matter of equilibrating the demand and supply forces of the economy. Both of these assertions are, to quote Keynes, “crazily improbable – the sort of thing that which no man could believe had not his head fuddled with nonsense for years and years.” Government expenditure is as inflationary as any other sector expenditure. Unemployed workers are spending in consumption either way, being sustained by welfare or, dangerously, by credit – and there’s nothing financially “sound” about that.

A JG program would in fact control for inflation by proving a minimum wage anchor for prices and by increasing the productive capacity of the economy through its projects. It would take off the pressure put on demand from the unemployed by increasing supply of goods and services by incorporating those idle workers in the productive structure. Furthermore, even if we assume it to be inflationary it would be a “one-time” increase in inflation, and not an accelerating type one, meaning that demand (and inflation) wouldn’t rise above the full employment level.

In that sense, the costs associated with a JG program (increasing budget deficit and inflation) are not more than ideological myths that obscure the true social costs of unemployment and poverty and curtails any innovative attempts to deal with them. Indeed, generating aggregate demand, employment and inflation is all what the US economy has tried to do since the 2008 financial crisis, but through the wrong ways. A JG program would be extremely more efficient and less costly than QE or negative interest rates. As the world crumbles in economic and political instability, guaranteeing jobs would surely deal with most of its problems. It is up to governments to load and shoot that silver bullet. I don’t think there’s a more appropriate time than now.

Written by Carlos Maciel & Vitor Mello
Illustrations by Heske van Doornen

Why is Austerity Still Being Prescribed?

After years of strict austerity and a worsening crisis, the Greek economy is still in a slump.

However, Eurozone officials continue to prescribe the medicine of austerity. The diagnosis for the Greek crisis was the fiscal profligacy of its government, and thus to restore the health of its economy, Greece simply had to slash its spending. As with any prescription, some short-term side effects were expected. However, year after year the side effects have gotten worse, with unemployment and poverty at all-time highs and demand at all-time lows. Meanwhile, the economy, in a deepening recession, is far from being cured. To make matters worse, despite the reduced fiscal deficits, the shrinking economy means the debt-to-GDP ratio is nevertheless growing.

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Europe embraced austerity as the best medicine to cure its damaged economies. Conservative economists and leading institutions such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) promoted the concept of austerity. The EU imposed spending cuts on all its members. It is using the dire situation of Greece as a warning against the accumulation of more debt. A council of Eurozone ministers, spearheaded by Germany, aggressively pushed for more austerity. Meanwhile, despite complying with the prescribed “medicine,” the health of the Greek economy grew increasingly worse…

However, the theoretical justification behind austerity is questionable. The fear of government deficits was backed by studies such as “Growth in a time of debt” by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. This paper, published in 2010 predicted catastrophic economic consequences for any country surpassing a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 90%. Backed by this research, high-ranking European officials made their case to abruptly cut government spending.

While Reinhart and Rogoff’s study created a buzz amongst conservative politicians when it was published. However, it was mostly ignored by the same politicians when it was discredited. In 2013, it was shown that the spreadsheet used for the calculations in the study was laden with mistakes. Its results were gravely exaggerated. After the errors were fixed, some correlation between government debt and slow growth remained but not one sufficient to establish causation. It is plausible to assume that slow growth is the cause of the increase in government debt. A summary of this controversy can be found.

In the early 2000s, the Greek government began to accumulate massive amounts of debt. By 2009, the government debt had reached almost 135% of GDP. The government quickly enacted extreme spending cuts. So, it is resulting in a ratio decrease that lasted until 2011. However, the Greek economy, in the midst of a deep recession. It did not respond very well to these cuts which came coupled with the added bonus of tax hikes. Domestic demand collapsed and unemployment soared. Moreover, overall confidence in the economy faded. Greek GDP fell, and the debt-to-GDP ratio exploded. Currently, that ratio is at about 180% of GDP and is projected to reach 200% by 2020. (OECD) The Greek economy is on a downward spiral in which imposed spending cuts reduce incomes, reduce spending, and further contract the economy, and limit its ability to repay its debts.

Despite the academic case for austerity weakening, the Greek parliament is forced to impose even deeper spending cuts to receive more funds from European institutions. Without additional loans, Greece would be unable to make the payments on its previous debt. However, most of the bailout money received by Greece has gone on payments for maturing loans.

The Greek sovereign debt has turned into a ponzi scheme. New loans are obtained to make interest payments on older ones, while the principals rise and the economy shrinks. The IMF, initially a main proponent of austerity, has recently come out in favor of restructuring Greece’s debt and allowing for some economic stimulus. It appears that EU officials are finally willing to listen, at least in respect, to debt restructuring. Last week, the council of Eurozone ministers agreed to discuss some debt relief. However, this comes with the same condition attached: more and even harsher austerity.

For a sick economy such as Greece, it is difficult to see how even aggressive spending cuts could nurse it back to health. After austerity has failed year after year in reducing Greek debt and revitalizing its economy, it is time to try a different medicine. Under EU agreements, countries are required to be fiscally conservative. Moreover, EU officials, under German direction, have refused to change their stance on weakening the austerity imposed on Greece. Greece’s suffering has become an example of what happens when those rules are broken.

However, if the EU wants Greece to repay its debt and recover, it needs to stop punishing it and give it room for growth. The European officials who continue to force austerity on Greece should take a step back and realize that the best way to reduce the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio and make it sustainable, is to allow for its economy to grow. Clearly, austerity measures have not brought about the desired growth and health. Greece needs a different prescription. One that would indeed stimulate its economy and not keep it locked in an ICU.

Written by Lara Merling
Illustrations by Heske van Doornen