policy Archives – Page 2 of 3

Moving Beyond the Status Quo: The Case for Ecofeminism

Back in 2002, economists Shane Frederick, George Lowenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue found that people generally value the present over the future—something they called a time preference. While this seemed intuitive for most people, economists Marcus Dittrich and Kristina Leipold later showed that this time preference is not necessarily uniform across gender lines. Following an online experiment with 1019 subjects, they found that men were more impatient than women, choosing to receive rewards immediately, while “women are better able than men to delay gratification and tend to be more self-disciplined.” In a county like the United States—which is mostly controlled by men—it is not surprising that policymakers have continually privileged the present over the future.

Despite the fact that 97 percent of all climate scientists believe that climate change is real, many Republican leaders (Donald Trump, for instance) still argue it is some fictional conspiracy, while many others who do recognize the reality of climate change, still privilege economic growth over environmental protection. There is a deeply embedded culture of masculinity in the United States that is problematic for those who want to create constructive solutions for mitigating climate change. Researchers Aaron R. Brough, James E.B. Wilkie, and their colleagues conducted a series of experiments with over 2,000 participants and found a “psychological link between eco-friendliness and perceptions of femininity” and that “men may shun eco-friendly behavior because of what it conveys about their masculinity.”

Perhaps what is needed is a more feminist approach to climate change. As journalist Maria Laurino writes, “Contemporary American feminism has primarily come to mean championing women’s autonomy and challenging the privileging of male over female.” In other words, it means that feminists do not privilege men over women—who are equal in every capacity and therefore should have equal opportunity. If you are a man, being a feminist does not mean you are somehow feminine or unmanly, it simply means that you don’t believe that men are somehow exceptional and that women are equally competent to take leadership positions.

Do more women in leadership roles translate into more environmental protection? Sociologists Kari Norgaard and Richard York surveyed women policymakers in 19 countries that hold 92 percent of the world’s population and found that “nations with higher proportions of women in Parliament are more prone to ratify environmental treaties than are other nations.” If women are more likely than men to delay gratification, pursue environmental protection, and cooperate internationally, doesn’t it make sense that they should have greater authority over environmental research and policy?

What about those who guide policymakers, such as economists? Researchers Ann Mari May, Mary McGarvey, and David Kucera surveyed economists in universities across 18 nations in the European Union and found that male economists not only prefer market solutions over government intervention, they are more skeptical of environmental protection than women economists. Isn’t economics supposed to be an objective science? As economist Duncan Foley wrote in 2016, economics is not an objective science because it is guided by values — which determines which research questions to pursue and which kinds of economic policies economist will support and legitimize.

In addition, May, McGarvey, and Kucera also found that male economists were two times more likely to become full professors. “Despite an increase in the number of women entering economics from the 1970s to the 1990s,” the researchers wrote, “the profession remains predominantly male.” Even the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, acknowledged that the field of economics favors men over women. Despite the evidence that suggest the economics profession discriminates against women, Ben Casselman and Jim Tankersley of the New York Times, report that some male economists dismiss the notion of a gender bias, “arguing [instead] that gender disparities must reflect differences in preference or ability.” As this article has shown, this is clearly not the case.

Given the data that suggests that female economists and policymakers are more open to responding to environmental issues (see also here, here, and here), it seems pretty clear that we need a more feminist approach to alleviating climate change. A greater representation of women in senior economics positions, as researchers May, McGarvey, and Kucera show, would lead to a more diverse set research questions — widening the range of discussion about climate change and creating a more diverse set of conclusions and policy outcomes.

About the Author: Johnny Fulfer received a B.S. in Economics and a B.S. in History from Eastern Oregon University. He is currently pursuing an M.A. in History at the University of South Florida and has an interest in political economy, the history of economic thought, intellectual and cultural history, and the history of the human sciences and their relation to the power in society.

Basic Income’s Politics Problem

The rising interest in Basic Income, and its being put on the political agenda in countries ranging from Canada to South Africa to to Finland, is driven by a number of economic and political factors. There remain the old concerns about the administrative costs and paternalism of welfare bureaucracies, and these have been joined by observations about the increasing precariousness of the labor market, caused in part by increased automation, the growth of the informal labor sector in both the Global North and Global South and the sense that, at least at a global level, the old problem of economic scarcity may have been overcome.

Basic Income, from this perspective, represent a potential way of dealing with the fallout of massive changes within the economic structure of countries whilst also allowing individuals to retain autonomy and acting in contrast to the often-homogenizing biopolitical structures of the post-World War II Western welfare states. It is also argued that its very simplicity imbues the program with a flexibility which would allow it to work in a wider variety of economic and political contexts. Recently, both the province of Ontario in Canada and the nation of Finland have experimented with welfare delivery reforms in the direction of basic income, whilst in South Africa there is wide-ranging social push for implementation of a basic income grant program.

This rising interest has, however, led to a number of questions from both skeptics of basic income and those open to it. A number of such concerns could be classified as practical matters which are particular to the political and bureaucratic systems of each particular government concerned with implementation. There is also another set of questions which concern the basic income project at a more general level, which could be classed as pertaining to the philosophical and ontological underpinnings of such a policy.

The Subject Complication:

To begin with, there is the problem of exactly whom the basic income will apply to; in other words, what is the subject for claims to social justice in the world of basic income. In most formulations, from Thomas Paine forward, a basic income is conceived of as having a condition of citizenship attached to it. Though this would be a relatively straightforward in a world of limited interstate migration, the reality is that individuals and families currently exist in a wide variety of positionalities vis-à-vis the state in which they physically inhabit. In addition to citizens, there are permanent residents, refugees, students on visas, temporary foreign workers and more. The danger with a citizenship-conditional basic income, as it is unlikely that every country would implement such a policy at the same time, and certainly not at the same monetary level, is that it would further deepen the divide between citizen and non-citizen inhabitants of particular countries.

There is, of course, a counter-proposal, of opening basic income to all living within a country, regardless of status. However, given the already fraught nature of immigration and integration policy, this would most likely prove politically damning of both the government who implemented the policy and Basic Income itself.

The Scarcity Complication:

This points to another potential issue with basic income, namely, that of scarcity. The compulsion to work in order to receive income, either within the market in a capitalist society or in some other arrangement, such as a communal obligation or kinship system in a non-capitalist one, has traditionally been justified on grounds of resource scarcity. In essence, the idea that one must contribute one’s labor or resources, adding to the overall “pie” of the society, in order to make a claim on taking resources out later on.

However, in practice, societies tend to exempt certain classes of people from the labor compulsion, such as the elderly and children, if sufficient resources exist to allow these populations to exist as “free riders” of a sort. The argument for basic income, in relation to the scarcity question, is that, at least at the global level, scarcity has been overcome by technological advances, productivity gains and automation, such that a labor compulsion is no longer strictly necessary.

At the national level, however, even setting aside questions of effective governance and level of citizen trust in government which affect many states, governments may be capable of deploying resources, but not all governments have the same level of resources to deploy. Given the citizenship-focused nature of most basic income projects, the scarcity question will continue to trouble such proposals absent a mass nation-to-nation wealth redistribution or the establishment of a level of transnational government capable of effectively taking on the task of administering such a program.

The Sustainability Complication:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not a basic income program would be sustainable in the political sense in the manner in which the growth of the social democratic welfare state was in the 20th century. The key to this growth of the welfare state, and the notion of decommodified consumption (via free-at-point-of-use services such as health care) was the mobilization of working-class political power resources, primarily trade unions and left-wing parliamentary political parties usually associated with them. By contrast, until very recently, basic income tended to be a subject of interest to academics and policymakers rather than a concrete demand made by a mobilized political power grouping, either in the traditional sense of trade unions and political parties, or in more modern social movements.

To some degree, this may be legacy of libertarian strands of support for basic income which were explicitly aimed at taking down aspects of the welfare state that such movements viewed as their major achievements. With the exception of South Africa, where there was a broad social push for the BIG, that even those social justice movements which exist outside of the traditional social democratic framework have not yet made basic income into a clearly articulated demand. Organizations explicitly concerned with labor issues, such as Fight for 15, have placed emphasis more on rights-at-work and raising wages, rather than a right-to-not-work implicit in at least the progressive, as opposed to libertarian, interpretation of basic income. In a way, this indicates that such organizations may still be stuck, to greater or lesser degrees, in the old social democratic model, with its emphasis on labor rights, albeit with some new elements.

A Way Forward:

With that said, the notion of basic income continues to express a certain truth about the collective stake in the commons and the ability to demand a just share of social wealth, free of restrictions or paternalistic impediments, and without the, increasingly unnecessary, compulsion to engage in the formal labor market. With both the increasing interconnectedness of global economic production, and the increasing precarity of many forms of work, the case for basic income on both moral and practical grounds has rarely been more compelling than it is now.

However, in order for basic income to be implemented in a progressive fashion, a recognition and a concrete convergence of action (as opposed to a notional convergence of interest) must be had between basic income advocates and political movements both of the precariat and the traditional working class. Just as the welfare state of the 20th century was largely built on the political muscle of the workers of its time, if basic income is to be the welfare cornerstone of the 21st, it will need a similarly strong mobilization behind it.

By Carter Vance

Carter Vance has a Masters of Arts from the Political Economy program at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. He has also published his work for Jacobin on water rights protests and has written on a variety of topics for publications such as Truthout and Inquires Journal.

Why Left Economics is Marginalized

After the 2009 recession, Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman wrote a New York Times article entitled “How did economists get it so wrong?” wondering why economics has such a blind spot for failure and crisis. Krugman correctly pointed out that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.” However, by lumping the whole economics profession into one group, Krugman perpetuates the fallacy that economics is one uniform bloc and that some economists whose work is largely ignored had indeed predicted the financial crisis. These economists were largely dismissed for not falling into what Krugman calls the “economics profession.”

So let’s acknowledge there are many types of economics, and seek to understand and apply them, before there’s another crisis.

Left economics understands power

Let’s take labor as an example. Many leftist economic thinkers view production as a social relation. The ability to gain employment is an outcome of societal structures like racism and sexism, and the distribution of earnings from production is inherently a question of power, not merely the product of a benign and objective “market” process. Labor markets are deeply intertwined with broader institutions (like the prison system), social norms (such as the gendered distribution of domestic care) and other systems (such as racist ideology) that affect employment and compensation. There is increasing evidence that the left’s view of labor is closer to reality, with research showing that many labor markets have monopsonistic qualities, which in simple terms means employees have difficulty leaving their jobs due to geography, non-compete agreements and other factors.

In contrast, mainstream economics positions labor as an input in the production process, which can be quantified and optimized, eg. maximized for productivity or minimized for cost. Wages, in widely taught models, are equal to the value of a worker’s labor. These unrealistic assumptions don’t reflect what we actually observe in the world, and this theoretical schism has important political and policy implications. For some, a job and a good wage are rights, for others, businesses should do what’s best for profits and investors. Combative policy debates like the need for stronger unions vs. anti-union right-to-work laws are rooted in this divide.

The role of government

The left believes the government has a role to play in the economy beyond simply correcting “market failures.” Prominent leftist economists like Stephanie Kelton and Mariana Mazzucato, argue for a government role in economic equity and shared prosperity through policies like guaranteed public employment and investment in innovation. The government shouldn’t merely mitigate product market failures but should use its power to end poverty.

On the other hand, mainstream economics teaches that government crowds out private investment (research shows this isn’t true), raising the wage would reduce employment (wrong) and that putting money in the hands of capital leads to more economic growth (also no). As we have seen post-Trump-cuts, tax cuts lead to the further enrichment of the already deeply unequal, equilibrium.

Limitations to left economics: public awareness and lack of resources

History and historically entrenched power determine both final outcomes but also the range of outcomes that are deemed acceptable. Structural inequalities have been ushered in by policies ranging from predatory international development (“free trade”) to domestic financial deregulation, meanwhile poverty caused by these policies is blamed on the poor.

Policy is masked by theory or beliefs (eg. about free trade), but the theory seems to be created to support opportunistic outcomes for those who hold power to decide them. The purely rational agent-based theories that undergird deregulation have been strongly advocated for by particular (mostly conservative) groups such as the Koch Network which have spent loads of money to have specific theoretical foundations taught in schools, preached in churches and legitimized by think tanks.

There have been others who question the centrality of the rational agent, the holy grail of the free market, believe in public rather than corporate welfare, and the need for government to not only regulate but to make markets and provide opportunity. This “alternative” history exists but is less present – it’s alternative-ness defined by sheer public awareness, lack of which, perhaps, stems from a lack of capital.

Financial capital is an important factor in what becomes mainstream. I went through a whole undergraduate economics program at a top university without hearing the words “union” or “redistribution,” which now feels ludicrous. Then I went to The New School for Social Research for graduate school, which has been called the University in Exile, for exiled scholars of critical theory and classical economics. In the New School economics department, we study Marxist economics, Keynesian and post-Keynesian economics, Bayesian statistics, ecological and feminist economics, among others topics. There are only a few other economics programs in the US that teach that there are different schools of thought in economics. But after finishing at the New School and thinking about doing a PhD there, I understood this problem on a personal level.

There’s barely any funding for PhDs and most have to pay their tuition, which is pretty unheard of for an economics doctorate. Why? Two reasons – 1. Because while those who treat economics like science go on to be bankers and consultants, those who study economics as a social science might not make the kind of money to fund an endowment. And 2. Perhaps because of this lack of future payout, The New School is just one of many institutions that doesn’t deem heterodox economics valuable enough to warrant the funding that goes to other programs, in this case, like Parsons.

Unfortunately, a combination of these factors leaves mainstream economics schools well funded by opportunistic benefactors, whether they’re alumni or a lobbying group, while heterodox programs struggle or fail to support their students and their research.

The horizon for economics of the left

Using elements of different schools of thought, and defining the left of the economics world, is difficult. Race, class, and power, elements that define the left, are sticky, ugly, and stressful, and don’t provide easily quantifiable building blocks like mainstream economics does. Without unifying building blocks, we’re prone to continuing to produce graduates from fancy schools who go into the world believing that economics is a hard science and that the world can be understood with existing models in which human behavior can be easily predicted.

Ultimately the mainstream and the left in economics are not so different from the mainstream and the left politically, and there is room for a stronger consensus on non-mainstream economics that would bolster the left politically. It’s worth exploring and strengthening these connections because at the heart of our economic and political divides is a fundamental difference in opinion regarding how society at large should be organized. And whether we continue to promote wealth creation within a capitalistic system, or a distributive system that holds justice as a pinnacle, will determine the extent to which we can achieve a healthy, civilized society.

Fortunately, the political left in many ways is upholding, if not the theory and empirics, the traditions and values of non-mainstream economics. Calls from the left to confront a half-century of neoliberal economic policy are more sustained and perhaps successful than other times in recent history, with some policies like the federal job guarantee making it to the mainstream. After 2008 the 99 percent, supported by mainstreamed research about inequality, began to organize.

There’s hope for change stemming from a new generation of economists, in particular, the thousands of young and aspiring economists researching and writing for groups like Rethinking Economics, the Young Scholars Initiative (YSI), Developing Economics, the Minskys (now Economic Questions), the Modern Money Network, and more. But ideas and policies are path dependent, and it will take a real progressive movement, supplemented by demands by students in schools, to bring left economics to the forefront.

By Amanda Novello.

A version of this post originally appeared on Data for Progress’ Econo-missed Q+A column, in response to a question about the marginalization of leftist voices in economics.

Amanda Novello (@NovelloAmanda) is a policy associate with the Bernard L. Schwartz Rediscovering Government Initiative at The Century Foundation. She was previously a researcher and Assistant Director at the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis at The New School for Social Research.

There Is No Such Thing As Low-Wage Competitiveness

By Daniel Olah and Viktor Varpalotai.

An old myth

Moderate labor costs serve as the basis for the international economic success of a country – this has been the approach favored by policymakers and academicians since the eighties. Still today, most analyses and definitions of competitiveness refer primarily to cost and price factors since these are easy to measure. If you keep your wages down, foreign capital will find you – as the overly simplistic approach suggests, which is a very dangerous narrative.

Countries on the peripheries of the richer Western economies often tried to follow this path and it may indeed have been a crucial step towards attracting the much needed capital inflow into developing economies. Think of post-socialist countries which had to achieve what no one managed to do before: to transform their economies from a centrally planned one into a well-functioning market economy in just a few years without an adequate amount of capital, savings, technology, and know-how. A typical win-win situation: developing countries were offered a chance to integrate into global value chains, while companies outsourced production processes with low added value into these economies.

But there is a crucial problem with that: this is just the first period of childhood. To say so, the role of a low-wage model in an economy is similar to that of parents in human life: it is difficult to grow up without them in a healthy way, but once you are an adult you have to realize that you need to live your own life. This means commitment and efforts to move out from the parental nest. Although the low-wage model may be needed to grow up and acquire the potential for an own future life, every economy should move on. But this depends on willingness and ability as well since nothing comes for free. Becoming a successful adult is the most challenging transformation of our lives.

This story is exactly about being able to overcome the low-wage model. When the economy is growing in its childhood period it is key for economic development, but once it turns 18 it suddenly becomes an obstacle to it. The low-wage model conserves inefficient production methods and means no incentive for companies to innovate and invest in the future. A low-wage model is never truly competitive in the long-term: it is a necessary evil in the development process. Nicholas Kaldor already showed this decades ago.

It’s nothing new: Nicholas Kaldor already said that

Kaldor, the famous Hungarian economist of Cambridge University, claimed in 1978 that countries with the most dynamic economic growth tended to record the fastest growth in labor costs as well. The renown “Kaldor-paradox” may be confusing for policymakers influenced by the neoclassical mainstream. It tells us that keeping costs low may not lead to competitive advantages and faster economic growth. So let’s resurrect the Kaldorian ideas and see whether the relationship has changed at all (hint: it has not).

An Econ 101 course would tell us that there is no causality here, and it’s true. But another thing is valid as well: that average annual real GDP growth and the annual growth of unit labor costs per person employed are not negatively related in developed countries.

But let’s examine an even better measure, the export share of an economy, which is the best indicator to grasp export competitiveness in an international context. It shows us that in the case of OECD countries it is hard to find a negative relationship between unit labor costs and export market shares. (If we created two groups of OECD countries based on GDP per capita in international dollars we would find no relationship in case of the richer but strong positive relationship for the poorer countries.)

Increasing labor costs: a sign of economic success?

In fact, outside the pure neoclassical framework, the Kaldor-paradox is not a paradox anymore. A wide literature suggests that increasing real wages result in higher productivity: better quality of customer service, lower incidence of absences and higher discipline inside companies. Corporations gain on increasing labor productivity thanks to better housing, nutrition and education opportunities for workers. It is no coincidence that increasing wages improve mental performance and self-discipline as well (Wolfers & Zilinsky, 2015).

As for the companies, a main mechanism for adapting to increasing wages is to improve management and production processes and bring forward new investments. What is more: the often extremely large costs of fluctuation and that of recruiting workers may also be greatly reduced. And finally, the most important aspect: the increase of wages result in greater capacity utilization on the supply side, which results in growing capital stock in the economy (Palley, 2017). Could the Kaldor-paradox imply that most of the examined countries are wage-led (or demand-led) economies?

Several empirical results validate that export-competitiveness is nothing to do with depressed labor costs. Fagerberg (1988) analyzed 15 OECD countries between 1961 and 1983 – more thoroughly than this article does – and found the same results. He states that technological and capacity factors are the primary determinants of export competitiveness instead of prices. Fagerberg (1988) argues that the Japanese export successes are due to technology, capacity, and investments while the US and the UK lost market shares because they allocated resources from investing into production capabilities towards the military.

Storm and Nasteepad (2014) argues that the German recovery from the crisis is not primarily due to depressed wages but to corporatist economic policy, the key reason which focuses shared attention of capital, labor and government towards the development of industry and technology. As for Central-Europe, the case is the same: Bierut and Kuziemska-Pawlak (2016) finds that the doubling of Central-European export share is due to technology and institutions, and not due the cost of labor. In fact, unprecedented wage growth and dynamic export increases go hand in hand in many Central European countries nowadays.

And if we consider the new approach to competitiveness by Harvard-researchers then we come to the conclusion that economic complexity instead of wages is the key driver of future economic and export growth. Their competitiveness ranking seems much different from the traditional measure of the World Economic Forum, having the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic among the first 15 countries in the world. This shows that peripheric countries of the developed West may become deeply embedded in global value chains, becoming more and more organically complex and this complexity of their economic ecosystem has the potential for future growth – even despite forty years of communism.

This evidence shows that policymakers should be careful and conscious. Economic relationships or the adequate economic policy approaches may change faster than we think. Economies are just like children: they grow up so fast that we hardly notice it. That is what the stickiness of theories is about.

About the authors:

Daniel Olah is an Economics editor, writer and PhD student.

Viktor Varpalotai is the Deputy Head of Macroeconomic Policy Department at the Ministry of Finance, Hungary.

It’s Time to Guarantee Jobs

The first half of the twentieth century was a challenging time for economics. The Great Depression wiped out incomes, investments, and most importantly, optimism. But when the traditional laissez-faire approach proved ineffective, the work of Keynes and FDR showed that there was another way. The New Deal employed American workers directly and restored confidence among business owners. Today, we could benefit from a similar program. It’s time for a new New Deal, or a Job Guarantee Program, that secures employment to all who are able and willing to work. We’ve done it before, and we can do it again. By Johnny Fulfer.

What We Learned from the Great Depression

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. economy was in a recession just over 48 percent of the time between 1871 and 1900. But none were as bad as the crisis that followed The Great Crash of 1929. Nevertheless, orthodox economic theorists urged policymakers to maintain the status quo and argued the economy would return to normal as long as it was left alone. This perspective was influential and often framed the ways in which political leaders such as Herbert Hoover understood the crisis. Hoover was not only politically committed to free-market ideas, he was psychologically invested in them, urging Americans to show thrift and self-reliance, practices which later resulted in more turmoil.

Elected president in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt did not have an all-embracing theory that would solve all America’s problems. Rather, he employed a wide range of policies, some of which failed, while others were successful in getting people to work. Perhaps the greatest impact Roosevelt’s New Deal had on American society was the change in perspective policymakers had toward government intervention. Earlier leaders like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had had only moderate success producing government initiatives to restrain the predatory nature of American capitalism. But after the Great Depression, FDR helped policymakers and citizens markedly change their views in favor of government assistance, temporarily pushing the conservative opposition to the margins.

As such, FDR’s New Deal momentarily ended the ‘rugged individualism’ of the Hoover era and demonstrated that free-market economics could not be relied upon in a time of crisis. When the economy falls into a slump, the government must be used as a source of relief.

This, too, is the argument that John Maynard Keynes makes in his influential 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes challenged the neoclassical principle that the market naturally adjusts itself to full employment. Along with the two held theories of unemployment—voluntary and frictional—Keynes wrote, there is also the involuntary, which was the result of a shortfall in aggregate demand.

The volatility of investment, Keynes argued, is dependent on our expectations of the future. The only way entrepreneurs would invest is if they expect sufficient demand for goods and services. This was a problem during the Depression—spending money was scarce. When people are unemployed, or fearful of losing their jobs, they are likely to reduce spending. This creates a cycle of insufficient demand, bringing profit-expectations down. Increasing savings, Keynes showed, would only make things worse. A rise in savings would reduce spending, and thus bring down the total level of employment and income. Surplus inventories with nobody to buy commercial products would force firms to contract operations and lay off even more workers.

Therefore, Keynes concluded, there is no automatic recovery from depression; supply does not create its own demand. The only solution is for the government to heavily invest in public works, creating jobs and increasing demand to rebuild confidence in the business community.

Roosevelt’s New Deal did exactly this. It produced nearly 13 million jobs, over 60 percent of which came from the Works Progress Administration, an organization which hired a wide range of individuals, from artists and writers to laborers who constructed roads, bridges, and schools. An incredible number of public goods were provided through these programs, and money was placed in the hands of the workers, whose purchasing power gave business owners’ profit expectations the much needed boost.

Why We Need a new New Deal

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recently published a report examining the current employment conditions in the United States. The unemployment rate stands at 4.1 percent, the BLS reports, which is roughly 6.6 million people in the labor force. While the unemployment rate is relatively low from a conventional perspective, Dantas and Wray argue that this does not consider the falling participation rate for prime-age workers and wide-spread income stagnation.

Moreover, we often gauge the economy based on the unemployment rate, although, this economic indicator does not consider the fact that 40.6 million Americans remain in poverty. A job paying the current federal minimum wage doesn’t mean a worker will make enough money to live without relying on various forms of welfare. In order to turn this around, we need a new New Deal.

While the New Deal of the 1930s was a centralized program, controlled by the federal government, Dantas and Wray propose that a “new New Deal” would be more efficient by creating a more decentralized workforce, hired by state and local governments to meet the needs of the local communities, with wages paid by the federal government. They propose a Job Guarantee program.

The idea behind this policy is that those who are involuntarily unemployed don’t have to be if the government supplied them with a job. Economist Carlos Maciel further argues that the Job Guarantee program would cost around 1 percent of the U.S. GDP, providing additional jobs through the multiplier effect. When the government invests $1, it multiplies through consumer spending, turning into $2 or $3 in the real economy. In his General Theory, Keynes estimated the multiplier to be somewhere between 2 ½ and 3.

Employment works in the same manner. If one new job is created from the initial government investment, the consumption created by the additional worker will produce more jobs in other industries, whose consumption will take the process further, until the multiplier is reached. Moreover, this program would redistribute money from current welfare programs toward the Job Guarantee program. Those who are currently under the poverty line will not need traditional welfare benefits if they have jobs that pay a living wage.

Perhaps the reason U.S. policymakers are hesitant towards a Job Guarantee program has less to do with economics, and more about an investment in the status quo, whether politically or psychologically. Many Americans are invested in the idea of ‘free markets’, whatever they envision that to be, pushing rational economic discourse and the notion of social justice to the margins, and elevating the politically constructed parallel between self-interest and the partial idea of the American Dream. We must move beyond the free-market ideology, which views everything as profit or loss, win or lose. Only time will tell how this polarized form of reasoning will impact the American people, especially the 40.6 million Americans that are currently below the poverty line, who stand to suffer the most.

The Neoliberal Tale

“The tide of Totalitarianism which we have to counter is an international phenomenon and the liberal renaissance which is needed to meet it and of which first signs can be discerned here and there will have little chance of success unless its forces can join and succeed in making the people of all the countries of the Western World aware of what is at stake.” (Friedrich Hayek)

In the past year we’ve seen a number of mentions to the maladies that neoliberalism and globalization have brought upon Western societies (e.g., see here, here, and here). It is well known that during the past decades the levels of inequality and wealth concentration have continued to increase in capitalist economies, leading to the arrival of “outsiders” to the established political powers such as Trump in the US and Macron in France, a turn to the right all over Latin America, and Brexit.

Neoliberalism, one of the main elements to blame, is better known for the policies that defined the world economy since the 1970s. Faithful devotees like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, in the US and UK respectively, exported a number of their neoliberal policies to low and middle income countries through the Washington Consensus under the pretense that it would bring about development.

Neoliberal policies did not exactly turn out the way their creators envisioned. They wanted to reformulate the old liberal ideas of the 19^th century in a deeper and coherent social philosophy – something that was actually never accomplished. This article will review some of the origins of neoliberalism.

The first time the term “neoliberalism” appeared, according to Horn and Mirowski (2009), was at the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris, in 1938. The Colloque was organized to debate the ideas presented in Lippmann’s recent book The Good Society in which he proposed an outline for government intervention in the economy, establishing the boundaries between laissez-faire – a mark of the old liberalism – and state interventionism.

Lippmann set the foundations for a renovation of the liberal philosophy and the Colloque was a first opportunity to discuss the classical liberal ideas and to first draw a line in what the new liberal movement would or should differ from the old liberalism. It was a landmark that, in subsequent years, sparked several attempts to establish institutions that would reshape liberalism, such as the Free Market Study at the University of Chicago and Friedrich Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society (MPS).

This event announced major difficulties among the peers of liberalism. Reservations and disagreements among free market advocates were not uncommon. A notable mention is Henry Simons, of the Chicago School, whose position against monopolies and how they should be addressed was a point of disagreement with fellow libertarians such as Hayek, Lionel Robbins – both at the London School of Economics (LSE) at the time – and Ludwig von Mises.

Simons’s view that the government should nationalize and dismantle monopolies would nowadays be viewed as a leftist attack on corporations but it fits perfectly under the classical liberal basis that Simons and Frank Knight, also from the University of Chicago, were following. Under their interpretation, any concentration of power that undermines the price system and therefore threatens market – and political, individual – freedoms should be countered, even if it meant using the government for that purpose.

It becomes clear that the reformulation of liberal ideas into what we know today as neoliberalism was not a smooth and certain project. In fact, market advocates struggled to make themselves heard in a world guarded by state interventionism that dominated the Great Depression and post-war period. Keynes’s publication of The General Theory in 1936 and the wake of the Keynesian revolution, swiped economic departments all over and further undermined the libertarian view.

By the end of the 1930s and of Lippmann’s Colloque, however, the perception that neoliberalism would only thrive if there were a concerted collective effort by its representatives changed Hayek’s perception over his engagement in the normative discourse. In 1946-47, the establishment of the Chicago School and the MPS, were both results of a transnational effort to shape public policy and fit liberal ideas under a broader social philosophy. The main protagonists beyond Hayek were Simons, Aaron Director, and the liberal-conservative Harold Luhnow, then director of the William Volker Fund and responsible for devoting funds to the projects.

The condition for success, as remarked in the epigraph, was to “join and succeed in making the people of all the countries of the Western World aware of what is at stake.” What was at stake? Social and political freedom. Hayek and many early neoliberals understood that any social philosophy or praxis crippling market mechanisms would invariably lead to a “slippery slope” towards totalitarianism.

It is important to note, though, that the causation runs from market to social and political freedom and not the other way around. As Burgin (2012) indicates, while market freedom is a precondition to a free democratic society, the latter may threaten market freedom. Free market should not be subjected to popular vote, it should not be ruled over by any “populist” government (a common swear-word today), and there needs to exist mechanisms to protect that from happening.

Once we have that in mind, it is not so bugging the association that Hayek, Milton Friedman, and the Chicago School once had with authoritarian governments such as Pinochet’s in Chile, one of the most violent dictatorships in Latin American history.

Several liberal economists that occupied important public positions in the Chilean dictatorship had been trained at the Chicago School. The famously known “Chicago Boys” first experimented in Chile what later would be applied in the US and UK and then exported to the rest of the developing world through the Washington Consensus.

In brief, the adoption of some form of authoritarian control over popular sovereignty was deemed acceptable in order to guarantee market sovereignty.

Nevertheless, in the discussions within the early neoliberal groups the boundaries of disciplinary economics were trespassed, and the formulation of neoliberalism – and the Chicago School and MPS – was not grounded on any scientific analytical basis but simply on political affiliation.

The multidisciplinary character, dispersion, and incertitude are some of the reasons why it is hard to give a straightforward definition of what the term “neoliberalism” really means. In order to understand it, we have to mind the set of “dualisms” (capitalism vs. socialism; Keynesianism vs. liberalism; freedom vs. collectivism, and so on) that marked the period. Its defenders (academics, entrepreneurs, journalists, etc.) did not know what their own agenda was – they only knew what they were supposed to oppose. Neoliberalism was born out of a “negative” effort.

It wasn’t until many years later that the division between normative and positive economics came to surface with Friedman and his book Capitalism and Freedom, published in 1962. The increasing participation of economists in the MPS, and a more active public policy advocacy by Milton Friedman brought an end to Hayek’s intention to construct a new multidisciplinary social philosophy.

Economically, Friedman embraced laissez-faire; methodologically, he embraced empirical analysis and positive policy recommendations, getting ever further away from abstract notions of value and moral discussions that his earlier MPS fellows, such as Hayek, were worried about. Neoliberalism lost its path on the way to its triumph; it became a “science” that offered legitimacy to a new credo, a new “illusion”.

As the shadows of neoliberalism became more intertwined with the current neoclassical economics and Friedman’s monetarism, it not only lost its name but also gave birth to a corporate type of laissez-faire; one in which social relations are downgraded to market mechanisms; politics, education, health, employment, it all could fit under the market process in which individuals maximize their own utility. There’s nothing that the government can do that the market cannot do better and more efficiently. Monopolies, if anything, are to be blamed on government actions, while labor unions are disruptive to the economy’s wellbeing. Neoliberalism became a set of policies to be followed: privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, tax cuts, etc. on a crusade to commoditize every single essential service – or every aspect of life itself.

Hayek believed that these ideas could spread and change the world. And they certainly did. What is worth noting is that there is no fatalistic understanding that neoliberalism was unavoidably a result of historical factors.

The rise of neoliberalism was not spontaneous but rather orchestrated and planned; it was a collective transnational movement to counteract the mainstream of the time; it was originated out of delusion in a period marked by wars, authoritarianism and economic crisis; it was grounded on political affiliations and supported by the dominant ruling class that funded its endeavors and transformed public opinion. These are the roots of what is now the mainstream economic thought.

Brazil Suffers Under a Leader that Believes in Fairies

Brazil’s current economic policy follows the logic of a fairytale. And unless President Temer wakes up to reality, the Brazilian people will continue to suffer the consequences.

In conservative circles, the solution advocated for economic recovery is a reduction in government spending. The argument behind it is that a large government deficit lowers the market’s confidence in its ability to repay. This lower confidence then drives private investment away.

By the same logic, if the government cuts down the deficit, markets are reassured of its commitment to be a good payer. This newly gained confidence drives up private sector investment and the economy grows.

While this may sound like a great way to boost a struggling economy, it’s not. To expect that a reduction in public spending will lead to an increase in private spending in the middle of a recession is like believing in an economic “confidence fairy.” Picture a creature dressed in dollar bills, fluttering eyelashes at private investors while the government takes a step back. With enough fairy dust, investors regain confidence, and the economy turns into a sparkly paradise. It sounds nice, but it’s not real.

The idea of expansionary austerity is a dangerous one. While most of the arguments against government deficit rest upon flawed economic theory, the confidence fairy has its backbone solely on psychological factors that play into private investment decisions. However, what a depressed economy needs is a boost in aggregate demand, many times driven by public investment. Even fairy-enthusiasts, as the IMF, have expressed increasing skepticism towards the ability of austerity to expand an economy.

There are plenty of recent examples that cast doubt on the confidence theory. Take the low growth trap of the world economy, for instance. Several countries struggled with low growth for almost a decade despite their efforts to reduce their budget deficit. As monetary policy played an excessive role, fiscal policy ― and by effect aggregate demand ― was ostracized. New investments do not take place in a depressed economy regardless of the interest rates level or the government debt; in Minsky’s words, investment does not take place as long as the demand price of capital is lower than the supply price of capital.

Nevertheless, Brazil’s Michel Temer continues to be captivated by the fairytale. Amid continuous involvements in the corruption scandals, Temer introduced ambitious austerity measures to cut government spending and reduce the fiscal deficit. Placing his faith in the confidence fairy, he portrays his policies as the only path to recovery and growth ― as if there were a certain magic debt number to achieve.

But thus far, Temer’s policies have failed miserably. Expecting to see the fairy do wonders, 2016’s 3.6% decline in GDP was “unexpected” to Temer’s team. That’s a harsh reality to wake up to, especially since 2015 showed a similar decline in growth. For 2017, the economy is expected to grow 0.5 percent; but growth projections keep getting adjusted downward, and a third year of recession is only half a percentage point away.

Brazil’s collapse in domestic demand is visible in the economy’s capacity utilization. Averaging 73.5 percent in 2016, it’s reached the lowest level since the early 1990s, when the country was plagued by hyperinflation. At this rate, Brazil will have to get through a long period of idle capacity until new private investments can foster demand. Furthermore, the efforts to reduce the government deficit seem to have been futile. The budget deficit has actually surged due to the reduction in tax revenues and the increasing burden of interest rate payments.

Despite everything, Temer isn’t giving up on the confidence fairy yet. Earlier last month, he announced a cut of $42.1 billion reais (approx. US $13.5) in the government budget, nearly a fourth of which on the Growth Acceleration Program for social, urban, and energy infrastructure investment. Other significant cuts were made to the ministries of defense ($5.7 billion reais), transportation ($5.1 billion reais), and education ($4.3 billion reais).

As you may expect, none of this helps to create jobs. On April 28, it became known that the unemployment rate reached a record-high 13.7% for this year’s first quarter. Since the last quarter of 2016, 2 million more people lost their jobs. The number of unemployed now adds to 14.2 million, and that’s more than double the record-low rate of 6.2% in 2013.

Unlike the President, the people of Brazil know they can’t count on fairy dust. Last week, workers went on a general strike, during which millions of Brazilians protested against the austerity agenda. As much as 72 percent of the population opposes the reforms that are being discussed today, and government approval rates are as low as 10%.

But Temer ignores all cries of concern and keeps going steady. Two of his the structural reforms have already been initiated. Real government spending is frozen for the next 20 years, and labor market is under flexibilization. A third, more complex one is the pension reform, whose main proposal is to increase the minimum retirement age and time of contribution. Although the subject is too extensive to be covered in here, it’s worth mentioning that the pension reform disregards some of the social inequalities in the country (e.g. conditions of rural and poor workers) and it solely focus on curbing the long-term system’s expenditure instead of dealing with the falling revenues that collapsed in recent years due to tax breaks and the crisis.

Together, these reforms dismantle any efforts at building a social welfare system in Brazil. Crucial areas for public investment such as education and health will suffer.

Right now, it’s more clear than ever that Brazil’s story is not a fairytale, but a living nightmare. And there’s no confidence fairy that can fix it. As Skidelsky puts it, “confidence cannot cause a bad policy to have good results, and a lack of it cannot cause a good policy to have bad results, any more than jumping out of a window in the mistaken belief that humans can fly can offset the effect of gravity.”

The Tragedy of “The Tragedy of the Commons”

How should society manage its common-pool resources like fisheries, forests, and grasslands?

The problem, as presented in an Econ 101 course, is that these systems lack the proper incentives for sustainable use. Without private property or government regulation, people inevitably overuse and exploit them. This is the “tragedy of the commons” —famously formulated in a seminal 1968 paper by ecologist Garrett Hardin, and taught to thousands of economics undergraduates every year. There’s just one problem: Tragedy of the commons fails to explain real-world behavior.

Hardin’s argument runs something like this. First, he invites us to “picture a pasture open to all.” In this scenario, herdsmen of the pasture, if they are rational, self-interested agents, will figure that the benefits they receive from adding one additional cattle to the pasture outweigh the costs from overgrazing that are shared by all the other users. Each herdsman continues to add cattle to the pasture, but in this way, the resource is inevitably depleted.

For this reason, Hardin argued that “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush.”

Scholars—many outside the economics discipline—have attacked this argument for its unrealistic assumptions and lack of evidence. One prominent critic is Elinor Ostrom. Elinor Ostrom is a lifelong researcher of the commons and Nobel Laureate in economics. Ostrom said that Hardin confused a joint property commons with an “open-access regime,” where restrictions on use are completely absent. Open-access regimes sometimes do exist (e.g., fishing on the high seas). However, in the real world, common-pool resources are often governed by rules and norms that their users develop. This means Hardin’s “pasture open to all” does not accurately map how the commons operate in practice.

There is ample empirical evidence for the sustainability of commons regimes—as defined by Ostrom.

The very existence of the commons, particularly where resources are scarce, proves neither private property nor state coercion is a prerequisite for their viability. In the words of Ostrom and her colleagues: “although tragedies have undoubtedly occurred, it is also obvious that for thousands of years people have self-organized to manage common-pool resources, and users often do devise long-term, sustainable institutions for governing these resources.” Commons are not always successful, but they are far from doomed to a tragic fate.

Take, for instance, the grasslands in northern China, Mongolia, and Southern Siberia. State-run and private methods of resource management implemented in Russia and China are not nearly as effective in conservation as the traditional Mongolian group-property institutions. Around three-fourths of grassland in Russia, and more than one-third in China has shown signs of degradation, compared to just one-tenth of grasslands in Mongolia.

The water commons in Bali provide another example.

Subak, the traditional institution for irrigation management, has been sustainable for centuries without state regulation or private ownership. With water flowing downhill, the position of upstream farmers seemingly puts them in a prime position to free-ride. It is diverting more water for their own crops, but in reality, the opposite occurs. Farmers, upstream and downstream, are able to create a synchronized cropping arrangement in which damage from pests is minimized and downstream farmers retain access to water. In the end, crop yields are increased while water is used sustainably by all.

The voluminous literature on the commons documents countless similar examples. In the West, these include the cod fishery in Newfoundland (before it collapsed due to government mismanagement) and the lobster fishery in Maine. Digital and intellectual domains can fall under commons management as well. Wikipedia and the Creative Commons license exist only because people are able to cooperate and discourage free-riding.

Policymakers, unfortunately, sometimes fail to see the nuances of these sustainable systems.

Under “tragedy of the commons” assumptions (no communication, self-interested, rational agents, etc.), arrangements like those found in Mongolia and Bali simply can’t exist. As a result, technocrats, looking to promote sustainability and growth. It has often designed policies that backfire because they fail to take into account the complexity of local conditions.

Case in point:

Bali in the 1970s. On advice from the Asian Development Bank, the Indonesian government, in an attempt to boost crop yields, instructed farmers to plant rice as often as they could—disrupting the synchronized cropping schedule. Pest populations exploded as a result, and crop losses were massive. In this example, simplistic and detached development policy had disastrous consequences for the Balinese farmers.

Thus we see a genuine understanding of the commons is imperative for coherent policymaking. Scholars have long shown that Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” is an inaccurate representation of reality. Policymakers ought to adopt a more realistic view of the commons, and professors should jettison this fallacious model from their Econ 101 courses. A failure to do this and embrace the real world would, indeed, be the real tragedy.

Written by Jimmy Chin
Jimmy is an undergraduate studying economics and Asian studies at UNC-Chapel Hill. He hopes to continue his studies in graduate school and has interests in economic development, political economy, and China. Other sources of enjoyment for him include reading philosophy, writing, and hiking.