keynes Archives

Is Money View Ready to Be on Trial for its Assumptions about the Payment System?

A Review of Perry Mehrling’s Paper on the Law of Reflux

By Elham Saeidinezhad | Perry Mehrling’s new paper, “Payment vs. Funding: The Law of Reflux for Today,” is a seminal contribution to the “Money View” literature. This approach, which is put forward by Mehrling himself, highlights the importance of today’s cash flow for the survival of financial participants. Using Money View, this paper examines the implications of Fullarton’s 1844 “Law of Reflux” for today’s monetary system. Mehrling uses balance sheets to show that at the heart of the discrepancy between John Maynard Keynes’ and James Tobin’s view of money creation is their attention to two separate equilibrium conditions. The former focuses on the economy when the initial payment takes place while the latter is concerned about the adjustments in the interest rates and asset prices when the funding is finalized. To provide such insights into several controversies about the limits of money finance, Mehrling’s analysis relies deeply on one of the structural premises of the Money View; the notion that the payment system that enables the cash flow to transfer from a deficit agent to the surplus agent is essentially a credit system. However, when we investigate the future that the Money View faces, this sentiment is likely to be threatened by a few factors that are revolutionizing financial markets. These elements include but are not limited to the Fed’s Tapering and post-crisis financial regulations and constrain banks’ ability to expand credit. These restrictions force the payment system to rely less on credit and more on reserves. Hence, the future of Money View will hinge on its ability to function under new circumstances where the payment system is no longer a credit system. This puzzle should be investigated by those of us who consider ourselves as students of this View.

Mehrling, in his influential paper, puts on his historical and monetary hats to clarify a long-standing debate amongst Keynesian economists on the money creation process. In understanding the effect of money on the economy, “old” Keynesians’ primary focus has been on the market interest rate and asset prices when the initial payment is taking place. In other words, their chief concern is how asset prices change to make the new payment position an equilibrium. To answer this question, they use the “liquidity preference framework” and argue that asset prices are set as a markup over the money rate of interest. The idea is that once the new purchasing power is created, the final funding can happen without changing asset prices or interest rates. The reason is that the initial increase in the money supply remains entirely in circulation by creating a new demand for liquid balances for various reasons. Put it differently, although the new money will not disappear on the final settlement date, the excess supply of money will be eliminated by the growing demand for money. In this situation, there is no reflux of the new purchasing power.

In contrast, the new Keynesian orthodoxy, established by James Tobin, examines the effects of money creation on the economy by focusing on the final position rather than the initial payment. At this equilibrium, the interest rate and asset prices will be adjusted to ensure the final settlement, otherwise known as funding. In the process, they create discipline in the monetary system. Using “Liquidity Preference Framework”, these economists argue that the new purchasing power will be used to purchase long-term securities such as bonds. In other words, the newly created money will be absorbed by portfolio rebalancing which leads to a new portfolio equilibrium. In this new equilibrium, the interbank credit will be replaced by a long-term asset and the initial payment is funded by new long-term lending, all outside the traditional banking system. Tobin’s version of Keynesianism extracted from both the flux of bank credit expansion and the reflux of subsequent contraction by only focusing on the final funding equilibrium. It also shifts between one funding equilibrium and another since he is only interested in final positions. In the new view, bank checkable deposits are just one funding liability, among others, and their survival in the monetary system entirely depends on the portfolio preferences of asset managers.

The problem is that both views abstract from the cash flows that enable a continuous payment system. These cash flows are key to a successful transition from one equilibrium to another. Money View labels these cash flows as “liquidity” and puts it at the center of its analysis. Liquidity enables the economy to seamlessly transfer from initial equilibrium, when the payment takes place, to the final equilibrium, when the final funding happens, by ensuring the continuity of the payment system. In the initial equilibrium, payment takes place since banks expand their balance sheets and create new money. In this case, the deficit bank can borrow from the surplus bank in the interbank lending market. To clear the final settlement, the banks can take advantage of their access to the central bank’s balance sheet if they still have short positions in reserve. Mehrling uses these balance sheets operations to show that it is credit, rather than currency or reserves, that creates a continuous payment system. In other words, a credit-based payment system lets the financial transactions go through even when the buyers do not have means of payment today. These transactions, that depend on agents’ access to liquidity, move the economy from the initial equilibrium to the ultimate funding equilibrium.

The notion that the “payment system is a credit system” is a defining characteristic of Money View. However, a few developments in the financial market, generated by post-crisis interventions, are threatening the robustness of this critical assumption. The issue is that the Fed’s Tapering operations have reduced the level of reserves in the banking system. In the meantime, post-crisis financial regulations have produced a balance sheet constrained for the banking system, including surplus banks. These macroprudential requirements demand banks to keep a certain level of High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) such as reserves. At the same time, the Global Financial Crisis has only worsened the stigma attached to using the discount loan. Banks have therefore become reluctant to borrow from the Fed to avoid sending wrong signals to the regulators regarding their liquidity status. These factors constrained banks’ ability to expand their balance sheets to make new loans to the deficit agents by making this activity more expensive. As a result, banks, who are the main providers of the payment system, have been relying less on credit and more on reserves to finance this financial service.

Most recently, Zoltan Pozsar, a prominent scholar of the Money View, has warned us that if these trends continue, the payment system will not be a credit system anymore. Those of us who study Money View realize that the assumption that a payment system is a credit system is the cornerstone of the Money View approach. Yet, the current developments in the financial ecosystem are fundamentally remodeling the very microstructure that has initially given birth to this conjecture. It is our job, therefore, as Money View scholars, to prepare this framework for a future that is going to put its premises on trial.

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”. Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Why Left Economics is Marginalized

After the 2009 recession, Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman wrote a New York Times article entitled “How did economists get it so wrong?” wondering why economics has such a blind spot for failure and crisis. Krugman correctly pointed out that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.” However, by lumping the whole economics profession into one group, Krugman perpetuates the fallacy that economics is one uniform bloc and that some economists whose work is largely ignored had indeed predicted the financial crisis. These economists were largely dismissed for not falling into what Krugman calls the “economics profession.”

So let’s acknowledge there are many types of economics, and seek to understand and apply them, before there’s another crisis.

Left economics understands power

Let’s take labor as an example. Many leftist economic thinkers view production as a social relation. The ability to gain employment is an outcome of societal structures like racism and sexism, and the distribution of earnings from production is inherently a question of power, not merely the product of a benign and objective “market” process. Labor markets are deeply intertwined with broader institutions (like the prison system), social norms (such as the gendered distribution of domestic care) and other systems (such as racist ideology) that affect employment and compensation. There is increasing evidence that the left’s view of labor is closer to reality, with research showing that many labor markets have monopsonistic qualities, which in simple terms means employees have difficulty leaving their jobs due to geography, non-compete agreements and other factors.

In contrast, mainstream economics positions labor as an input in the production process, which can be quantified and optimized, eg. maximized for productivity or minimized for cost. Wages, in widely taught models, are equal to the value of a worker’s labor. These unrealistic assumptions don’t reflect what we actually observe in the world, and this theoretical schism has important political and policy implications. For some, a job and a good wage are rights, for others, businesses should do what’s best for profits and investors. Combative policy debates like the need for stronger unions vs. anti-union right-to-work laws are rooted in this divide.

The role of government

The left believes the government has a role to play in the economy beyond simply correcting “market failures.” Prominent leftist economists like Stephanie Kelton and Mariana Mazzucato, argue for a government role in economic equity and shared prosperity through policies like guaranteed public employment and investment in innovation. The government shouldn’t merely mitigate product market failures but should use its power to end poverty.

On the other hand, mainstream economics teaches that government crowds out private investment (research shows this isn’t true), raising the wage would reduce employment (wrong) and that putting money in the hands of capital leads to more economic growth (also no). As we have seen post-Trump-cuts, tax cuts lead to the further enrichment of the already deeply unequal, equilibrium.

Limitations to left economics: public awareness and lack of resources

History and historically entrenched power determine both final outcomes but also the range of outcomes that are deemed acceptable. Structural inequalities have been ushered in by policies ranging from predatory international development (“free trade”) to domestic financial deregulation, meanwhile poverty caused by these policies is blamed on the poor.

Policy is masked by theory or beliefs (eg. about free trade), but the theory seems to be created to support opportunistic outcomes for those who hold power to decide them. The purely rational agent-based theories that undergird deregulation have been strongly advocated for by particular (mostly conservative) groups such as the Koch Network which have spent loads of money to have specific theoretical foundations taught in schools, preached in churches and legitimized by think tanks.

There have been others who question the centrality of the rational agent, the holy grail of the free market, believe in public rather than corporate welfare, and the need for government to not only regulate but to make markets and provide opportunity. This “alternative” history exists but is less present – it’s alternative-ness defined by sheer public awareness, lack of which, perhaps, stems from a lack of capital.

Financial capital is an important factor in what becomes mainstream. I went through a whole undergraduate economics program at a top university without hearing the words “union” or “redistribution,” which now feels ludicrous. Then I went to The New School for Social Research for graduate school, which has been called the University in Exile, for exiled scholars of critical theory and classical economics. In the New School economics department, we study Marxist economics, Keynesian and post-Keynesian economics, Bayesian statistics, ecological and feminist economics, among others topics. There are only a few other economics programs in the US that teach that there are different schools of thought in economics. But after finishing at the New School and thinking about doing a PhD there, I understood this problem on a personal level.

There’s barely any funding for PhDs and most have to pay their tuition, which is pretty unheard of for an economics doctorate. Why? Two reasons – 1. Because while those who treat economics like science go on to be bankers and consultants, those who study economics as a social science might not make the kind of money to fund an endowment. And 2. Perhaps because of this lack of future payout, The New School is just one of many institutions that doesn’t deem heterodox economics valuable enough to warrant the funding that goes to other programs, in this case, like Parsons.

Unfortunately, a combination of these factors leaves mainstream economics schools well funded by opportunistic benefactors, whether they’re alumni or a lobbying group, while heterodox programs struggle or fail to support their students and their research.

The horizon for economics of the left

Using elements of different schools of thought, and defining the left of the economics world, is difficult. Race, class, and power, elements that define the left, are sticky, ugly, and stressful, and don’t provide easily quantifiable building blocks like mainstream economics does. Without unifying building blocks, we’re prone to continuing to produce graduates from fancy schools who go into the world believing that economics is a hard science and that the world can be understood with existing models in which human behavior can be easily predicted.

Ultimately the mainstream and the left in economics are not so different from the mainstream and the left politically, and there is room for a stronger consensus on non-mainstream economics that would bolster the left politically. It’s worth exploring and strengthening these connections because at the heart of our economic and political divides is a fundamental difference in opinion regarding how society at large should be organized. And whether we continue to promote wealth creation within a capitalistic system, or a distributive system that holds justice as a pinnacle, will determine the extent to which we can achieve a healthy, civilized society.

Fortunately, the political left in many ways is upholding, if not the theory and empirics, the traditions and values of non-mainstream economics. Calls from the left to confront a half-century of neoliberal economic policy are more sustained and perhaps successful than other times in recent history, with some policies like the federal job guarantee making it to the mainstream. After 2008 the 99 percent, supported by mainstreamed research about inequality, began to organize.

There’s hope for change stemming from a new generation of economists, in particular, the thousands of young and aspiring economists researching and writing for groups like Rethinking Economics, the Young Scholars Initiative (YSI), Developing Economics, the Minskys (now Economic Questions), the Modern Money Network, and more. But ideas and policies are path dependent, and it will take a real progressive movement, supplemented by demands by students in schools, to bring left economics to the forefront.

By Amanda Novello.

A version of this post originally appeared on Data for Progress’ Econo-missed Q+A column, in response to a question about the marginalization of leftist voices in economics.

Amanda Novello (@NovelloAmanda) is a policy associate with the Bernard L. Schwartz Rediscovering Government Initiative at The Century Foundation. She was previously a researcher and Assistant Director at the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis at The New School for Social Research.

Why You’re Not Getting a Raise

By Nikos Bourtzis.

Much of the developed world has experienced stubbornly low real wage growth since the financial crisis of 2007. Currently, the British people are seeing their earnings decline in real terms. Even in Germany, where unemployment keeps falling to record lows, wage growth is stagnating. This phenomenon has squeezed living standards and has been one of the main culprits behind the rise of anti-establishment movements. Faster pay rises are desperately needed for the global recovery to accelerate and for ordinary people to actually be a part of it. This piece explains why rising labor compensation has been relatively minuscule during the current economic upturn and how this phenomenon could be remedied.

A bit of history

The lack of meaningful pay rises is not a phenomenon that started with the financial crisis of 2007. It can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, when monetarism started sweeping into academia and politics. The stagflation of the 1970s, the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment, led some governments to abandon the Keynesian policies of the past because apparently these policies could not deal with the stagflation. Monetary policy became the preferred tool to control inflation, together with a revived notion that markets, if left to their own devices, would bring the best social outcomes. The Thatcher and Reagan governments are some of the most famous examples of States adopting and implementing these beliefs. The first institution targeted for deregulation was the labor market. Wages increases were frozen and employment protection was scaled back, because it was believed that demand and supply forces would restore full employment. However, unemployment in the UK exploded after Thatcher came into office in 1980, increasing to over 10% and never returning to its post-World War II lows of between 1% and 2%.

Labor unions are one of the most important institutions regarding pay rises. In most industrial countries, they are responsible for wage and working conditions negotiations between employers and employees. Union membership in OECD countries grew until the mid-1970s but then started dropping. With the rise of neoliberal governments in the West, organized labor came under attack. Under the free-market ideology, unions disrupt economic activity with strikes and demand higher-than-optimal wages. Thus, their power needed to be kept in check. What is more important, though, is the shifting of ideas in what the goals of the State should be. In the post-War period, an expressed purpose of governments was to keep aggregate demand at full employment levels. The UK government, for example, stated full employment as its purpose after the War in its Economic Policy White Paper in 1944. That goal changed with the rise of neoliberalism.

When the commitment to keep employment levels high and stable was abandoned, and labor markets were deregulated, unemployment spiked in most countries and has never fallen at levels where it can be stated that full employment exists. Even during strong upturns unemployment levels in most countries did not dip below 4%. As a result, labor unions, and workers in general have lost their biggest bargaining chip. When there is full employment, and thus jobs are abundant, workers have more power to demand higher wages and better working conditions. With the neoliberal policies of the Reagan administration, real wages in the US got decoupled from productivity, meaning that workers stopped receiving their fair share of the output produced. The same phenomenon has been observed in many other industrialized countries, such as the UK. The policies introduced in the 1980s were pretty much sustained and expanded up until 2008.

The Financial Crisis: A turn for the worse

The situation became even worse after the financial crisis erupted. For example, in both the US and the UK the growth of wages slowed even more, as shown in the following figure, even as the headline unemployment returned to pre-crisis levels.

Moving towards a low headline unemployment rate, though, does not mean full employment is being achieved. In the US, the U-6 measure of the unemployment rate, which adds the underemployed to the headline rate, shows that the real unemployment rate is at 8.6%. Far from full employment! In the UK, it has been reported by the Office for National Statistics that the number of people employed in zero-hour contracts has risen by 400% since 2000 but most of the rise happened after the financial crisis. Thus, the employment situation is worse than before the crisis which leads to a further decline in wage growth.

Why is high wage growth important for the recovery?

It is essential to point out that one of the main reasons the current economic recovery has been weak is low wage growth. Wage income is the main propeller of consumer spending, which accounts for more than 60% of GDP in industrialized countries. Low wage growth means low consumer spending, thus low GDP growth and employment. Currently, households are borrowing to keep their living standards stable and that is what’s keeping consumer spending going. This process, though, is unsustainable and will not last long. When households cannot afford to borrow anymore another financial crisis will almost certainly occur. That’s why governments need to do everything in their power to restore wage growth.

What can be done?

The power of organized labor has been decimated since the 1980s. If workers cannot actually have a say in what happens in the workplace then they cannot fight for fair wages. This is why unions need to be strengthened and supported by governments. Employers should be forced to negotiate wages through collective bargaining and union coverage should be expanded above the current 50% OECD average. This will level the playing field between powerful employers and the currently weak labor class.

As mentioned before, productivity and real wages have been delinked since the 1980s. That’s where the minimum wage could potentially help. In the US, the real minimum wage fell after 1980 and has stayed relatively flat since then. With the liberalization “mania” sweeping the western world, governments are freezing public sector pay rises and Greece even cut the minimum wage in the name of restoring public finances and growth. That’s the exact opposite of what should be done to restore growth. Wages drive consumption and growth, cutting them can only depress the economy. Hiking the minimum wage will help sustain consumption based on wages, employment growth and, thus, wage growth.

A sure way to speed up wage growth again is fiscal stimulus. Government spending lifts aggregate demand directly and effectively. If enough spending is injected into the economy, it will create enough jobs to bring full employment. The momentum and labor scarcity created by the stimulus will force wages up and give workers and labor unions more bargaining power. A Job Guarantee Program, if ever implemented, would effectively set a wage floor in the economy, since any person working at a lower wage than the Job Guarantee offers will be given work in the public sector.

The “curse” of low wage growth is not something new and it definitely got exacerbated with the financial crisis. Even though unemployment is currently falling in many countries, it is still way above full employment levels. With workers’ rights under attack for some time now, unions do not have the power they once did to promote strong pay growth. If the current recovery is to accelerate, and for ordinary people to participate in it, wage growth has to rise substantially. The only way to do this is for labor unions to be strengthened and governments to once again commit to full employment.

About the Author
Nikos Bourtzis is from Greece and recently graduated with a Bachelor in Economics from Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He will be pursuing a Master in Economics and Economic analysis at Groningen University. Research interests are heterodox macroeconomics, anti-cyclical policies, income inequality, and financial instability.

Italy is Hungry for Expansionary Fiscal Policy

In a meeting with Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande on August 22, the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi proudly announced that Italy has the lowest public deficit of the last 10 years, and will continue with structural reforms to reduce it further. Monti has long aimed to “restore credibility” by cutting the public deficit, and now the Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan enjoys praise on his achievement of a deficit as small as 2.4% of GDP. The FED (Financial and Economic Document) goes so far as say this makes Italy “among the most virtuous countries in the Eurozone.”

A closer look at Italy’s economy, however, shows this “virtuosity” has no basis in reality. In 2015, 1.5 million households lived in absolute poverty. Another 4.5 million individuals saw stagnant incomes. The situation has not been this bad since 2005. In addition, the Migrantes foundation informs us that there has been a boom of italians who go abroad, 107,000 in 2015 (+6,2%). Especially youth from 18 to 34 years old (36,7%).
Source: [Ansa.it “Rapporto fondazione Migrantes”]

The percentage of serious material deprivation index is 11,5% for total households members. Official unemployment rate is at 11,9% whereas the real unemployment rate is well above the 20%. The inactivity rate is at 36,0 % and the fixed capital investment ratio is stuck well below the pre-crises (2007-08) levels.
Source: [“Rapporto annuale Istat, 2016”]

It is clear that Italy is stuck in a deep depression. And it’s not alone. Many other euro countries are suffering the same fate. Cutting public spending cannot help them recover. We turn to Keynes to see why it cannot, and consult the work of Minsky and Wynne Godley to see what can.

Keynes and Aggregate Demand

In The General Theory, J.M. Keynes explains the challenges blocking achieving and maintaining full employment in a market economy. He argues that the booms and busts associated with capitalism make this state of equilibrium very difficult to reach. When a bust occurs, and businesses expect their profits to fall, there’s no reason to expect a magical market-force to step in and fix employment while costs are being cut.

This applies to Italy, too. After years of austerity and a Global Financial Crises, aggregate demand levels have declined sharply most people feel uncertain about the future. Additional demand for labor is close to zero and the private sector is pessimistic. Investment and spending is not sufficient to employ the unemployed. Cutting down government expenditure is not going to to help. It will simply make it worse.

Minsky and Fiscal Policy

A follower of Keynes, Hyman Minsky explained how any analysis of a monetary capitalist economy must start from the analysis of balance sheets and its relative financial interrelations ‘measured’ in of cash flows. If balance sheets and especially the relative financial relations are not taken into account within an analysis of an essentially financial and monetary economy, that analysis fails to reflect the full reality.

Minsky’s alternative analysis shows that in case of crisis, a nation needs a “Big Government” (The Treasury Department) and a “Big Bank” (The Central Bank) to step up. These institutions must focus on serving as an “Employer of Last Resort” and a “Lender of Last Resort”, respectively. This way, they can prevent wages and asset prices from dropping further, and tame the market economy. In the Euro-zone, this has not been realized. The Treasury Department is constrained, leaving them unable to reach full employment. Meanwhile, citizens continue suffer under austerity.

Wynne Godley and the Government Budget

Wynne Godley’s sectoral balance approach sheds more light on this Minskyian alternative. He shows the economy consists of two sectors: The government sector, and the private sector (all households and businesses).** The private sector can accumulate net financial assets only if the other sector, government, runs a budget deficit. That is, only if the flows of the government spends more than it receives in taxes. It is impossible for both sectors to run a surplus at the same time.

And as a simple matter of macro-accounting, for aggregate output to be sold, total spending must equal the total income generated in the production process. So given households’ decisions to consume and given firms’ decisions to invest, there will be involuntarily idle labour for sale with no buyers at current wages, if the government deficit spending is too small to accommodate the net desire to save of the private sector.

What Renzi and Padoan are Really Saying

We can now see what Renzi and Padoan are really congratulating themselves for. Having done nothing to lift a struggling private sector out of the recession, they patting themselves on the back for worsening it’s social and economic situation. Renzi may claim he will go to Brussels to “sbattere i pugni sul tavolo”, but his executives continue to respect the Stability and Growth pact regime, and decrease the deficit further.

From Wynne Godley, we know that further decreasing the government deficit corresponds to further deterioration the private sector surplus. So when the officials say they “need to put public accounts in order,” they are actually saying they will put households and business accounts in dis-order. So when they say that Italy has the lowest budget deficit of the last 10 years, they are actually stating that the government is draining more financial assets from the private sector than it has in a decade.

When they call Italy virtuous for keeping a smallest deficit, they assign virtue to the nation that most effectively perpetuates poverty and social disarray. When Renzi says that his non elected executive “will continue […] the reduction of the deficit for our children and grandchildren”, he is instead telling us that his government is going to reduce the net desire to save of the current population, to keep involuntary unemployment and part-time working levels high and to firmly deteriorate the (net) financial and real wealth of the future generations.

Unless Italy changes its approach and adopts expansionary fiscal policy, it will not serve the well-being of the society and its economy. The main goal of full employment will never be attained and maintained. Work will lack moral and economic dignity, public sector goods will fall short in quantity and quality, and basic human rights will be violated. Not only will policy goals fail to be achieved, they will be even farther out of reach. One thing is certain: either Renzi and his ministers don’t know what they’re doing, or they are doing it in bad faith. I am afraid of it may be both.

* To be as precise as possible, Italian public budget deficit has been systematically reduced from 1991, that is the year when the Treaty of Maastricht was ratified which, among other things, established the respect of the parameter of the 3% to the public deficit and 60% to the (flawed) public debt/gdp ratio.
** I do not take into account the foreign sector balance sheet, because the substance of my brief argument won’t be undermined.