inequality Archives

The Fed is the Treasury’s Bank. Does it Matter for the Dollar’s Global Status?

By Elham Saeidinezhad | There is a consensus amongst the economist that the shadow banking system and the repurchase agreements (repos) have become the pinnacle of the dollar funding. In the repo market, access to liquidity depends on the firms’ idiosyncratic access to high-quality collateral, mainly U.S. Treasuries, as well as the systemic capacity to reuse collateral. Yet, the emergence of the repo market, which is considered an offshore credit system, and the expectations of higher inflation, have sparked debates about the demise of the dollar. The idea is that the repo market is becoming less attractive from an accounting and risk perspective for a small group of global banks, working as workhorses of the dollar funding network. The regulatory movement after the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), including leverage ratio requirements and liquidity buffers, depressed their ability to take counterparty risks, including that of the repo contracts. Instead, large banks are driven to reduce the costs of maintaining large balance sheets.

This note argues that the concerns about the future of the dollar might be excessive. The new monetary architecture does not structurally reduce the improtance of the U.S. government liabilities as the key to global funding. Instead, the traditional status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency is replaced by the U.S. Treausies’ modern function as the world’s safest asset and the pinnacle of the repo market. Lastly, I put the interactions between the Fed’s roles as the manager of the government’s debt on the one hand and monetary policy architect on the other at the center of the analysis. Recognizing the interconnectedness could deepen our understanding of the Fed’s control over U.S. Treasuries.

As a result of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the dollar was officially crowned the world’s reserve currency. Instead of gold reserves, other countries accumulated reserves of dollars, the liability of the U.S. government. Till the mid-1980s, the dollar was at the top of the monetary hierarchy in both onshore and offshore financial systems. In the meantime, the dollar’s reserve status remained in an natural way. Outside the U.S., a few large global banks were supplying dollar funding to the rest of the world. This offshore bank-oriented system was called the Eurodollar market. In the U.S., the Federal Funds market, an interbank lending market, became the pinnacle of the onshore dollar funding system. The Fed conducted a simple monetary policy, detached from the capital market, and managed exclusively within the traditional banking system.

Ultimately, events never quite followed this smooth pattern, which in retrospect may not be regretted. The growth of shadow banking system meant that international investors reduced their reliance on bank loans in the Eurodollar markte. Instead, they turned to the repo market and the FX swaps market. In the U.S., the rise of the repo market implied that the U.S. monetary policy should slowly leak into capital market and directly targe the security dealers. At the heart of this structural break was the growing acceptance of the securities as collaterals.

Classical monetary economics proved to be handicapped in detecting this architectural development. According to theories, the supply of the dollar is determined in the market for the loanable funds where large banks act as financial intermediaries and stand between savers and borrowers. In the process, they set the price of the dollar funding. Regarding the global value of the dollar, as long as the Fed’s credibility in stabilizing prices exceeds its peers, and Treasury keeps its promises to pay, the global demand for the dollar will be significant. And the dollar will maintain its world reserve currency status. These models totally overlooked the role of market-makers, also called dealers, in providing short-term liquidity. However, the rise of the shadow banking system made such an abstraction a deadly flaw. In the new structure, the dealers became the de facto providers of the dollar funding.

Shadow banking created a system where the dealers in the money market funded the securities lending activities of the security dealers in the capital market. This switch from traditional banking to shadow banking unveiled an inherent duality in the nature of the Fed. The Fed is tasked to strike a balance between two rival roles: On the one hand, the Fed is the Treasury’s banker and partially manages U.S. debt. On the other hand, it is the bankers’ bank and designs monetary policy. After the financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s, the Fed tried to keep these roles divided as separate arms of macroeconomic policy. The idea was that the links between U.S. debt management and liquidity are weak, as the money market and capital market are not interconnected parts of the financial ecosystem. This weak link allowed for greater separation between monetary policy and national debt management.

The GFC shattered this judgment and exposed at least two features of shadow banking. First, in the new structure, the monetary condition is determined in the repo market rather than the banking system. The repo market is very large and the vast majority of which is backed by U.S. Treasuries. This market finances the financial market’s primary dealers’ large holdings of fixed-income securities. Second, in the new system, U.S. Treasuries replaced the dollar. The repo instruments are essentially short-term loans secured by liquid “collateral”. Although hedge funds and other types of institutional investors are important suppliers of collateral, the single most important issuer of high quality, liquid collateral, is the U.S. Treasury.

U.S. Treasury securities have become the new dollar. Hence, its velocity began to matter. The velocity of collateral, including U.S. Treasuries, is the ratio of the total pledged collateral received by the large banks (that is eligible to be reused), divided by the primary collateral (ie, sourced via reverse repos, securities borrowing, prime brokerage, and derivative margins). Before the GFC, the use (and reuse) of pledged collateral was comparable with the velocity of monetary aggregates like M2. The “reusability” of the collateral became instrumental to overcome the good collateral deficit.

After the GFC, the velocity of collateral shrank due to the Fed’s QE policies (involving purchases of bonds) and financial regulations that restricted good collateral availability. Nontheless, the availability of collateral surpassed the importance of private credit-creation in the traditional banking system. It also started to leak into the monetary policy decision-making process as the Fed started to consider the Treasury market condition when crafting its policies. At first glance, the Treasury market’s infiltration into monetary policy indicates a structural shift in central banking. First, the Treasury market is a component of the capital market, not the money market. Second, the conventional view of the Fed’s relationship with the Treasury governs that its responsibilities are mainly limited to managing the Treasury account at the Fed, running auctions, and acting as U.S. Treasuries registrar.

However, a thorough study of the traditional monetary policy would paint a different picture of the Fed and the U.S. Treasuries. Modern finance is only making the Fed’s role as a de-facto U.S. national debt manager explicit. The Fed’s primary monetary policy tool, the open market operation, is essentially monetizing national debt. Essentially, the tool enabled the Fed to monetize some portion of the national debt to control the quantity of bank reserves. The ability to control the level of bank reserves permitted the Fed to limit the level of bank intermediation and private credit creation. This allowed the Fed to focus on compromising between two objectives of price stability and full employment.

What is less understood is that the open market operation also helped the Fed’s two roles, Treasury’s bank and the bankers’ bank, to coexist privately. As private bankers’ bank, the Fed designs monetary policy to control the funding costs. As the Treasury’s bank, the Fed is implicitly responsible for U.S. debt management. The open market operation enabled the Fed to control money market rates while monetizing some portion of the national debt. The traditional monetary system simply helped the Fed to conceal its intentions as Treasury’s bank when designing monetary policy.

The point to emphasize is that the traditional central banking was only hiding the Fed’s dual intentions. The Fed could in theory monetize anything— from gold to scrap metals—but it has stuck largely to Treasury IOUs. One reason is that, unlike gold, there has never been any shortage of them. Also, they are highly liquid so the Fed can sell them with as much ease as it buys them. But, a third, and equally important reason is that in doing so, the Fed explicitly fulfilled its “role” as the manager of the U.S. national debt. All this correctly suggests that the Fed, despite its lofty position at the pinnacle of the financial system, has always been, and is, none other than one more type of financial intermediary between the government and the banking system.

The high-level relationship between the Treasury and the Fed is “inherent” and at the heart of monetary policy. Yet, nowhere along the central banking learning curve has been a meaningful examination of the right balances between the Fed’s two roles. The big assumption has been that these functions are distinctly separated from each other. This hypothesis held in the past when the banks stood between savers and borrowers as financial intermediaries. In this pre-shadow banking world, the money market and capital market were not interconnected.

Yet, the GFC revealed that more than 85 percent of the lending was based on securities lending and other credit products, including the repo. In repo, broker-dealers, hedge funds, and banks construct short-term transactions. They put up collateral—mostly U.S. Treasury securities —with an agreement to buy them back the next day or week for slightly more, and invest the proceeds in the interim. The design and conduct of the monetary policy intimately deepened on the availability and price of the U.S. Treasuries, issues at the heart of the U.S. national debt management.

The U.S. debt management and monetary policy reunion happened in the repo market. In a sense, repo is a “reserve-less currency system,” in the global funding supply chain. It is the antithesis of the reserve currency. In traditional reserve currency, central banks and major financial institutions hold a large amount of currency to use for international transactions. It is also ledger money which indicates that the repo transactions, including the securities lending of its, are computed digitally by the broker-dealers. The repo market is a credit-based system that is a reserve-less, currency-less form of ledger money.

In this world of securities lending, which has replaced traditional bank lending, the key instrument is not the dollar but the U.S. Treasury securities that are used as collateral. The U.S. national debt is being used to secure funding for private institutional investors. Sometimes lenders repledge them to other lenders and take out repo loans of their own. And the cycle goes on. Known as rehypothecation, these transfers used to be done once or twice for each posted asset but are now sometimes done six to eight times, each time creating a new money supply. This process is the de-facto modern money creation—and equally depends on the Fed’s role as Treasury’s bank and bankers’ bank.

Understanding how modern money creation works has implications for the dollar’s status in the international monetary system. Some might argue that the dollar is losing its status as the global reserve currency. They refer to the collateralized repo market and argue that this market allows international banks operating outside the supervision of the Fed to create US dollar currency. Hence, the repo, not the dollar, is the real reserve currency. Such statements overlook the repo market’s structural reliance on the U.S. Treasury securities and neglect the Fed’s role as the de-facto manager of these securities. Shadow banking merely replaced the dollar with the U.S. Treasuries as the world’s key to funding gate. In the meantime, it combined the Fed’s two roles that used to be separate. Indeed, the shadow banking system has increased the importance of U.S. institutions.

The rising dominance of the repo market in the global funding supply chain, and the decline in collateral velocity, implies that the viability of the modern Eurodollar system depends on the U.S. government’s IOUs more than any time in history. US Treasuries, the IOU of the US government, is the most high-quality collateral. When times are good, repos work fine: The agreements expire without problems and the collateral gets passed back down the chain smoothly. But eventually, low-quality collateral lurks into the system. That’s fine, until markets hit an inevitable rough patch, like, March 2020 “Dash for Cash” episode. We saw this collateral problem in action. In March credit spreads between good and junkier debt widened and Treasury prices spiked as yields plummeted because of the buying frenzy. The interest rate on one-month Treasurys dropped from 1.61% on Feb. 18 to 0.00% on March 28. That was the scramble for good collateral. The reliance on the repo market to get funding indicates that no one will take the low-quality securities, and everyone struggles for good collateral. So whenever uncertainty is high, there will be a frenetic dash to buy Treasurys—like musical chairs with six to eight buyers eagerly eyeing one chair.

Elham Saeidinezhad is a Term-Assistant Professor of Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University. Before joining Barnard College, she was a lecturer of Economics at UCLA, a research economist in the International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, and a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET), New York. As a postdoctoral fellow, Elham worked closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studied his “Money View” framework. She obtained my Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

Can “Money View” Provide an Alternative Theory of Capital Structure?

By Elham Saeidinezhad

Liquidity transformation is a crucial function for many banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. It is a balance sheet operation where the firm creates liquid liabilities financed by illiquid assets. However, liquidity transformation is a risky operation. For policymakers and macroeconomists, the main risk is to financial stability caused by systemic liquidation of assets, also called “firesale.” In this paper, I emphasize an essential characteristic of firesale that is less explored—the order of liquidation. The order of liquidation refers to the sequence at which financial assets are converted into cash or cash equivalents- when the funds face significant cash outflow. Normally, economists explain assets’ order of liquidation by using theories of capital structure. However, the financial market episodes, such as March 2020 “Cash for Dash,” have revealed that firms’ behaviors are not in line with the predictions of such classical theories. Capital structure theories, such as “Pecking Order” and “Trade-off,” argue that fund managers should use their cash holding as the first line of defense during a liquidity crunch before selling their least liquid asset. In contrast to such prophecies, during the recent financial turmoil, funds liquidated their least liquid assets, even US Treasuries, first, before unhoarding their cash and cash equivalents. In this paper, I explore a few reasons that generated the failure of these theories when explaining funds’ behavior during a liquidity crisis. I also explain why Money View can be used to build an alternative framework.

Traditional capital structure theories such as pecking order differentiate financial assets based on their “adverse selection” and “information costs” rather than their “liquidity.” The pecking order theory is from Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Since it is famous, I will be brief. Assume that there are two funding sources available to firms whenever they hit their survival constraint: cash (or retained earnings) and securities (including debt and equity). Cash has no “adverse selection” problem, while securities, primarily equity, are subject to serious adverse selection problems. Compared to equity, debt securities have only a minor adverse selection problem. From the point of view of an external investor, equity is strictly riskier than debt. Both have an adverse selection risk premium, but that premium is significant on equity. Therefore, an outside investor will demand a higher rate of return on equity than on debt. From the perspective of the firm’s managers, the focus of our paper, cash is a better source of funds than is securities. Accordingly, the firm would prefer to fund all its payments using “cash” if possible. The firm will sell securities only if there is an inadequate amount of cash.

In the trade-off theory, another popular conventional capital structure theory, a firm’s decision is a trade-off between tax-advantage and capital-related costs. In a world that firms follow trade-off theory, their primary consideration is a balance between bankruptcy cost and tax benefits of debt. According to this approach, the firm might optimize its financing strategies, including whether to make the payments using cash or securities, by considering tax and bankruptcy costs. In most cases, these theories suggest that the firms prefer to use their cash holdings to meet their financial obligations. They use securities as the first resort only if the tax benefit of high leverage exceeds the additional financial risk and higher risk premiums. The main difference between pecking order theory and trade-off theory is that while the former emphasizes the adverse selection costs, the latter highlights the high costs of holding extra capital. Nonetheless, similar to the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory predicts that firms prefer to use their cash buffers rather than hoarding them during a financial crisis.

After the COVID-19 crisis, such predictions became false, and both theories underwent a crisis of their own. A careful examination of how funds, especially intermediaries such as Money Market Funds, or MMFs, adjusted their portfolios due to liquidity management revealed that they use securities rather than cash as the first line of defense against redemptions. Indeed, such collective behavior created the system-wide “dash for cash” episode in March 2020. On that day, few funds drew down their cash buffers to meet investor redemptions. However, contrary to pecking order and trade-off theories, most funds that faced redemptions responded by selling securities rather than cash. Indeed, they sold more of the underlying securities than was strictly necessary to meet those redemptions. As a result, these funds ended March 2020 with higher cash levels instead of drawing down their cash buffers.

Such episodes cast doubt on the conventional theories of capital structure for liquidity management, which argues that funds draw on cash balances first and sell securities only as a last resort. Yet, they align with Money View’s vision of the financial hierarchy. Money View asserts that during the financial crisis, preservation of cash, the most liquid asset located at the top of the hierarchy, will be given higher priority. During regular times, the private dealing system conceals such priorities. In these periods, the private dealing system uses its balance sheets to absorb trade imbalances due to the change in preferences to hold cash versus securities. Whenever the demand for cash exceeds that of securities, the dealers maintain price continuity by absorbing the excess securities into their balance sheets. Price continuity is a characteristic of a liquid market in which the bid-ask spread, or difference between offer prices from buyers and requested prices from sellers, is relatively small. Price continuity reflects a liquid market. In the process, they can conceal the financial hierarchy from being in full display.

During the financial crisis, this hierarchy will be revealed for everyone to see. In such periods, the dealers cannot or are unwilling to use their job correctly. Due to the market-wide pressing need to meet payment obligations, the trade imbalances show up as an increased “qualitative” difference between cash and securities. In the course of this differentiation, there is bound to be an increase in the demand for cash rather than securities, a situation similar to the “liquidity trap.” A liquidity trap is a situation, described in Keynesian economics, in which, after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers holding cash rather than holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest. In this environment, investors would prefer to reduce the holding of their less liquid assets, including US Treasuries, before using their cash reserves to make their upcoming payments. Thus, securities will be liquidated first, and cash will be used only as a last resort.

The key to understanding such behaviors by funds is recognizing that the difference in the quality of the financial instruments’ issuers creates a natural hierarchy of financial assets. This qualitative difference will be heightened during a crisis and determines the capital structure of the funds, and the “order of liquidation” of the assets, for liquidity management purposes. When the payments are due and liquidity is scarce, firms sell illiquid assets ahead of drawing down the cash balances. In the process, they disrupt money markets, including repo markets, as they put upward pressure on the price of cash in terms of securities. Thus, during a crisis, the liability of the central banks becomes the most attractive asset to own. On the other hand, securities, the IOUs of the private sector, become the less desirable asset to hold for asset managers.

So why do standard theories of capital structure fail to explain firms’ behavior during a liquidity crisis? First, they focus on the “fallacious” type of functions and costs during a liquidity crunch. While the dealers’ “market-making” function and liquidity are at the heart of Money View, the standard capital structure theories stress the “financial intermediation” and “adverse selection costs.” In this world, the “ordering” of financial assets to be liquidated may stem from sources such as agency conflicts and taxes. For Money View, however, what determines the order of firesaled assets, and the asset managers’ portfolio is less the agency costs and more the qualitative advantage of one asset than another. The assets’ status determines such qualitative differences in the financial hierarchy. By disregarding the role of dealers, standard capital structure models omit the important information that the qualitative difference between cash and credit will be heightened, and the preference will be changed during a crisis.

Such oversight, mixed with the existing confusion about the non-bank intermediaries’ business model, will be fatal for understanding their behavior during a crisis. The difficulty is that standard finance theories assume that non-bank intermediaries, such as MMFs, are in the business of “financial intermediation,” where the risk is transferred from security-rich agents to cash-rich ones. Such an analysis is correct at first glance. However, nowadays, the mismatch between the preferences of borrowers and the preferences of lenders is increasingly resolved by price changes rather than by traditional intermediation. A careful review of the MMFs balance sheets can confirm this viewpoint. Such examination reveals that these funds, rather than transforming the risks, “pool” them. Risk transformation is a defining characteristic of financial intermediation. Yet, even though it appears that an MMF is an intermediary, it is mainly just pooling risk through diversification and not much transforming risk.

Comprehending the MMF’s business as pooling the risks rather than transforming them is essential for understanding the amount of cash they prefer to hold. The MMF shares have the same risk properties as the underlying pool of bonds or stocks by construction. There is some benefit for the MMF shareholders from diversification. There is also some liquidity benefit, perhaps because open-end funds typically promise to buy back shares at NAV. But that means that MMFs have to keep cash or lines of credit for the purpose, even though it will lower their return and increase the costs for the shareholders.

Finally, another important factor that drives conventional theories’ failure is their concern about the cash flow patterns in the future and the dismissal of the cash obligations today. This is the idea behind the discounting of future cash flows. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC), generally used in these theories, is at the heart of discounting future cash flows. In finance, discounted cash flow analysis is a method of valuing security, project, company, or asset using the time value of money. Discounted cash flow analysis is widely used in investment finance, real estate development, corporate financial management, and patent valuation. In this world, the only “type” of cash flow that matters is the one that belongs to a distant future rather than the present, when firms should make today’s payments. On the contrary, the present, not the future, and its corresponding cash flow patterns, is what Money View is concerned about. In Money View’s world, the firm should be able to pay its daily obligations. If it does not have continuous access to liquidity and cannot meet its cash commitments, there will be no future.

The pecking order theory derives much of its influence from a view that it fits naturally with several facts about how companies use external finance. Notably, this capital structure theory derives support from “indirect” sources of evidence such as Eckbo (1986). Whenever the theories are rejected, the conventional literature usually attributes the problem to cosmetic factors, such as the changing population of public firms, rather than fundamental ones. Even if the pecking order theory is not strictly correct, they argue that it still does a better job of organizing the available evidence than other theories. The idea is that the pecking order theory, at its worst, is the generalized version of the trade-off theory. Unfortunately, none of these theories can explain the behavior of firms during a crisis, when firms should rebalance their capital structure to manage their liquidity needs.

The status of classical theories, despite their failures to explain different crises, is symptomatic of a hierarchy in the schools of economic thought. Nonetheless, they are unable to provide strong capital structure theories as they focus on fallacious premises such as the adverse selection or capital costs of an asset. To build theories that best explain the financing choices of corporates, economists should emphasize the hierarchical nature of financial instruments that reliably determines the order of liquidation of financial assets. In this regard, Money View seems to be positioned as an excellent alternative to standard theories. After all, the main pillars of this framework are financial hierarchy, dealers, and liquidity management.

Do Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy Pass through Debt, rather than Wealth?

Who has access to cheap credit? And who does not? Compared to small businesses and households, global banks disproportionately benefited from the Fed’s liquidity provision measures. Yet, this distributional issue at the heart of the liquidity provision programs is excluded from analyzing the recession-fighting measures’ distributional footprints. After the great financial crisis (GFC) and the Covid-19 pandemic, the Fed’s focus has been on the asset purchasing programs and their impacts on the “real variables” such as wealth. The concern has been whether the asset-purchasing measures have benefited the wealthy disproportionately by boosting asset prices. Yet, the Fed seems unconcerned about the unequal distribution of cheap credits and the impacts of its “liquidity facilities.” Such oversight is paradoxical. On the one hand, the Fed is increasing its effort to tackle the rising inequality resulting from its unconventional schemes. On the other hand, its liquidity facilities are being directed towards shadow banking rather than short-term consumers loans. A concerned Fed about inequality should monitor the distributional footprints of their policies on access to cheap debt rather than wealth accumulation.

Dismissing the effects of unequal access to cheap credit on inequality is not an intellectual mishap. Instead, it has its root in an old idea in monetary economics- the quantity theory of money– that asserts money is neutral. According to monetary neutrality, money, and credit, that cover the daily cash-flow commitments are veils. In search of the “veil of money,” the quantity theory takes two necessary steps: first, it disregards the payment systems as mere plumbing behind the transactions in the real economy. Second, the quantity theory proposes the policymakers disregard the availability of money and credit as a consideration in the design of the monetary policy. After all, it is financial intermediaries’ job to provide credit to the rest of the economy. Instead, monetary policy should be concerned with real targets, such as inflation and unemployment.

Nonetheless, the reality of the financial markets makes the Fed anxious about the liquidity spiral. In these times, the Fed follows the spirit of Walter Bagehot’s “lender of last resort” doctrine and facilitates cheap credits to intermediaries. When designing such measures, the Fed’s concern is to encourage financial intermediaries to continue the “flow of funds” from the surplus agents, including the Fed, to the deficit units. The idea is that the intermediaries’ balance sheets will absorb any mismatch between the demand-supply of credit. Whenever there is a mismatch, a financial intermediary, traditionally a bank, should be persuaded to give up “current” cash for a mere promise of “future” cash. The Fed’s power of persuasion lies in the generosity of its liquidity programs.

The Fed’s hyperfocus on restoring intermediaries’ lending initiatives during crises deviates its attention from asking the fundamental question of “whom these intermediaries really lend to?” The problem is that for both banks and non-bank financial intermediaries, lending to the real economy has become a side business rather than a primary concern. In terms of non-bank intermediaries, such as MMFs, most short-term funding is directed towards shadow banking businesses of the global banks. Banks, the traditional financial intermediaries, in return, use the unsecured, short-term liquidity to finance their near-risk-free arbitrage positions. In other words, when it comes to the “type” of borrowers that the financial intermediaries fund, households, and small-and-medium businesses are considered trivial and unprofitable. As a result, most of the funding goes to the large banks’ lucrative shadow banking activities. The Fed unrealistically relies on financial intermediaries to provide cheap and equitable credit to the economy. In this hypothetical world, consumers’ liquidity requirements should be resolved within the banking system.

This trust in financial intermediation partially explains the tendency to overlook the equitability of access to cheap credit. But it is only part of the story. Another factor behind such an intellectual bias is the economists’ anxiety about the “value of money” in the long run. When it comes to the design of monetary policy, the quantity theory is obsessed by the notion that the only aim of monetary theory is to explain those phenomena which cause the value of money to alter. This tension has crept inside of modern financial theories. On the one hand, unlike quantity theory, modern finance recognizes credit as an indispensable aspect of finance. But, on the other hand, in line with the quantity theory’s spirit, the models’ main concern is “value.”

The modern problem has shifted from explaining any “general value” of money to how and when access to money changes the “market value” of financial assets and their issuers’ balance sheets. However, these models only favor a specific type of agent. In this Wicksellian world, adopted by the Fed, agents’ access to cheap credit is essential only if their default could undermine asset prices. Otherwise, their credit conditions will be systemically inconsequential, hence neutral. By definition, such an agent can only be an “institutional” investor who’s big enough so that its financial status has systemic importance. Households and small- and medium businesses are not qualified to enter this financial world. The retail depositors’ omission from the financial models is not a glitch but a byproduct of mainstream monetary economics.

The point to emphasize is that the Fed’s models are inherently neutral about the distributional impacts of credit. They are built on the idea that despite retail credit’s significance for retail payment systems, their impacts on the economic transactions are insignificant. This is because the extent of retail credit availability does not affect real variables, including output and employment, as the demand for this “type” of credit will have proportional effects on all prices stated in money terms. On the contrary, wholesale credit underpin inequality as it changes the income and wealth accumulated over time and determines real economic activities.

The macroeconomic models encourage central bankers to neglect any conditions under which money is neutral. The growing focus on inequality in the economic debate has gone hand in hand to change perspective in macroeconomic modeling. Notably, recent research has moved away from macroeconomic models based on a single representative agent. Instead, it has focused on frameworks incorporating heterogeneity in skills or wealth among households. The idea is that this shift should allow researchers to explore how macroeconomic shocks and stabilization policies affect inequality.

The issue is that most changes to macroeconomic modeling are cosmetical rather than fundamental. Despite the developments, the models still examine inequality through income and wealth disparity rather than equitable access to cheap funding. For small businesses and non-rich consumers, the models identify wealth as negligible. Nonetheless, they assume the consumption is sensitive to income changes, and consumers react little to changes in the credit conditions and interest rates. Thus, in these models, traditional policy prescriptions change to target inequality only when household wealth changes.

At the heart of the hesitation to seriously examine distributional impacts of equitable access to credit is the economists’ understanding that access to credit is only necessary for the day-to-day operation of the payments system. Credit does not change the level of income and wealth. In these theories, the central concern has always been, and is, solvency rather than liquidity. In doing so, these models dismiss the reality that an agent’s liquidity problems, if not financed on time and at a reasonable price, could lead to liquidations of assets and hence insolvency. In other words, retail units’ access to credit daily affects not only the retail payments system but also the units’ financial wealth. Even from the mainstream perspective, a change in wealth level would influence the level of inequality. Furthermore, as the economy is a system of interlocking balance sheets in which individuals depend on one another’s promises to pay (financial assets), their access to funding also determines the financial wealth of those who depend on the validations of such cash commitments.

Such a misunderstanding about the link between credit accessibility and inequality is a natural byproduct of macroeconomic models that omit the payment systems and the daily cash flow requirement. Disregarding payment systems has produced spurious results about inequality. In these models, access to liquidity, and the smooth payment systems, is only a technicality, plumbing behind the monetary system, and has no “real” effects on the macroeconomy.

The point to emphasize is that everything about the payment system, and access to credit, is “real”: first, inthe economy as a whole, there is a pattern of cash flows emerging from the “real” side, production and consumption, and trade. A well-functioning financial market enables these cash flows to meet the cash commitments. Second, at any moment, problems of mismatch between cash flows and cash commitments show up as upward pressure on the short-term money market rate of interest, another “real” variable.

The nature of funding is evolving, and central banking is catching up. The central question is whether actual cash flows are enough to cover the promised cash commitments at any moment in time. For such conditions to be fulfilled, consumers’ access to credit is required. Otherwise, the option is to liquidate accumulations of assets and a reduction in their wealth. The point to emphasize is that those whose access to credit is denied are the ones who have to borrow no matter what it costs. Such inconsistencies show up in the money market where people unable to make payments from their current cash flow face the problem of raising cash, either by borrowing from the credit market or liquidating their assets.

The result of all this pushing and pulling is the change in the value of financial wealth, and therefore inequality. Regarding the distributional effects of monetary policy, central bankers should be concerned about the effects of monetary policy on unequal access to credit in addition to the income and wealth distribution. The survival constraint, i.e., agents’ liquidity requirements to meet their cash commitments, must be met today and at every moment in the future.

To sum up, in this piece, I revisited the basics of monetary economics and draw lessons that concern the connection between inequality, credit, and central banking. Previously, I wroteabout the far-reaching developments in financial intermediation, where non-banks, rather than banks, have become the primary distributors of credit to the real economy. However, what is still missing is the distributional effects of the credit provision rather than asset purchasing programs. The Fed tends to overlook a “distributional” issue at the heart of the credit provision process. Such an omission is the byproduct of the traditional theories that suggest money and credit are neutral. The traditional theories also assert that the payment system is a veil and should not be considered in the design of the monetary policy. To correct the course of monetary policy, the Fed has to target the recipients of credit rather than its providers explicitly. In this sense, my analysis is squarely in the tradition of what Schumpeter (1954) called “monetary analysis” and Mehrling (2013) called “Money View” – the presumption that money is not a veil and that understanding how it functions is necessary to understand how the economy works.

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”. Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory

New Thinking in the News

These are the latest reflections from new thinkers around the on what should have been done already, what must be done next, and what the near future may look like:

1 | New Study Reveals Stark Picture of Bay Area Poverty Leading up to Covid-19 Pandemic, in Tipping Point Community, by john a. powell.

“Known for its progressive politics and rich diversity, the San Francisco Bay Area is no exception to patterns of systemic racial and economic inequality found across the nation,” said john a. powell, Director of the Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley. “In fact, the Bay Area’s hot housing market and booming economy may exacerbate these trends, making it harder for low-skilled workers to find affordable housing and pay their bills. This study, drawing upon an original survey of Bay Area residents and census data, gives us a vivid portrait of poverty and inequality, and what we should do about it, even before the COVID-19 pandemic occurred. Now this research is more urgent than ever.”

2 |30 million Americans are unemployed. Here’s how to employ them in Vox, by Pavlina Tcherneva

“But the program will actually stabilize these fluctuations. There are reasons unemployment feeds on itself. If you have this kind of preventative program, where people trickle into other employment rather than unemployment, their spending patterns are stabilized, so you have smaller fluctuations in the private sector. We see this in countries that have active labor-market policies, that do a lot more public employment than we do.”

3 | Messages from “Fiscal Space” in Project Syndicate by Jayati Ghosh

“Well before the pandemic arrived, it was evident that the financialization of the global economy was fueling massive levels of inequality and unnecessary economic volatility. In this unprecedented crisis, the need to rein it in has literally become a matter of life or death.”

4 | The ‘frugal four’ should save the European project in Social Europe by Peter Bofinger

“It is therefore crucial that the frugal four [Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands] abandon their opposition to a joint financing facility at EU level. Only in this way will the European project be able to survive and Europe respond to this terrible crisis in a manner as effective as in the United States. For, as the US economist Paul Krugman has put it, paraphrasing Franklin Roosevelt, ‘The only fiscal thing to fear is deficit fear itself.’”

5 | Making the Best of a Post-Pandemic World, in Project Syndicate, by Dani Rodrik

“It is possible to envisage a more sensible, less intrusive model of economic globalization that focuses on areas where international cooperation truly pays off, including global public health, international environmental agreements, global tax havens, and other areas susceptible to beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Insofar as the world economy was already on a fragile, unsustainable path, COVID-19 clarifies the challenges we face and the decisions we must make. In each of these areas, policymakers have choices. Better and worse outcomes are possible. The fate of the world economy hinges not on what the virus does, but on how we choose to respond.”

6 | Two Rounds of Stimulus Were Supposed to Protect Jobs — Instead We Have Record Unemployment with Tom Ferguson in the Institute for Public Accuracy

“We all know that the U.S. response to COVID-19 has lagged far behind other countries. But now a real trap is closing. The public premise of the government stimulus programs was that they would be needed only for a short period and channeling aid to businesses would enable them to retain workers on their payrolls. So vast sums were handed out while the Federal Reserve intervened massively in financial markets. But now unemployment is soaring, in a country whose health insurance system is keyed to the workplace. Small businesses are collapsing and plainly never got much aid. Workers are also dropping out of the workforce in enormous numbers while a major health and safety crisis rages. Government policy has got to address these issues before it’s too late. It can’t simply grant blanket immunity to businesses for the sake of a hasty, premature reopening. A major re-calibration of policy is in order.”

Every week, we share a few noteworthy articles that showcase the work of new economic thinkers around the world. Subscribe to receive these shortlists directly to your email inbox.

The Social Determinants of Health in the Age of COVID19

With the ongoing pandemic and economic crisis, there is much to discuss. To inform the debates taking place in the YSI community, Luisa Scarcella and Aleksandar Stojanović have kicked off a special webinar series in which to unpack some of the accompanying challenges. For the first session, Luisa invited Professor Sir Michael Marmot, Professor of Epidemiology and Public Health at University College London, Director of the UCL Institute of Health Equity, and Past President of the World Medical Association. His work reveals the interrelated nature of health and socioeconomic inequality; a highly relevant topic today.

When economists talk about health, they usually talk about the healthcare system. They don’t often talk about what makes people sick in the first place. But Marmot does, and he finds that our people’s health is closely tied to the socio-economic conditions they are in; lower socio-economic conditions lead to worse health, and increasing socioeconomic inequality yields a widening health gap. His findings are compelling:

In the developed world, general life expectancy has stagnated since WW2; that is unprecedented for peacetime. But for the lower economic classes, it’s even worse. In the UK, the life expectancy of the poor has been decreasing for a decade now. It’s no coincidence, Marmot argues, that this trend emerged in a context of harsh austerity measures. Having reduced the purchasing power of the underprivileged, healthy living is increasingly out of reach.

Other advanced economies, the US in particular, show similar trends. There, too, structural inequalities give rise to job insecurity, housing insecurity, food insecurity, racism, and violence. These disadvantages translate into worse health for the poor. So, to improve the health of the American people, a better healthcare system would only be the beginning. To actually improve public health, the US would need to address the socio-economic inequalities that underlie it.

These insights offer a fresh take on the national responses to the COVID-19 outbreak, too. Many governmental remedies are receiving criticism for ‘treating the symptom and not the cause,’ echoing Professor Marmot’s plea. On top of that, most nations’ stimulus packages do not sufficiently alleviate the economic despair of the most vulnerable groups, leading to a worsening of the socio-economic conditions that are associated with bad health. The issues Marmot points out may only accelerate during this crisis.

Marmot’s work demonstrates the interconnected nature of many of the societal challenges we study in YSI: socioeconomic inequality, societal fragmentation, the concentration of economic and political power, and ultimately human despair. As Rob Johnson commented: “We must continue trying to understand how and why the political economy produces these conditions and tolerates them.”

A recording of Professor Marmot’s webinar is available here. Marmot’s book, the Health Gap, provides a more detailed account of his findings.

Despite its new rhetoric, the IMF still promotes failed policies

An event titled Income Inequality Matters: How to Ensure Economic Growth Benefits the Many and Not the Few is not exactly what comes to mind when one thinks of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Yet, in April, at the latest Spring Meetings, managing director Christine Lagarde, along with the IMF’s chief economist, discussed the urgency of addressing rising income inequality and the need for redistributive policies. While IMF staff in Washington were expressing their concern with inequality, people in Ecuador, Argentina and Tunisia were taking to the streets to protest against anti-worker austerity policies their governments are implementing as part of the IMF programs.

In the 1980s and 1990s, when a series of debt crises plagued the developing world, the IMF lent money to those countries as part of what it called structural adjustment programs (SAPs). These programs, part of what is now referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’, aggressively promoted an agenda of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, along with sharp cuts to social spending.

SAPs protected creditors and opened the doors for multinational corporations to do business in these countries, while the brunt cost of the adjustments was borne by people.

As the growth and development that was promised as a result of these programs never materialized, the IMF slowly lost some of its influence. The painful memories of the social costs that resulted from SAPs have made the IMF an extremely unpopular institution.

In recent years, the IMF has made substantial efforts to rebrand itself and create the image of an institution concerned with inclusive growth and social indicators. The IMF’s research department has dedicated a significant amount of time and space to the issue of rising inequality. This included research that showed that the fiscal consolidation and liberalization of capital accounts – policies that are at the core of IMF programs – increase income inequality.

The Fund has also examined the effect of the labor market policies it promotes and their contribution to the decline in the share of income captured by labour.

Yet, while its research department tackled questions on how to pursue both growth and inclusion, the Fund’s loan programs have not incorporated these concerns.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, the IMF re-emerged as a major player on the global scene. The IMF stopped using the name SAP, but the structure of IMF loan conditions and the policy demands remained very similar, with the failure of previous programs all but forgotten.

To make matters worse, the IMF continues a trend of underestimating the depth of recessions caused by the austerity policies it promotes, which prolongs economic crises and increases debt burdens as economies shrink.

The IMF’s latest loan agreement with Ecuador has the typical features of a structural adjustment program. It demands massive cuts in government spending, which directly target public sector employees, along with a series of neoliberal institutional reforms.

The program continues to impose failed policies that are shown by the IMF’s own research department to increase inequality and have high social costs.

To go along with the IMF’s new image, the program does include a floor on social spending, along with a modest increase in spending on social assistance for the first year. However, the spending floor, which establishes a minimum amount of the budget to be allocated towards social assistance programs is set at a low level, which is unlikely to keep up with the increased needs that will arise from Ecuador’s recession.

The case of Argentina, which entered an agreement with the IMF in the summer of 2018, has already shown the inadequacy of social spending floors. As the economic crisis has continued to worsen throughout the program, poverty in Argentina has skyrocketed, increasing from 25.7 percent in mid-2017, to 32 percent by the end of 2018, a staggering 6.3 percentage points.

Argentina also serves as an example of the failure of IMF austerity programs, where growth projections had to be adjusted downwards by over 3 percent for a single year only 3 months after the initial agreement was signed

An in-depth study of all IMF loans approved in 2016 and 2017 has shown that 23 out of a total of 26 programs imposed austerity measures. The number of conditions attached to loans also continues to increase. Furthermore, the study has shown the inadequacy of social spending floors, which do not provide enough funding, even for the provision of basic healthcare.

The IMF has changed its rhetoric on inequality and social inclusiveness, but its operations continue to impose the same harmful policies of the past. While some symbolic steps have been taken on how to operationalize research on inequality, they have yet to be incorporated into lending agreements.

If the IMF is truly concerned about growth that benefits ‘the many,’ it needs to stop promoting policies that have time and time again hurt working people.

This article originally appeared in Equal Times.

Tackling Urban Homelessness the Green Way

The US housing affordability crisis is driving more and more of the working poor to live out of cars and squatter homes- the solution seems to be creating more affordable homes in both urban and suburban areas where there is a high level of homelessness amongst the working poor but this means more carbon emissions and pollution in urban areas the long run. A green alternative needs to be found if both homelessness and pollution are to be solved simultaneously.

By Athullya Gopi | The US housing affordability crisis is driving more and more of the working poor to live out of cars and squatter homes- the solution seems to be creating more affordable homes in both urban and suburban areas where there is a high level of homelessness amongst the working poor but this means more carbon emissions and pollution in urban areas the long run. A green alternative needs to be found if both homelessness and pollution are to be solved simultaneously.

Homelessness is a growing global phenomenon. In the United States (US), its rampant increase is most evident in urbanized areas along the East and West coasts. Homelessness in the US does not only occur as a result of an individual’s perceived social and economic problems such as mental health and substance abuse issues or the stagnation of incomes, it is also the result of long-standing imperfections in the private US housing market that prevent everyone in the economy who demands housing as a dependable and primary source of shelter from accessing it. Such market imperfections limit the number of affordable housing units supplied by the private sector to urban low or very low income households – often making such individuals or households highly susceptible to homelessness as both incomes stagnate and rents or home values spike. An ideal long-run solution to reducing this type of homelessness is to employ federally mandated policies designed to increase the supply of available affordable housing units to those needing dependable shelter. The idea of increasing the number of physical dwelling spaces in already congested and polluted urban areas, however, implies an added burden to carbon emissions and energy utilization in cities at a time when careful consideration needs to be given to the latter. Is there a green solution to solving homelessness caused by the housing affordability crisis in the US?

The rapid growth of urbanization is most evident in the rising number of people living in cities – by 2030 it is estimated that at least 27% of the world population will be concentrated in cities with a population of more than 1,000,000. It is also clear that the rapid growth of urbanization is increasingly becoming a contributor to global climate change – although cities only account for less than 2% of the earth’s surface 71 to 76% of the world’s carbon emissions originate from urban areas. The impact of climate change is being increasingly felt in urban areas including its homeless. Since 2016 the number of homeless individuals in urban areas perishing from being unsheltered in extreme climate conditions has been increasing.

However, it is not just in urban areas that homelessness is growing. Poverty and homelessness have been increasing in suburban areas in the US over the last 15 years. With homelessness on the increase as a social ill not necessarily constrained by population density or geography more and more households/individuals who find themselves chronically unsheltered as a result will also be directly exposed to the increasingly devastating effects of climate change. A sustainable and joint solution needs to be found to address both problems, one that envisions more eco-friendly homes for those who need them as a source of shelter when they have no recourse to one.

To start formulating such a joint solution we must begin with understanding the source of growth in homelessness over the last few decades. While foreclosures in the post-recession era have largely been responsible for people losing their owner-occupied homes, the source of homelessness relating to economic conditions extends beyond mere market forces that are freely operating. In the United States, the private housing market is an imperfect one, meaning that there are constraints imposed upon it that prevent demand and supply of housing from fully clearing. The imperfect housing market leads to renters being priced out of housing that is affordable when they are faced with either income shocks (like being made redundant when the economy goes down) or rental price shocks (when an upturn in the economy leads to a surge in property prices and therefore rents). This leads to a growing number of individuals/households that are at risk of becoming temporarily homeless. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) refers to such individuals as “transients”. Modern-day representations of homelessness are no longer restricted to the visibly homeless woman forced to live in her car while working as an adjunct professor and the army veteran who can only afford housing through a gofundme crowdfunding campaign. The housing crisis is one that is increasingly an affordability crisis.

The imperfect market leads to demand for housing persistently remaining relatively higher than the supply of available housing at any point in time. Often this mismatch between housing demand and supply is the result of the relative inelasticity (low sensitivity to price changes) of housing supply. Generally speaking when the price of a good or service increases, the supply of housing should respond over time by increasing too and vice versa. Housing supply, however, is relatively quite slow to respond to price signals due to a number of factors that do not directly impact the housing market. For example state regulations regarding land use vary across the United States and often favor the use of land in urban areas for commercial purposes rather than for housing, making it difficult to quickly increase housing supply in such areas in response to a sudden surge in housing real estate prices.

Additionally, the increasing use of housing real-estate as sources of investment leaves more and more units either vacant or used in a way that allows investors to gain higher than market returns – such as converting them to “AirBnB” units. This indicates that the market is biased towards those in the economy who demand housing real-estate as an investment good rather than as a basic form of shelter. This bias towards housing investors is clearly seen in urban areas by the rising levels of gentrification in cities – a way of making housing investments more attractive and therefore valuable to investors. Ultimately the existence of this bias means that richer entities/households that can afford to purchase or rent more than the one unit of housing they need for shelter gain access to the additional units they demand more readily than the relatively poorer households that need at least one unit for basic shelter. With a ‘sticky’ housing supply and a bias in how demand for housing is met, poorer households are ever more at risk of transient homelessness and not receiving at least the single unit of housing they require to meet their need for basic shelter.

Furthermore federal government safety nets for low income and very-low income households have been declining over the years instead of increasing: there have been no significant increases in federal housing voucher funding to make housing more affordable and more public housing units have been retired or demolished than built between 2000 and 2016 leading to an overall drop of around 200,000 units during this time. All of this implies a greater need for more physical housing units to be supplied outside of the imperfect private sector – to be made available ideally through federal government-led policy intervention that creates housing for the growing population of working poor that are most likely to be made transiently and then chronically homeless.

Increasing the supply of affordable housing to meet the real demand for housing as a source of shelter is only one half of a joint solution – the second half must resolve how to achieve this in a sustainable manner without adding to pollution levels. In this regard, special emphasis needs to be made on urban as opposed to rural areas mainly because the former are focal points of energy and durable goods consumption, both of which contribute significantly to the overall carbon footprint. For example, concentrated energy consumption in urban areas tends to create enough heat to change their surrounding microclimates, even causing them to differ in temperature on average by more than 1 degree Celsius than neighboring rural areas. Urban areas also generate undesirable runoff patterns in water – the way urban landscapes are constructed means that less water gets filtered back to replenish the local water table. At the same time urban areas, because of their warmer microclimates, generate more rainfall, meaning that run-off containing pollutants from industrial sites occurs more quickly and intensely than rural industrialized areas and significantly reducing water quality.

Innovative sustainable construction methods are becoming more popular. One example of a green construction standard is the Living Building Challenge, a green building certification program that outlines how sustainable built-up structures that are net water and energy positive (i.e. water is re-treated onsite and that more energy is generated onsite than consumed). This building standard was successfully used in a sustainable affordable housing project is present in Minneapolis. In 2015 two local nonprofit organizations, Aeon and Hope Community launched “the Rose”, a 90 unit mixed-income apartment complex with half the units assigned as affordable housing at a monthly rent of around $636 for a single bedroom apartment. What is remarkable is that the per square foot cost of constructing the Rose was less than a half that of a similar conventional high-end sustainable building. While it was 20% more expensive and more complicated to build than a comparable code-compliant building the Rose was intended to offer long-term cost-effectiveness by being up to 75% more energy efficient.

Affordable housing is largely not a favorable investment option for real-estate developers and so its sustainable development must be incentivized through policy change – one option would be through tax credits. However future policymakers must remain cautious about private investors using green building techniques in the name of climate change to deliberately ramp up property values.

Such an example appears in a case study of a multifamily residential property development supported by the City of Portland Oregon Department of Environmental Services. The latter is responsible for managing the city of Portland’s wastewater and stormwater infrastructure. In the Barrington Square Apartments project, the property owner retrofitted stormwater controls with greener technology that enabled the removal of more than 350,000 gallons of runoff with pollutants. While at first glance it appears that the Environmental Services Department that supported the project successfully promoted the implementation of green technology in the private sector to clean up of the environment, the project report indicates that the property owner was motivated to make these changes to increase the value of the property itself – an idea that is counter-intuitive to the expansion of sustainable affordable housing.

About the Author
Athullya is originally Indian, born and brought up in the United Arab Emirates. She joined the Levy Masters Program in 2016 after leading a successful career in credit insurance. The choice to swap her role as the head of commercial underwriting with that of a full-time student came after being inspired to see how Economics works in the real world. She now works at the Institute for New Economic Thinking in New York.

Buying Power: an often neglected, yet essential concept for economics

Buying power is a concept that is absent from basic economic theory, and this has major implications both for theory and for the practical issues that we face. This absence is odd because buying power is central to how the economy works. Its importance is not a new observation.

By Michael Joffe.

In 1776, Adam Smith wrote that the degree to which a “man is rich or poor” depends mainly on the quantity of other people’s “labour which he can command, or which he can afford to purchase” (emphasis added). However, this idea of differential buying power has never been incorporated into economic theory, despite it being an obvious feature of the world we live in. The extent of a person’s disposable income and wealth gives them a corresponding degree of influence. It is like a voting system, where everybody votes for their view of what the economy should produce, but where the number of votes is very unequal. The term “power” here is best understood as meaning the degree of ability of a person or organization to bring something about. It is a causal (not e.g. a moral or political) concept.

Examples of its importance are everywhere. When prices rise, some potential consumers may be excluded – a form of rationing. In pleasant locations, affluent urban dwellers buy holiday homes, crowding out the local inhabitants who do not have the buying power to compete and therefore may have to leave the area. In low-income countries, the amount of transactional sex depends on inequality (the buying power of richer men), not poverty. Any industry depends on its (potential) customers’ buying power for support: washing machine manufacture is only possible if there is a market of people who can afford their product; luxury goods such as mega-yachts exist because there are mega-rich people to buy them.

Firms also have buying power, in varying degree, which enables them to transform the world, e.g. by taking possession of land and natural resources. Within the firm, the employers’ buying power is what enables them to employ workers, thereby creating the authority structure. And shareholders’ influence over the conduct of firms’ directors results from their ability to have bought shares. Finally, when China’s economy was expanding rapidly, its buying power created a worldwide commodities boom, with major impacts on (for example) Australia and Brazil, an impact that has diminished in recent years.

With a concept that is so obvious, one might expect it to be a prominent feature of economic theory. But in fact, it is only patchily represented. Notably, basic consumer theory obscures it completely, by looking at a potential consumer’s decision making given the amount of money that they have to spend – the fixed “budget constraint”. This naturally leads to a conception of the economy that neglects the role of effective demand.

At the aggregate level, in macroeconomics, buying power is represented: it is Keynes’ key concept of aggregate demand. It is also implicit in the flow diagrams that are often used to introduce students to economics, showing two-way flows with money in one direction and goods/services in the other, e.g. between households and firms in the aggregate.

Much of the controversy in economics is concerned with disputes over the competing varieties of macroeconomic theory, and other topics that are directly policy related. Commentators often say that micro is in a satisfactory condition, e.g. on the grounds that it is largely evidence-driven in specific areas such as labor economics, healthcare, education, etc. It is true that some good work is done in these applied areas. But the implication is that macro is the only problem, and this lets mainstream micro theory off the hook.

One implication – which is replicated across sub-disciplines such as health economics – is that the focus is mainly on the willingness to pay, obscuring the importance of the ability to pay. More broadly, it means that economics is a form of decision theory, and this often produces a default way of thinking that treats inequalities as an afterthought, rather than being inherent in how the economy operates. It has taken a huge rise in inequality in countries like the US and the UK, plus Piketty’s best-selling book, to bring this issue to mainstream attention.

This is especially problematic in the context of the widespread orthodox view that macro theory should be based on “micro-foundations” as if the micro theory is totally unproblematic. It implies adopting the extreme version of rationality assumed by mainstream microeconomic theorists, as well as optimization and so on. Naturally, there must be some correspondence between theories at the micro and macro levels – but that needs to involve concepts that correspond to the real world, both at the micro and macro levels.

But there is more: buying power is not the only type of economic power that we fail to recognize. Whilst monopoly power features in textbook economics and bargaining power is recognized, e.g. in game theory, other important types are neglected. These include corporate power and the power of the financial sector including the power of banks to create money. They overlap to some extent with buying power, but also have additional features that are beyond the scope of this article. This analysis is part of a broader rethinking of the foundations of economics, using concepts that actually correspond to the way the economy works – evidence-based economics.

Vast disparities in buying power have major macroeconomic and societal results. Inequality tends to lead to private-sector debt, which creates a vicious cycle, further enhancing the inequality. Private-sector debt also generates systemic instability and a risk of financial crisis. An IMF study concluded that restoring the bargaining power of the lower income groups would be the best way of reducing this debt, and enhancing the stability of the system.

Another consequence is environmental: increasingly rich consumers, in satisfying their wants, inflate their ecological footprints and damage the carrying capacity of the Earth. Recognizing and addressing over-consumption can play a major part in reducing our environmental impact.

Thus, buying power plays a central role, both in how the economy works and in pressing practical issues, and it is a serious error to ignore it. By incorporating it into our core thinking, we will be much better equipped to understand the economy and to address the challenges of increasing inequality, systemic instability, and environmental degradation.

About the Author
Michael Joffe was originally trained as a biologist, and for many years carried out epidemiological research at Imperial College, where he is still attached. He now applies his insight into the way that the natural sciences generate secure causal knowledge to his work in economics.