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In the Spotlight: Pavlina Tcherneva

If I ask you to picture an economist, chances are you’ll visualize an older white male who makes you feel bad for failing to understand mysterious diagrams. Those certainly exist. But so does Pavlina Tcherneva. Chair and Associate Professor of the Economics Department at Bard College, Pavlina spearheads the group of faculty that convinced me (daughter of graphic-designer-dad and dancer-mom) to get a degree in Economics, and then another.

Pavlina’s Work in a Nutshell
Pavlina is comfortable in many unconventional territories of economics. She can tell you why the government should be your backup employer, why the federal budget really need not balance, and what money really is. Besides the US and her native Bulgaria, she’s consulted policy makers in Argentina, China, Canada, and the UK. Her work has been recognized by a wide range of people; most recently by Bernie Sanders, who used her graph to illustrate his point on inequality.

Current Research
Pavlina’s current research focuses on the “Job Guarantee” policy, which recommends the government acts like an employer of last resort by directly employing those people looking for work during economic slowdowns. In 2006, she spent her summer in the libraries of Cambridge, examining the original writings of Keynes. She offered a fresh interpretation of his approach to fiscal policy, and got a prize for it, too. Today, she investigates what the policy can do for economic growth, the unemployed, and in particular: women and youth.

Path to the Present
If you’re feeling inspired, take note: Being like Pavlina doesn’t happen overnight. In her case, it began with winning a competition that sent her to the US as an exchange student. She then earned a BA in math and economics from Gettysburg College, and a PhD in Economics from the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Her undergraduate honors thesis was a math model of how a monopoly currency issuer can use its price setting powers to produce long-run full employment with stable prices.

As a college student, she helped organize a conference in Bretton Woods around this idea, which became the inaugural event of what has become known as Modern Monetary Theory. Then, there were a few years of teaching at UMKC and Franklin and Marshall, and a subsequent move to the Levy Economics Institute and Bard College several years ago. In the midst of all that, she was a two-time grantee from the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) in New York. Today, Pavlina lives in the Hudson Valley, together with her husband and daughter.

Eager for more?
If you’re curious about the Job Guarantee policy, here is both a 15 minute video, and a 150 page book. To understand Pavlina’s take on the Federal Budget, this article goes a long way. And to figure out what’s the deal with money, read this chapter of her book. Her work on inequality was featured in the New York Times, NPR, and other major media outlets. She has articles published by INET, Huffington Post, and over a dozen works on the SSRN.

The Brazilian Burden

On August 29th Dilma Rousseff, the democratically elected Brazilian ex-president, defended herself at the Senate against accusations of fiscal fraud, the so called “pedaladas fiscais.” Despite her defense, two days later, the president was formally impeached, putting an end to a process that has been carried on since May, when she first left office to face trial. The crime accusations were mainly accompanied by harsh criticisms of how the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) fiscal irresponsibility led to the poor economic condition that the country finds itself. Among the economic meltdown and several scandals of corruption, her approval rate and the popularity of her party collapsed in recent years. After 13 years of the leftist PT administration, the presidency is now occupied by the then vice-president Michel Temer, member of the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), a party also involved in corruption scandals, and whose popularity is as bad as his predecessor.

Political matters “apart,” the Brazilian economic situation is indeed dire. GDP is expected to contract 3.18% in 2016, a second year of contraction, following the 3.85% in 2015. Unemployment increased more than four percentage points from the beginning of last year, reaching 11.3% in June 2016. Despite the poor economic performance, inflation is still above the 6.5% target roof, being expected to accumulate 7.4% this year. The inflationary pressure comes mainly as an effect of the rapid exchange rate nominal devaluation of almost 54% within the years of 2015 and 2016, reaching now R$ 3.29 per dollar. As an attempt to control inflation and attract foreign capital, the Brazilian Central Bank – going in the opposite direction of the major Central Banks – sharply rose the short-term interest rate (Selic), sustaining it at 14.25% (!!!) since mid-2015. This also had a feedback effect on the government’s total deficit. (*)

Two questions remain open: what are the real roots of the economic crisis and will the new administration be able to tackle it? To understand the roots of the bust, it might be easier to refer to the very causes of the boom that preceded it.

The boom and bust

From 2002 to 2008, the Brazilian economy performed really well, growing at an average of 4% per year. This was possible mainly by a combination of policies aimed to reduce poverty and income inequality along with the positive international scenario.

Increasing worker’s real wages and government cash transfers to poor households – channeled mainly through social security and the famous Bolsa Família – established a virtuous cycle of increasing private consumption. Another important factor was the promotion of policies towards labor-market formalization, which guaranteed not only access to social security but also the availability of poor households to private lines of credit. Note, however, that not only poor households benefited from “cash transfers”: the historically high short-term interest rate guaranteed that rich households too enjoyed the fruits of the boom. The government managed to attend then both extremes of the income distribution.

International conditions also played a major role in boosting the domestic economy. High international liquidity and the commodity-price super cycle guaranteed appreciation of the exchange rate, which beyond positively impacting domestic real wages, also helped to keep inflationary pressures under control by making foreign goods more accessible.

The Brazilian economy suffered its first hit with the 2008 financial crisis. Despite the GDP growth of 7.5% already in 2010, the fast economic recovery was mainly a result of aggressive counter-cyclical expansionary policies by the government, who acted through state-controlled enterprises (as the oil and energy companies, Petrobras and Eletrobras) and programs of investment in economic and social infrastructure. From 2011 on, GDP returned to low levels, making it necessary for the government to adopt a new set of policies that can be summarized in tax exemptions and subsidized credit expansion to private companies from public banks. As it happens, this attempt to increase private investment had the only effect of deteriorating the public fiscal situation.

The budget, the budget!!!

The change in orientation of government policies – from an expansion of public investment in 2008-10 to a provision of fiscal stimulus to private companies in 2012-14 – happened at the same time as the commodity boom ended. Already in 2011, commodity prices stagnated and, along with Brazilian terms of trade, started its downward path in 2014. The end of the commodity cycle had a harsh impact not only in economy’s aggregate demand but also on the fiscal budget.

Before we get to the fiscal issue though, please, don’t get me wrong. The cause of the Brazilian economic crisis is less a result of the end of the commodity boom in itself than by the productive structure that such cycle reinforced. Brazil’s external sector is highly dependent on the exports of primary goods, and this dependence only deepened in the past decade. In 2015, roughly 50% of Brazilian total exports were composed by primary products, a number that increased 4.5% per year since 2002, when it accounted for less than 30%. If we include natural resource-based manufactures on the calculus, it reaches nearly 70% of total exports! Furthermore, while labor productivity increased 5.3% per year from 2000 to 2013 in the agriculture sector, it decreased 0.6% per year in the manufacturing industry.

No wonder when commodity prices reverted trend the economy took a strong hit. Instead of setting the ground for the eventual bust, Brazil placed all its coins on booming commodities. Despite all the public investment programs and fiscal exonerations to the private sector, the PT administration did not manage to increase investment as share of GDP, which remained stagnant around the 18% level throughout 2002-2015 – with public investment accounting for less than 3% of GDP. Lack of investment in infrastructure and manufacturing industry perpetuated an anemic economy with low productivity and dependent on economic cycles.

Public consumption and investment decreased even further after 2014 when the rapid deterioration of the fiscal budget turned the 3%-of-GDP government fiscal surpluses to almost 3%-of-GDP deficits. It is interesting to notice that the decreasing surpluses started in 2011, not accidentally when commodity prices stagnated. We can look at the three institutional balances for the Brazilian economy, representing the government, private, and foreign sectors, as follows below in order to see these trends more clearly.

We already know from previous posts on this blog (see here and here) that the government sector has a “crowding-in” effect on the private sector, meaning that government expenditure will, by an account identity, revert in private sector savings. Of course, in an open economy, this is only true as long as we assume the foreign sector to remain “stable”. Both the private and government sectors can only simultaneously run a surplus if the foreign sector generates a surplus that is big enough to account for both. (The intention of the figure presented is not to show that the balances sum to zero – which could be demonstrated by inverting the sign of the private sector and using a bar graph – but to show the movements of the financial assets and liabilities between the three sectors).

In the case of the Brazilian economy, the improvement of the foreign sector in 2001 allowed an increase in the private sector savings and a decrease in government total deficits. Once the financial crisis struck at the end of 2007, despite the counter-cyclical policies, the deterioration of the current account was mainly absorbed by a decrease in savings of the private sector, with government persisting to run primary surpluses and to sustain its total deficit level – even decreasing it until late 2012. On that year, we observe a sharp deleveraging of the private sector which, given the steady trend of the current account, was completely mirrored by the public sector.

Once again, the mistake – to name one – of the PT administration is that instead of increasing fiscal stimulus through direct government expenditure and investment in infrastructure it bet on providing credit and fiscal exonerations to the private sector as an attempt to increase private investment. In a scenario in which – to use Minsky’s terminology – the demand price of capital decreases at a faster rate than the supply price of capital, investment will not take place. In other words, despite the stimuli reducing the cost of new investment, expectations of profits were falling at a faster rate. In a situation of lack of aggregate demand, the government has to directly spend in order to create the necessary stimulus to the private sector through the generation of profits. Its avoidance led to the deterioration of the fiscal budget through the revenue side, surpassing now 10% of GDP, a result of the economic meltdown.

Instead of stimulating the economic activity by driving aggregate demand and adjusting the economy by sustaining the levels of output and employment, the government opted, mainly after 2014, for a “building confidence” strategy in which it compromises to reducing inflation, generating primary surpluses by increasing interest rates, and cutting government deficits, an adjustment that comes, in such case, through deepening the economic recession. All of it with the intention to attract market’s attention and foreign capital inflows. It, in fact, has a huge potential to generate financial fragility – but this is subject for another post.

And what now?

To address the second question posed at the beginning of this text, it is hard to believe that the new administration will be able to revert the dire scenario. It is still unsure if Temer will have the political leverage to pass important fiscal structural reforms in Congress, such as pension reform. Temer’s pledge to sharply reduce the government deficit can be summarized in the attempt to pass a law that will impose a limit to government expenditure indexed to the inflation level of the previous year. Besides reducing the ability of the government to invest, it also means cutting spending on areas such as education and public health, thus reducing the welfare state that was established in the previous decade, a major element in the virtuous cycle.

Whether or not promising to reduce inflation and the public deficit will be miraculously enough to stimulate agents confidence in the future, it will for sure hurt the economy and lead to a further decrease in demand price of investment in the short-run. In a situation of deleveraging private sector and slow global trade, it is unlikely that private investment will rise anytime soon. Until then, workers will be the ones to suffer from the increasing unemployment levels. The interest rate, beyond undermining any conceivable investment effort that could come from private agents, also carries a feedback effect to government budget and a distributive matter, as mentioned in the beginning of this text. When the pressure to cut government spending increases, “attend both extremes of the income distribution” becomes a hard job. We already know which side was chosen. Unfortunately, very often the adjustment burden comes from the weaker side.

(*) All the data presented in the text are extracted from the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

Employ Young Americans Now: Beyond Education

Over forty years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a “War on Poverty” in his state of the union address. This war emphasized education as the remedy to America’s economic hardships. Critics, like Hyman Minsky, worried from the beginning that this would not be enough. As explained in some of his writings collected in Ending Poverty: Jobs Not Welfare, Minsky believed that without a focus on providing jobs the war would end in failure. In 2016 it is hard to say the poverty situation in America has improved drastically. Inequality has gotten worse, the minimum wage has stagnated, and food and health care prices have risen faster than inflation. I argue in my master’s thesis that while education has been shown to improve individual employment chances at higher wages, it is a fallacy of composition to assume those results can apply for everyone.

Trying to push all of our youth through high school will not guarantee them jobs, especially in today’s economy where we are far from tight labor markets. Minsky argued that programs should be designed which hold the promise of a useful and productive life for our high school dropouts. In my view, this would help students learn different skills that can’t be acquired sitting at a desk. Perhaps even more importantly, having an income would enable many students to either stay in or return to school, as requiring a student to forgo an income for four to eight years is just not realistic for many families living in poverty. College graduates are competing for jobs that do not require college educations. Our youth needs a more comprehensive “War on Poverty” than a focus on receiving a formal education.

14212114_10210003402663742_2076273988545782318_n — Illustration: Heske van Doornen

Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative John Conyers have introduced the bill Employ Young Americans Now, which would provide $5.5 billion in funding to create jobs for disadvantaged youth. This seems like a better solution for our youth living in poverty. Employment is connected with a slew of benefits that education and welfare have not provided. Employment is shown to reduce incidence of mental illness, reduce criminal activity, and it allows production of useful goods and services. In my thesis I modeled EYAN and demonstrated that it will provide 500,000 jobs to young disadvantaged youth. This gives a young person a job in 11% of families with unemployed disadvantaged youth. My results suggest that if the bill were expanded 10x, we could provide a job for every young person living in poverty at a cost of $50 billion.

One issue with EYAN is finding jobs suitable for young Americans that do not yet have high school degrees. One possibility is to pay EYAN participants for raising young children in their families, since this is a responsibility that already exists for many youth living in families in poverty. Early childhood education has been shown to have great returns. Another prospect would be something along environmental lines. In the National Youth Administration as a part of Roosevelt’s New Deal he had youth plant trees, forming his “Tree Army.” This is another job that any able bodied youth can do. Jobs offered by EYAN do not necessarily have to be profitable jobs. The bill specifies that they could help the nonprofit sector with jobs volunteers are already doing for free. The nice part about this bill is that it allows local communities to determine who to hire and what type of jobs to do, as Minsky foresaw for a Job Guarantee program. That is, it is federally funded but locally administered. It would thus be up to individual communities to determine how they can best be benefited.

In a previous article I have discussed the role that college should be playing in today’s workforce and how education, as it is currently administered, has actually increased racial and class inequalities. In tight labor markets racial inequality has been shown to decrease, while with loose labor markets we have seen racial discrimination get worse. Economist Sandy Darity has shown that job prospects for black high school graduates are worse than for white high school dropouts. As I have discussed earlier, expanding the education system fails to provide income for all of our youth, and it does not payoff the same for those from low income families. Automation is on the rise, and business does not have enough demand to justify hiring more workers. We can thus not rely on the private sector to get us to full employment, and should push our legislators to create more local public jobs. While we can probably expect a huge infrastructure bill with our next president, if it’s anything like the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act it is unlikely this will help out low skill workers. With proper targeting, EYAN could hire 22% of our high school dropouts nationwide. This is why I believe in this type of policy, and would love to make it happen.

Reducing poverty and inequality will be hard, but I think a new focus on employment beyond education is the right way to do it. Argentina has had a direct government job creation program, Jefes y Jefas, which was modeled after Minsky’s ELR proposal and showed a lot of promise. It is therefore reasonable to see how such a program would work within the States, and EYAN offers us this chance. I wish I knew how to get it through Congress.

This post is an adaptation of my master’s thesis, and you can find the whole argument here. Comments and feedback are appreciated.

How the Government Deficit Helps the Economy

When we talk about the government deficit, it’s often in the context of bad news. Whether it’s the cover of Time magazine, appointing us each a strangely precise debt of $42,998.12, or the US Debt Clock webpage, which portrays the debt as some sort of apocalypse countdown, we are meant to fear our government’s excessive spending. Standard economics warns against high deficits out of fear that government spending will “crowd out” private investment. This assumes that, when facing a limited money supply, the government will use up all the savings in the economy, in turn reducing private investment and raising interest rates. Clearly, this is not the case, as interest rates have been extremely low in the US despite our deficit.

Let’s look at deficit spending from an accounting perspective, where we divide the economy into three main sectors: the government, the private sector, and the foreign sector. The private sector includes all private entities (households and companies), and the foreign sector represents trade. This approach was pioneered by Wynne Godley and a detailed technical explanation can be found in this paper. In a given time, the amount of money spent and received by these sectors must add up to zero. In other words, a surplus of money in one sector always corresponds to a deficit in another. There can’t be one without the other. Here’s how this manifests in the United States: In a given year, the government spends X amount of money, and receives Y amount back in taxes. If the government spent more than it received, it means the private sector, along with the foreign sector, received more than they spent. Thus, the deficit of the government reflects forms the surplus of foreign and the private sector. In order to look at the foreign sector, we use the inverse of the capital account, which illustrates the trade surplus of the US. By using its inverse we are looking at the surplus of foreign countries against the US.

Applying this approach to the US, we can use the data from the US Financial Accounts to compile the following graph:

This graph illustrates the perfect mirror image between the government’s financial balance, the private sector balance, and the inverse of the capital account (because we are looking at the surplus of the rest of the world).

The mirror image from the graph clearly illustrates how the government deficit is reflected into a private sector surplus. If the government is spending more than it is taxing, it is stimulating the economy, not taking away from it.