Think Uber’s Problems Stop at Its Management and Culture? Think Again.

Keep track of all of Uber’s problems with The Big List of Uber’s Controversies

In February 2017, Susan Fowler published a blog post detailing the sexual harassment and gender discrimination she experienced during her time as an engineer at Uber, the ride-hailing company. Although this was not the first time that Uber had been accused of creating a workplace where pervasive sexism and discrimination thrive, Fowler’s piece struck a chord. It built on a wave of criticism of the company from an earlier public relations disaster — Uber’s missteps following protests of President Trump’s racist executive order at John F. Kennedy Airport starting on January 28th and the resulting #DeleteUber campaign — and emboldened others to report sexual and other misconduct at the company (215 complaints about its corporate workplace have been filed).

While the criticisms levied at Uber are generally applicable to Silicon Valley as a whole, public ire was now focused on Uber, which was having a public relations crisis seemingly every week. The one-time $70 billion-valued private company (five times more valuable than the grocery store Whole Foods, which has 431 supermarkets, and was recently acquired by Amazon) was under immense pressure from even investors too. In response, it agreed to two investigations, both led by law firms. One investigated the workplace complaints that had been lodged against the company, leading to the firing of over 20 employees as well as disciplinary action against others. The second’s task was to investigate Uber’s corporate culture and develop recommendations to restructure the company to try to address the root causes of the problems. This team was led by former Obama administration Attorney General, and former Uber advisor, Eric Holder.

The report from Holder’s team, released a few days ago, came up with 13 pages of recommendations, all of which were adopted by Uber’s board of directors. In general, they seek to bring Uber in line with the practices of a company of its size. Some of these are common sense: developing internal controls and processes in a variety of ways, eliminating bias by performing blind reviews, reducing the unusually high amount of power of key executives, giving the board of directors more power, creating oversight and audit committees, using compensation as a carrot and stick, etc. Other recommendations include ensuring that people with children can participate in company events, which is laudable. Where the proposal fails is in its recommendations for changing values and emphasizing diversity, which include training for staff, developing programs to attract qualified diverse candidates, and reforming the list of the company’s core values (from something that a frat boy would write to, no doubt, corporate-speak clichés). It also included symbolic changes, like renaming Uber’s “War Room,” the “Peace Room”.

While revamping Uber’s structure and setting a bunch of (corporate) priorities might seem like a positive change at the company, it’s important to keep a few things in mind. One is that the problems that Uber is facing with regards to its culture and diversity are pervasive in Silicon Valley. Uber might be especially bad in these areas right now, but the typical solutions are unlikely to make much of a difference at the company because they haven’t made much of a difference at most tech companies. There are complicated reasons for these failures, and there should be little confidence that these tired and hollow strategies will work.

Another is that Uber is a private company, with control intentionally held closely among certain people, like CEO Travis Kalanick, who is most responsible for Uber’s reprehensible culture. As the CEO and founder, he ultimately controls much of what happens at the company, whether the Holder recommendations are adopted, and whether they are taken seriously. The most important result from the Holder investigation — Kalanick’s decision to take leave and take on a supposedly diminished role at the company — was undoubtedly due to pressure from the investigation but still entirely Kalanick’s own decision (and he’s still the CEO). Lastly, while the recommendations wisely agreed to use compensation as a way to incentivize and punish managers for transgressions, in practice, out-of-control pay of CEOs and executives, regardless of performance, is a systemic problem among not only tech companies, but companies in general. Kalanick’s poor performance as head of Uber should lead to a pay cut, but it likely won’t.

Thus, the Holder report might have some good ideas about how Uber could be run better, although it is unlikely that Uber will fundamentally change. (Indeed, at the board of directors meeting to discuss the results of the report, an Uber board member made a sexist remark.) But what this conversation about Uber misses are the more fundamental questions about Uber and its business. The narrative that has emerged about the company since the beginning of this year is that Uber’s problems start and stop at its management (specifically, Kalanick) and culture, when they don’t.

The Big List of Uber’s Controversies is a compendium of the problems and controversies that have plagued the company since its founding in 2009. Many of these are related to the problems the company is very publicly dealing with now; others are not. The goal of the list is to point out that Uber’s problems are pervasive and fundamental to the company’s operations, yet not necessarily unique to the company (although Uber might be an outlier with regard to how poorly it is managed and structured). To that end, the controversies are divided into six categories: Business Practices; Social Costs; Misuse of Data and Software; Corporate Culture; Passenger Issues; and Driver Issues.

While the 79 controversies and problems currently on the list touch on many different and unique issues, there are themes that give some insight into the inner workings of the company and its problems, and demonstrate that Uber’s problems run much deeper than its culture or even the company itself.

  • Uber hemorrhages massive amounts of its investors’ money every year and does not have a viable business model, absent major changes in the industry or the creation of a monopoly;
  • Uber’s success depends on attracting more investment and growing quickly, as well as anti-competitive practices: it has not created efficiencies or value that would justify its poor financial performance;
  • Uber uses misleading research and fantastic technology forecasts to distract from the dismal failure of its core business, taxi service;
  • Uber has large and sophisticated lobbying, public relations, and research departments, often involving former Obama administration officials, that deliberately misleads (and outright lies to) reporters, investors, regulators, and the public in order to justify and give cover to flagrant violations of the law, defend exploitative conditions, and paper over the problems with its business model;
  • Uber erroneously claims that it is a technology — not a taxi — company, and that the business conducted on its platform is “sharing” in order to evade responsibility;
  • Uber has inadequate internal controls for its data and software tools, leading to improper, and possibly illegal, access and use by employees, including to surveil critics and regulators;
  • Uber’s growth-at-any-cost mentality and poor management has led to a culture that ignores problems and creates a toxic culture and workplace for its employees — significantly and negatively impacting its drivers and passengers as well;
  • Uber’s past behavior suggests it has a complete disregard for the safety of its drivers and passengers until it is pressured to take action;
  • Uber manipulates its drivers, entices them to enter into exploitative arrangements (including their misclassification as independent contractors), opposes their unionization, and exerts undue influence over their working conditions, consistently lowering their pay; and
  • Uber’s operation has significant social costs with implications for public safety, public finance, access for those with disabilities, discrimination, investment in public infrastructure, and the regulated taxi industry as well as the taxi driving occupation.

Recent criticism of Uber is undoubtedly a good thing, but as this list demonstrates, its problems extend far beyond the individuals that run it or its corporate culture. With these problems, the fundamental question should not be whether Uber can reform its workplace culture, or whether Kalanick should stay on as CEO, or if he is overly important to the company. Rather it should be whether Uber, and companies like it, should be tolerated at all. In Uber’s case, it is unclear whether it is any better than regulated taxis broadly. Individuals might like Uber’s service — and that’s fine, and also to be expected, considering their rides are all subsidized by Uber’s investors — but policy should not cater what certain segments of the population want, especially if they don’t understand how the company operates.

Another important point is that Uber’s reckless behavior has been tolerated and excused because of its ascending position in the market. But as the clear industry leader today, that is part of the reason why it is now in the crosshairs, even though other ride-hailing companies suffer from some of the same problems as Uber. (Lyft eagerly capitalized on Uber’s misfortunes following the JFK protests, for example.) Importantly, they too have not developed ways to be profitable or more efficient than regulated, fleet-based taxis. Even Juno, the supposedly fair and ethical ride-hailing company that gave its drivers equity in its business, sold them out when it was acquired.

So, while some have suggested that the solution is simply to stop using Uber (and, ostensibly, to use competitors like Lyft or Gett), this is no solution at all. The solution is making sure that these companies are subject to the same regulations as traditional taxis, as well as that they comply with labor and other laws, all of which was unsurprisingly absent from the Holder report. This is the innovative idea that is also a solution to many of Silicon Valley’s problems, regardless of the industry.

Uber might not be able to survive if it started caring about the safety of its passengers, the exploitation of its drivers, or the social costs it shifts onto the rest of us (it’s in trouble already), but maybe it shouldn’t. As politicians plot with Silicon Valley to take over public infrastructure and to revamp the fundamental nature of work, maybe Silicon Valley shouldn’t either.

It’s gotta be true, because data says so

Data and statistics are everywhere, especially in economics. But we forget that empirical results are often manipulated, biased, or inconclusive. To ensure we design policies responsibly, we must meet empirical work with greater skepticism.

by Selim Yaman

In 2008, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu of Deakin University conducted a meta-analysis of 84 studies about democracy and economic growth. After evaluating 483 regression estimates from these studies, they find that every outcome about the political democracy and growth relationship is possible; they observe that  

  • 37% of the estimates are positive and statistically insignificant
  • 27% of the estimates are positive and statistically significant
  • 15% of the estimates are negative and statistically significant
  • 21% of the estimates are negative and statistically insignificant.

The link between inequality and economic growth is equally difficult to identify. Dominics et al (2006) make a meta-analysis of studies focusing on this relationship. According to their study, most of the regressions yield a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth. Yet, when used different estimation techniques and panel datasets, this negative effect vanishes. So, after analyzing a vast amount of empirical literature, no clear relation appears.

Data and statistics grew increasingly important in recent decades. Big Data came to play a large role in many fields, from technology to healthcare. Economics is no different; regression analyses had already been popularized by the neoliberal school of thought. Economics was intentionally made “a real science, within which basic connections between phenomena could be established, like in physics.

In the neoliberal world of economics, you are free from complicated, theoretical discussions, and able to draw firm conclusions. Unlike more nuanced fields like sociology or political science, neoliberal economics allows for simple, elegant arguments. With the help of mathematical modeling and statistical results, arguments take up just a few pages. This neoliberal methodology sounds pretty good in the first place: Direct scientific results, no chit chat. But it’s not as simple as it looks.

To what extent we can trust these statistical methods or the economists that use them? Economists can easily manipulate data to fit their ideological stances, or to comply with their initial hypothesis. Errors rooted in research design create unreliable results too: the type of the data used, the selection of the sample, differences in evaluation methods of estimates, availability of data, direction of causation, regional/country specific characteristics all influence the results. They jointly create a big divergence among empirical macroeconomic studies, leading to a conundrum in many questions.

These problems are not confined to economics; as the use of econometric methodology expands to other fields, the risk contained in data-interpretation increases. Say, there are studies on how religiosity levels affect people’s career paths. Knowing that even the large, carefully executed polls have failed at predicting Brexit, Trump’s victory, and Labour’s success in the UK, how can we trust other surveys to teach us about religion or social preferences? How can someone even build a theory on such data? Above all, how can these studies shape policy designs?

Some of the empirical studies that resulted in wrong conclusions remain unharmed in the ivory tower of academia, desperately waiting for a rare reader. But many of these studies do integrate to the real world, either through policy-making (top to bottom) or through media outlets (bottom to top).

Via the policy-route, developing countries have been one of the victims of empirical studies. The Washington Consensus, for example, suggested fiscal consolidation and trade liberalization. Later, however, it became clear that this was bad advice; copying the economic institutions from the Western world North and applying them to developing nations without considering country-specific environments can be devastating. While the Washington consensus was an elegant argument and supported by data from the West, it failed to account for the complexities of the Global South.   

The second route of influence is the media; when people read the news and encounter headlines like “a recent study found…”, it sparks their attention. But that recent study’s sample size can be very low, and its data can be deficient, and neither editors in the media nor readers will be aware.  To them, the study’s seemingly conclusive result are what is important.

To avoid that we act on false conclusions, academics, policy-makers, and media professionals all carry the responsibility to treat their empirical findings with skepticism. If it was physics, then a causal relationship based on data could be trusted. But for economics and politics, human factors create complications that statistical methods cannot always handle. Overall, it’s better not to overly believe in statistics, because data says so.

About the Author
Selim Yaman works at TRT World Research Centre. Yaman received his BSc from the Economics Department of Boğaziçi University. He is currently a graduate student in Political Economy of Development, at SOAS in London.

Ending the Econocracy: The Need for Pluralism in Economics

To understand why economics students around the globe are calling for Rethinking Economics, the book The Econocracy is a thoughtful and accessible place to start. An econocracy, as defined by authors Joe Earle, Cahal Moran, and Zach Ward-Perkins is “a society in which political goals are defined in terms of their effect on the economy, which is believed to be a distinct system with its own logic that requires experts to manage it.” Their work carefully explains why our current system is an econocracy and discusses possible ways to change that. Based on my own experiences so far, I can’t help but agree with them. 

The Econocracy argues that the current definition of economics is limited to a narrow, neoclassical viewpoint. Institutions of higher education have accepted and helped reinforce this tendency, at the expense of the discipline. The neoclassical approach to economics requires an understanding of complex mathematical models, which leaves many citizens feeling unable to engage with it at all. However, they should not be intimidated by those who do possess the necessary quantitative skills. While today’s economic experts hold prestigious positions, their understanding of math is often greater than their understanding of the economy. As the 2008 recession demonstrated, the majority of current experts didn’t get things right. This shows “the perils of leaving economics to the experts.”

The authors’ critique of economics curricula at colleges and universities necessarily extends to a critique of the higher learning system where these curricula are taught. Interestingly enough, they argue neoclassical arguments have helped shape this system to become what it is today. “Human capital” theory has its roots in neoclassical utility maximization. One of the first exercises in standard econometrics classes is to calculate the “returns to education,” which shows that incomes are higher for those who have completed college degrees.

These type of theories are problematic because they frame education as a “financial investment” which encourages students to give “the minimum effort and engagement necessary to get a satisfactory grade.” Such a mentality “undermines many of the core principles of a liberal education.” The authors look through history at the UK’s higher education system, and show how rising tuition costs financed by personal loans also has its roots in neoclassical thinking. This type of change is symbolic of the econocracy’s influence throughout all spheres of civil life.

While studying at UC Berkeley and Bard College, I met many students who thought and acted this way. As long as you put in a minimal effort, there was little chance of failing or being expelled. Second and third chances were given out often. Teachers did not give a lot of room to think critically about what you were learning, and worksheets and one-size-fits-all curricula were the norm. Nearly every class I had was in a lecture/tutorial format, and nowhere was the socratic method used for teaching. Still, there were some great professors and fellow students who shined the light in the right direction for me. I finished school feeling like I missed out on something, but I’m glad I have my entire life to continue learning.

The Econocracy does more than offer a critiqueit also puts forth a new direction, albeit one that might be tough to achieve. For the authors, reform should start with the education system. They pose it’s necessary to shift away from “a passive student body—whose only input into their education is a tick-box feedback form—to an “active student co-production of education.” Debate and dialogue should be encouraged.

A shift needs to happen within economics curricula too. The authors recommend economics departments teach with a pluralist approach, which would place post-Keynesian, classical, Marxist, feminist, Austrian, historical, ecological, and other perspectives front and center next to neoclassical economics. This way, students would be able to see neoclassical views as one of many ways to look at things. They would recognize that scholars have debated alternative points of view for decades, often on the fringes of the institutions they call home.

As Joan Robinson quipped in Marx, Marshall and Keynes: “The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.” It doesn’t have to be this way. The Econocracy offers a different vision for economics. One where it is not only for the experts but for everyone.  They want to “democratise economics because [they] believe at its core economics should be a public discussion about how to organise society.” That’s something we should all get behind.

At The Minskys, we too hope to help advance a jargon free view of the economy that everyone feels empowered to engage with. Economics can’t just be left to the experts, because “the economy” affects us all.

Be sure to grab your own copy of The Econocracy, read it, and comment down below with your thoughts.