Tag: Crisis

Why You’re Not Getting a Raise

By Nikos Bourtzis.

 

Much of the developed world has experienced stubbornly low real wage growth since the financial crisis of 2007. Currently, the British people are seeing their earnings decline in real terms. Even in Germany, where unemployment keeps falling to record lows, wage growth is stagnating. This phenomenon has squeezed living standards and has been one of the main culprits behind the rise of anti-establishment movements. Faster pay rises are desperately needed for the global recovery to accelerate and for ordinary people to actually be a part of it. This piece explains why rising labor compensation has been relatively minuscule during the current economic upturn and how this phenomenon could be remedied.

A bit of history

The lack of meaningful pay rises is not a phenomenon that started with the financial crisis of 2007. It can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, when monetarism started sweeping into academia and politics. The stagflation of the 1970s, the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment, led some governments to abandon the Keynesian policies of the past because apparently these policies could not deal with the stagflation. Monetary policy became the preferred tool to control inflation, together with a revived notion that markets, if left to their own devices, would bring the best social outcomes. The Thatcher and Reagan governments are some of the most famous examples of States adopting and implementing these beliefs. The first institution targeted for deregulation was the labor market. Wages increases were frozen and employment protection was scaled back, because it was believed that demand and supply forces would restore full employment. However, unemployment in the UK exploded after Thatcher came into office in 1980, increasing  to over 10% and never returning to its post-World War II lows of between 1% and 2%.

Labor unions are one of the most important institutions regarding pay rises. In most industrial countries, they are responsible for wage and working conditions negotiations between employers and employees. Union membership in OECD countries grew until the mid-1970s but then started dropping. With the rise of neoliberal governments in the West, organized labor came under attack. Under the free-market ideology, unions disrupt economic activity with strikes and demand higher-than-optimal wages. Thus, their power needed to be kept in check. What is more important, though, is the shifting of ideas in what the goals of the State should be. In the post-War period, an expressed purpose of governments was to keep aggregate demand at full employment levels. The UK government, for example, stated full employment as its purpose after the War in its Economic Policy White Paper in 1944. That goal changed with the rise of neoliberalism.

When the commitment to keep employment levels high and stable was abandoned, and labor markets were deregulated, unemployment spiked in most countries and has never fallen at levels where it can be stated that full employment exists. Even during strong upturns unemployment levels in most countries did not dip below 4%. As a result, labor unions, and workers in general have lost their biggest bargaining chip. When there is full employment, and thus jobs are abundant, workers have more power to demand higher wages and better working conditions. With the neoliberal policies of the Reagan administration, real wages in the US got decoupled from productivity, meaning that workers stopped receiving their fair share of the output produced. The same phenomenon has been observed in many other industrialized countries, such as the UK. The policies introduced in the 1980s were pretty much sustained and expanded up until 2008.

 

The Financial Crisis: A turn for the worse

The situation became even worse after the financial crisis erupted. For example, in both the US and the UK the growth of wages slowed even more, as shown in the following figure, even as the headline unemployment returned to pre-crisis levels.

Moving towards a low headline unemployment rate, though, does not mean full employment is being achieved. In the US, the U-6 measure of the unemployment rate, which adds the underemployed to the headline rate, shows that the real unemployment rate is at 8.6%. Far from full employment! In the UK, it has been reported by the Office for National Statistics that the number of people employed in zero-hour contracts has risen by 400% since 2000 but most of the rise happened after the financial crisis. Thus, the employment situation is worse than before the crisis which leads to a further decline in wage growth.

 

Why is high wage growth important for the recovery?

It is essential to point out that one of the main reasons the current economic recovery has been weak is low wage growth. Wage income is the main propeller of consumer spending, which accounts for more than 60% of GDP in industrialized countries. Low wage growth means low consumer spending, thus low GDP growth and employment. Currently, households are borrowing to keep their living standards stable and that is what’s keeping consumer spending going. This process, though, is unsustainable and will not last long. When households cannot afford to borrow anymore another financial crisis will almost certainly occur. That’s why governments need to do everything in their power to restore wage growth.

What can be done?

The power of organized labor has been decimated since the 1980s. If workers cannot actually have a say in what happens in the workplace then they cannot fight for fair wages. This is why unions need to be strengthened and supported by governments. Employers should be forced to negotiate wages through collective bargaining and union coverage should be expanded above the current 50% OECD average. This will level the playing field between powerful employers and the currently weak labor class.

As mentioned before, productivity and real wages have been delinked since the 1980s. That’s where the minimum wage could potentially help. In the US, the real minimum wage fell after 1980 and has stayed relatively flat since then. With the liberalization “mania” sweeping the western world, governments are freezing public sector pay rises and Greece even cut the minimum wage in the name of restoring public finances and growth. That’s the exact opposite of what should be done to restore growth. Wages drive consumption and growth, cutting them can only depress the economy. Hiking the minimum wage will help sustain consumption based on wages, employment growth and, thus, wage growth.

A sure way to speed up wage growth again is fiscal stimulus. Government spending lifts aggregate demand directly and effectively. If enough spending is injected into the economy, it will create enough jobs to bring full employment. The momentum and labor scarcity created by the stimulus will force wages up and give workers and labor unions more bargaining power. A Job Guarantee Program, if ever implemented, would effectively set a wage floor in the economy, since any person working at a lower wage than the Job Guarantee offers will be given work in the public sector.

The “curse” of low wage growth is not something new and it definitely got exacerbated with the financial crisis. Even though unemployment is currently falling in many countries, it is still way above full employment levels. With workers’ rights under attack for some time now, unions do not have the power they once did to promote strong pay growth. If the current recovery is to accelerate, and for ordinary people to participate in it, wage growth has to rise substantially. The only way to do this is for labor unions to be strengthened and governments to once again commit to full employment.

About the Author
Nikos Bourtzis is from Greece and recently graduated with a Bachelor in Economics from Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He will be pursuing a Master in Economics and Economic analysis at Groningen University. Research interests are heterodox macroeconomics, anti-cyclical policies, income inequality, and financial instability.

Let’s face it: Monetary Policy is Failing

By Nikolaos Bourtzis.

Monetary policy has become the first line of defense against economic slowdowns — it’s especially taken the driver’s seat in combating the crisis that began in 2007. Headlines everywhere comment on central bank’s (CB) decision-making processes and reinforce the idea that central bankers are non-political economic experts that we can rely on during downturns. They rarely address, however, that central banks’ monetary policies have failed repeatedly and continue to operate on flawed logic. This piece reviews recent monetary policy efforts and explains why central bank operations deserve our skepticism–not our blind faith.

What central banks try to do

To set monetary policy central banks usually target the interbank rate, the interest rate at which commercial banks borrow (or lend) reserves from one another. They do this by managing the level of reserves in the banking system to keep the interbank rate close to the target. By targeting how cheaply banks can borrow reserves, the central bank tries to persuade lending institutions to follow and adjust their interest rates, too. In times of economic struggle, the central bank attempts to push rates down, such that lending (and investing) becomes cheaper to do.

This operation is based on the theory that lower interest rates discourage savings and promote investment, even during a downturn. That’s the old “loanable funds” story. According to the neoclassical economists in charge at most central banks, due to rigidities in the short run, interest rates sometimes fail to respond to exogenous shocks. For example, if the private sector suddenly decides to save more, interest rates might not fall in response. This produces mismatches between savings and investment; too much saving and too little investment. As a result, unemployment arises since aggregate demand is lower than aggregate supply. In the long run, though, these mismatches will disappear and the loanable funds market will clear at the “natural” interest rate which guarantees full employment and a stable price level. But to speed things up, the CB tries to bring the market rate of interest towards that “natural” rate through its interventions.

Recent Attempts in Monetary Policy

However, interest rate cuts miserably failed to kick-start the recovery during the Great Recession. That prompted the use of unconventional tools. First came Quantitative Easing (QE). Under this policy, central banks buy long-term government bonds and/or other financial instruments (such as corporate bonds) from banks, financial institutions, and investors, which floods banks with reserves to lend out and financial markets with cash. The cash is then expected to eventually filter down to the real economy. But this did not work either. The US (the first country to implement QE in response to the Crash) is experiencing its longest and weakest recovery in years. And Japan has been stagnating for almost two decades, even though it started QE in the early 2000s.

Second came “the ‘natural rate’ is in negative territory” argument; Larry Summers’ secular stagnation hypothesis. The logic is that if QE is unable to increase inflation enough, negative nominal rates have to be imposed so real rates can drop to negative territory. Since markets cannot do that on their own, central banks will have to do the job. First came Sweden and Denmark, then Switzerland and the Eurozone, and last but not least, Japan.

Not surprisingly, the policy had the opposite effect of what was intended. Savings rates went up, instead of down, and businesses did not start borrowing more; they actually hoarded more cash. Some savers are taking their money out of bank accounts to put them in safe deposits or under their mattresses! The graph below shows how savings rate went up in countries that implemented negative rates, with companies also following suit by holding more cash.


Central bankers seem to be doing the same thing over and over again, while expecting a different outcome. That’s the definition of insanity! Of course, they cannot admit they failed. That would most definitely bring chaos to financial markets, which are addicted to monetary easing. Almost every time central bankers providea weaker response than expected, the stock market falls.

There is too much private debt.

So how did we get here? To understand why monetary policy has failed to lift economies out of crises, we have to talk about private debt.

Private debt levels are sky high in almost every developed country. As more and more debt is piled up, it becomes more costly to service it. Interest payments start taking up more and more out of disposable income, hurting consumption. Moreover, you cannot convince consumers and businesses to borrow money if they are up to their eyeballs in debt, even if rates are essentially zero. What’s more, some banks are drowning in non-performing loans so why would they lend out more money, if there is no one creditworthy enough to borrow? Even if private debt levels were not sky high, firms only borrow if capacity needs to expand. During recessions, low consumer spending means low capacity utilization, so investing in more capacity does not make sense for firms.

How to move forward

So, now what? Should we abolish central banks? God no! Central banks do play an important role. They are needed as a lender of last resort for banks and the government. But they should not try to fight the business cycle. Tinkering with interest rates and buying up financial instruments encourages speculation and accumulation of debt, which further increases the likelihood of financial crises. The recent pick-up in economic activity is again driven by private debt and even the Bank of England is worried that this is unsustainable and might be the trigger of the next financial crisis.

The success of monetary policy depends on market mechanisms. Since this is an unreliable channel that promotes economic activity through excessive private debt growth, governments should be in charge of dealing with the business cycle. The government is the only institution that can pump money into the economy effectively to boost demand when it is needed. But due to the current misguided fears of large deficits, governments have not provided the necessary fiscal response. Investment requires as little uncertainty as possible to take place and only fiscal policy can reduce uncertainty. Admittedly in previous decades, monetary responses might have been responsible for restoring some business confidence as shown in the figure below.

This effect, though, cannot always be relied upon during severe slumps. And no doubt, more attention needs to be given to private debt, which has reached unprecedented levels.

Monetary policy has obviously failed to produce a robust recovery in most countries. It might have even contributed in bringing about the financial crisis of 2008. But central bankers refuse to learn their lesson and keep doing the same thing again and again. They don’t understand that their policies have failed to kick-start our economies because the private sector is drowning in debt. It’s time to put governments back in charge of economic stabilization and let them open their spending spigots. A large fiscal stimulus is needed if our economies are to recover. Even a Debt Jubilee should not be ruled out!

About the Author
Nikos Bourtzis is from Greece, and recently graduated with a Bachelor in Economics from Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He will be pursuing a Master in Economics and Economic analysis at Groningen University. Research interests are heterodox macroeconomics, anti-cyclical policies, income inequality, and financial instability.

Greece has a Private Debt Crisis and We Can Blame the Troika

The Greek public debt debacle and the bailout received by the government from the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – referred to collectively as the “troika” – has been making headlines for years. However, very little attention has been paid to the debt crisis in the Greek private sector. An alarmingly high portion of private sector borrowers is behind on their debt payments, and the Greek banking system currently has one of the highest ratios of delinquent loans in the European Union.

This collapse of debt prepayments is a direct result the policies imposed by the Troika and threatens the future of Greek economic growth. After the Greek government required financial assistance from international creditors, it was forced to introduce draconic austerity measures to repay its debt. Cutbacks to state services, collapses in incomes, and an increasingly unstable economic environment contracted spending, therefore, eliminating future cash flows that private entities expected to use to repay their debt. The result has been a spiral of collapsing demand and shrinking growth.   

Greece’s accession to the Eurozone was followed by a largely ignored, rapid, and unsustainable build-up in private sector debt. Once the Greek government was forced to impose severe austerity measures and the economy collapsed, the private debt crisis followed. Now, the large ratio of delinquent loans held by Greek banks is adding to the factors hampering economic growth. For Greece to recover, its private debt problems need to urgently be addressed with an approach that offers relief to both borrowers and lenders.

 

This article was originally published by the Private Debt Project. Read the entire article here.

 

The full article highlights how the mismanagement of the Greek sovereign debt problems triggered the current private debt crisis. We show the rapid growth in private debt, document the macroeconomic context that pushed to Greece into a depression, and explain how these factors created a private debt crisis. Then, we discuss some of the existing proposals for addressing a large number of loan delinquencies and their limitations, and finally, propose other approaches to tackle this pressing problem.

Community Currencies: A Ray of Light in the Rust Belt

In times of severe recession, cash can be hard to come by. To somewhat maintain their standard of living and avoid being further driven into poverty, some communities developed their own alternative currencies. These community currencies are parallel systems of exchange. They are growing in popularity in countries such as Greece, which is currently battling the failures of modern capitalism, and could also be implemented in parts of the United States. The Rust Belt states could benefit from the implementation of similar initiatives. We take a quick look at how:

Community Currencies in Europe: Volos

The existence of community currencies as parallel monetary systems is justified by ecological economics, a branch of research that focusses on the interdependence of human economics with the natural environment. The aim is to promote sustainable development through the revival of vital aspects of the socio-economic fabric that have taken a backseat with the rise of capitalism: rebuilding social capital, replacing material consumption and bringing back value to labor to mean more than just as a mere factor of production. In short, it brings the market and its dynamics back to the grassroots level where it is simply an arena for the facilitation of provisioning survival rather than primarily for capital gains and growth.

The way community currencies work is best explained through a real-life example. Take, for instance, the story of Volos, a fishing village located in central Greece. Volos has experienced hard times since the Greek debt crisis began several years ago. Now, barter forms the basis of their system of exchange. The underlying currency is a local alternative unit of account called the TEM.

The TEM acts as a temporary IOU that allows for a more immediate exchange of goods and services the villagers in Volos require to maintain their daily living standards. People can exchange ironing service for language lessons, or potatoes for fish, and so on. The exchanges are supported by an online platform where ads for community members’ needs are posted. The system has come into existence to resolve villagers’ limited access to cash. It’s helped to maintain demand and prevent an economic standstill.


Community Currencies in the US: Time Banks

The most popular form of community currency initiated in the US has been the Time Banking system. Time banks were originally set up to create a social support system within neighborhoods, allowing group members to trade goods and services without money. Each hour of community work is exchanged at the bank for a unit of time-based local credit that can be redeemed for other goods and services. In this way, the labor is valued based on time, not market prices.

The positive impact Time Banking leaves on a community extends well beyond just the ability for low-income groups to access goods and services that might otherwise be unaffordable. It also helps alleviate to some extent the systemic problems of inequality that are often not factored into its cost. Although such systems have sprouted around the United States, they have gained much recognition. Participation rates at Time Banks have remained very low, and it remains unclear why.


Can Community Currencies be used more extensively?

So if Community Currencies can improve economic well-being among low-income groups, why is it not more popular? First, the systems have not been studied sufficiently. A lack of research on Community Currencies and their benefits has limited our understanding of their potential, and their growth in popularity.

Second, there are inherent geographic constraints that community currencies have yet to overcome. Under the current format, payment in community currencies is only accepted within small areas. As such, they can only be used for the exchange of goods and services that were arbitrarily made available within those areas. In order to make the system more successful, the geographic reach should be extended, allowing for more goods and services to be taken up in the system.

State intervention could make this happen. A local government could offer tax incentives to private healthcare facilities within the geographic sector of the community currency. In exchange, the health-care facility would accept payment from uninsured low-income clients in the alternative currency. If more necessary goods and services can be included in the range of products made available there would be more sustainable.

Therefore, Community Currencies require the strong and continued support from their local government to remain successful. In Greece, a first step was made several years ago, when parliament passed a law that allowed barter groups to be classified as non-profit organizations. The local government in Volos was appreciative of the change, given that it allows for some semblance of normal everyday life to continue in a time of austerity.

One reason why government might be reluctant to endorse more of these programs is that it challenges the conventional payment system. However, a community currency as a limited IOU need not pose a threat and can be of significant help in keeping up demand. This allows for more stable incomes for a larger proportion of people in the economy and the capacity to generate more tax revenues in the long run. This is especially relevant in an economic environment that is highly dependent on bank credit to remain functional.

As such, the potential of community currencies should not go unrecognized. Governments should step in to help broaden the system, and allow for their participants to reap the full benefits. This way, community currencies can be an invaluable source of demand in times of crisis.

The Case for Community Currencies in the ‘Rust Belt’

The Rust Belt comprises the set of states bordering the Great Lakes, which were once famous for being the heart of manufacturing and industry in the US. This changed with the economic decline brought about by the recessions of the late 1970’s and early 80’s, which continued to worsen with the further decline of US manufacturing.

Entire towns and villages in this region have disappeared along with the core industry that once sustained them. Some towns were able to salvage their economies by capitalizing on tourism or education, but this is not a strategy that can be extended to the entire region. States such as Michigan and Ohio also cope with an aging population, male joblessness, and rising opiate addiction. There is a dire need for the region’s underprivileged to become active and positive contributors to society again.

If aided by the state, community currencies could be the starting point for the Rust Belt states to begin their journey back to being the productive contributors to the US economy that they once were. Just like in Volos, it could boost economic activity and allow members to contribute to the rebuilding of their community.

The economic benefits of State regulated Community Currencies could include incentives for sharing skill sets to allow more unskilled workers to become employed. There would be less dependence on welfare as the marginalized begin to seek more socially and individually meaningful ways of sustaining themselves. This would also offer a much-needed boost to local economies that would be limited to purchasing goods and services within the community

The success of such initiatives often depends on communities coming together and organizing to collectively achieve economic wellbeing, setting aside social and class differences. The effective implementation of community currencies in places like Volos was ultimately determined by the way such systems are maintained and nurtured by the entire community under the appropriate community leadership. Whether such social dynamics also exist to the required extent in the communities of the Rust Belt is still something to be discovered. If so, then there may well be a light on the horizon to guide them out from under the burden of years of poverty.

Written by Athulya Gopi
Athulya is originally Indian, born and brought up in the United Arab Emirates. She joined the Levy Masters Program in 2016 after leading a successful career in credit insurance over the last 8 years. She has a few more years of worldly wisdom than her fellow classmates! The choice to swap her role as the head of commercial underwriting with that of a full-time student came after being inspired to see how Economics works in the real world.

In Defense of Dodd-Frank

It’s been nearly a decade since we first felt effects of the Great Recession. While the recession officially ended, its consequences still affect us. Some are beneficial, others (like sluggish growth and the number of people leaving the labor market) not so much. One of the better side effects of the 2007-2008 crash, however, is likely to disappear rather soon: the Dodd-Frank act. The newly inaugurated White House is eager to scrap that set of financial regulations.

My goal with this post is to present a very simple explanation of what Dodd-Frank is, why some people want it gone, and why we should fight to keep it and strengthen it. Hopefully, this accessible explanation will motivate more people to join the fight. Maybe then we can have our voices heard. With this objective in mind, I am aware that some details will not be pursued to their full extent, but the overall message should still be whole.

Let me start with a very simplified analogy. Think of the financial system as a system of highways. In a modern highway, there are usually a few lanes on each side, separated by a median. There are many regulations put in place to make sure that the people zooming past each other inside two tons of metal–all the while sitting inches away from gallons of gasoline–do it safely. In this analogy, your average American with their savings, retirement account, mortgage, student debt and credit cards is driving north on the “commercial” lanes in their Peel P-50 (click the link, it will help you understand where I am going with this). Besides them are other entities such as big banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and the like. Those are heavy 18-wheelers and tanker trucks, so the massive gusts of wind that they create will shake smaller cars as they pass by. Of course, whenever a P-50 gets into a crash (like when a head of household goes bankrupt) it is tragic, but it does little to the overall flow of traffic. However, when one of those big vehicles crashes, it often leads to a chain reaction of other accidents, which affects all other drivers and overall makes everyone’s day a lot worse.  

After the great crash of 1929 (the financial crash, I’m unaware of any major vehicular crashes from back then), a set of fairly stiff regulations were designed to keep the drivers of that industry–namely the banks and other financial institutions–from getting in other accidents of similar magnitude. Those regulations were known as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, enacted as an answer to the failure of almost 5,000 banks. The legislation was put in place to strengthen the public’s opinion towards the financial sector, to curb the use of bank credit speculation, and to direct credit towards more “real economy” uses. In our analogy, Glass-Steagall introduced a number of norms to the ‘financial highway’. Most notably, it created a solid median between the financial and the commercial banking lanes. Now, commercial banks could not use their clients’ funds to engage in risky investments in the financial markets. In our analogy, it means that before Glass-Steagall those big trucks were free to go across the road to the “wrong way” whenever they felt like doing so would be beneficial for them. In addition, Glass-Steagall also created the FDIC, which insures bank deposits; think of it as the weight-per-axis limitations that help preserve the roads from the damage caused by overloaded trucks.

Fast forward to the Clinton presidency, 1999 to be exact. By then, the broad belief that separation between financial and commercial banking was necessary had lost force, even though it had kept the American economy away from any significantly serious recession/depression for over 70 years. That year the barrier between the financial and commercial lanes was brought down. Now, banks and other financial players were free to drive on whatever side of the highway they wanted; banks (and others) are now able to use their clients savings and retirements accounts to buy and sell toxic financial assets such as CDOs. As a result, they were able to take bigger risks, which brought–in many cases–good rewards. This is the era of leveraging, or what Minsky called “Money Manager Capitalism.” To some, it was clear that such an environment would eventually lead to a big crash; a few smaller ones serving as a warning. Indeed, with 2007 came the worst financial and economic ‘accident’ in almost 80 years.

Financial regulations are naturally reactionary. As Minsky stated, the economy is inherently unstable, and in good part that is due to the financial sector’s insatiable thirst for financial innovation. Regulators need to remain attentive to the markets and introduce rules to curb too-risky behaviors as they surface. This is especially true in the days and weeks following a crisis. Once the dust has settled we can look into the causes for the downturn, and put in place measures that are supposed to keep it from happening again, not unlike the way traffic regulations are designed. As such, the Dodd-Frank Act was drafted to put a stop to some of the recklessness that drove us to the Great Recession.

In short, Dodd-Frank ended Too Big to Fail Bailouts, created a council that identifies and addresses systemic risks within the industry’s most complex members, targeted loopholes that allowed for abusive financial practices to go unnoticed, and gave shareholders a say on executive pay. It aims to increase transparency and ethical behavior within the financial sector, both of which are good things.

In no way is the Act perfect. Some, like me, would have advocated for much stiffer regulatory practices like rebuilding the division between financial and commercial banks, or taking a more definitive approach to dissolving Too-Big-To-Fail institutions. Therefore, during its somewhat short existence, Dodd-Frank has received much criticism. While some of those critiques were fair and well founded, the loudest critics were the ones coming at a wrong angle. As it happens the loudest critics now have the opportunity to scrap those safeguarding regulations altogether.

The most common criticism of the Act (and the main reason the administration has given to overrule it) is that it has made it harder for people and businesses to borrow. That criticism is untrue. For example, Fed Chair Janet Yellen showed in her latest address to the senate that “lending has expanded overall by the banking system, and also to small businesses.” A survey from the National Federation of Independent Businesses, cited by Yellen, shows that only 2 percent of businesses that responded cited access to capital as a great obstacle to their activities. Furthermore, to claim that Dodd-Frank has a macro impact on lending is, at least, sketchy. As Yves Smith puts it:

“For starters, big corporations use bank loans only for limited purposes, such as revolving lines of credit (which banks hate to give but have to for relationship reasons because they aren’t profitable) and acquisition finance for highly leveraged transactions (and the robust multiples being paid for private equity transactions says there is no shortage of that). Banks lay off nearly all of the principal value of these loans in syndications or via packaging them in collateralized loan obligation. They are facing increased competition from the private equity firm’s own credit funds, which have become a major force in their own right. Otherwise, big companies rely on commercial paper and the bond markets for borrowing. And with rates so low and investors desperate for yield, many have been borrowing, for sure….but not to invest, but to a large degree to buy back their own stock.”

In fact, the amount of cash held by American corporations reached an all-time high in 2013. This shows that companies are sitting in liquidity without investing in the real economy. The hoarding of liquidity could even be considered an actual fail of Dodd-Frank; unlike the stiffer Glass-Steagall act it did not focus on pushing investment into the production of real goods and services.

The publicized reasoning behind repealing Dodd-Frank is untrue, so what is the motivation for lobbying against the regulations? In my opinion, there are two main arguments. The less malicious one is that there is still people out there who believe than an unregulated, free-for-all financial sector is effective, benevolent, and will serve the greater good. It is almost a dogmatic position based mostly on circular logic, and unrealistic economics modeling (which often does not even take the financial sector into account!), and lack of supporting evidence. It should be put aside. The second argument seems to be popular among lobbyists and government officials: reducing regulations will allow (at least in the short run) for immense profits.

Without Dodd-Frank, Wall Street will most likely revert to the risky and reckless practices that led to the Great Recession. The repeal of the act would, in Minskian terms, act as a catapult launching us towards the Ponzi state of finance, in which risky borrowing and lending end in a financial crisis. Doomsday predictions aside, repealing Dodd-Frank would hurt the common folk like you and I. For example, the Fiduciary Rule is likely to also be erased, and it requires that investment advisers put their clients’ interests above their own. This puts people’s retirement savings at great risk. If money managers do not have to act in their clients’ best interest, they will make decisions that allow them to maximize their commission even if it means losing money for their clients. Additionally, to some extent, the repeal would kill thousands of jobs across the nation; because of Dodd-Frank, financial institutions had to create and staff entire departments focused on quality assurance and compliance, without the rules these employees are not longer needed. Finally, without the rules, banks can go right back to targeting the most vulnerable and financially illiterate among us, offering them loans, mortgages, and other predatory instruments they cannot possibly afford; it would be disastrous.

Reverting back to our simplified analogy. Since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the highways of the financial systems do not have a median, separating investment traffic from going the ‘wrong way’ into the commercial lanes. Further repealing rules such as the Dodd-Frank Act, without substituting with a set of better regulations, is like removing the usage of turning signals, the requirement for turning the lights on at night, and speed limits – all the while releasing the Bull from Wall Street right in the middle of heavy traffic. Accidents will happen, and in the case of our financial highway it does not matter if we are inside the vehicles involved, we are all going to become casualties of the crash.

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 2

The work of Hyman Minsky highlighted the essential role of finance in the capital development of an economy. The greater a nation’s reliance on debt relative to internal funds, the more “fragile” the economy becomes. The first part of this post used these insights to uncover the weaknesses of today’s global economy. This part will discuss an alternative international structure that could address these issues.

Minsky defines our current economic system as “money manager capitalism,” a structure composed of huge pools of highly leveraged private debt.  He explains that this system originated in the US following the end of Bretton Woods, and has since been expanded with the help of  financial innovations and a series of economic and institutional reforms. Observing how this system gave rise to fragile economies, Minsky looked to the work of John Maynard Keynes as a start point for an alternative.

In the original discussions of the post-war Bretton Woods, Keynes proposed the creation of a stable financial system in which credits and debits between countries would clear off through an international clearing union (see Keynes’s collected writings, 1980).

This idea can be put in reasonably simple terms: countries would hold accounts in an International Clearing Union (ICU) that works like a “bank.” These accounts are denominated in a notional unit of account to which nation’s own currencies have a previously agreed to an exchange rate. The notional unit of account – Keynes called it the bancor – then serves to clear the trade imbalances between member countries. Nations would have a yearly adjusted quota of credits and debts that could be accumulated based on previous results of their trade balance. If this quota is surpassed, an “incentive” – e.g. taxes or interest charges – is applied. If the imbalances are more than a defined amount of the quota, further adjustments might be required, such as exchange, fiscal, and monetary policies.

The most interesting feature of this plan is the symmetric adjustment to both debtors and creditors. Instead of having the burden being placed only on the weakest party, surplus countries would also have to adapt their economies to meet the balance requirement. That means they would have to increase the monetary and fiscal stimulus to their domestic economies in order to raise the demand for foreign goods. Unlike a pro-cyclical contractionist policy forced onto debtor countries, the ICU system would act counter-cyclically by stimulating demand.

Because the bancor cannot be exchanged or accumulated, it would operate without a freely convertible international standard (which today is the dollar). This way, the system’s deflationary bias would be mitigated.  Developing countries would no longer accumulate foreign reserves to counter potential balance-of-payment crises. Capital flows would also be controlled since no speculation or flow to finance excessive deficits would be required. Current accounts would be balanced by increasing trade rather than capital flows. Moreover, the ICU would be able to act as an international lender of last resort, providing liquidity in times of stress by crediting countries’ accounts.

Such a system would support international trade and domestic demand, countercyclical policies, and financial stability. It would pave the way not only for development in emerging economies (who would completely free their domestic policies from the boom-bust cycle of capital flows) but also for job creation in the developed world. Instead of curbing fiscal expansion and foreign trade, it would stimulate them – as it is much needed to take the world economy off the current low growth trap.

It should be noted that a balanced current account is not well suited for two common development strategies. The first is  import substitution industrialization, which involves running a current account deficit.  The second is export-led development, which involves  a current account surplus. However, the ICU removes much of the need for such approaches to development. Since all payments would be expressed in the nation’s own currency, every country, regardless it’s size or economic power, would have the necessary policy space to fully mobilize its domestic resources while sustaining its hedge profile and monetary sovereignty.

Minsky showed that capable international institutions are crucial to creating the conditions for capital development. Thus far, our international institutions have failed in this respect, and we are due for a reform.

Undeniably, some measures towards a structural change have already been taken in the past decade. The IMF, for example, now has less power over emerging economies than before. But this is not sufficient, and it is up to the emerging economies to push for more. Unfortunately, the ICU system requires an international cooperation of a level that will be hard to accomplish. Aiming for a second-best solution is tempting. But let’s keep in mind that Brexit and Trump were improbable too. So why not consider that the next unlikely thing could be a positive one?

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 1

The global system has seen two major shocks in 2016: the Brexit vote and Trump. What these events have in common is their populist rhetoric that promised to bring back jobs. These elections have tapped into growing anxiety over job security, which has not been addressed by most governments and has given room for demagogues to tap into the anger of the people. They reflect a problem that transcends the boundaries of any single nation: the global economy has been in a slump for almost a decade. Governments need to create jobs, and public fiscal stimulus is the way to do so. To allow it, we must rethink that system.

To understand why we have to consider the international system in which nation states currently operate in. Its current characteristics present challenges for developed and developing economies alike. There are two important features to consider: first, the system creates a deflationary bias by requiring recessionary adjustments and hoarding of the international mean of payment (i.e. dollars). Second, it lacks mechanisms to offset the chronic surpluses and deficits between nations, thus breeding financial instability. In a nutshell, it leads to poor creation and distribution of demand that is managed through capital flows. Instead of propping up demand, the global economic system props up debt.

This post will be split into two parts. This first part will employ the theories of Hyman Minsky to explain the features of our current global economy. Next week, we will follow up to discuss an alternative system that would allow for a better distribution of demand among countries and would support emerging economies’ development by freeing them from the swings of international markets.

In his Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky addresses the ability of a company to honor its debt commitments. Companies can finance investment through previously retained earnings (internal funds) and/or by borrowing (external funds). If retained earnings prove to be insufficient, and the company comes more and more reliant on borrowed funds, the company’s balance sheet structure shifts from being stable to unstable. As presented in a previous post on this blog, Minsky described this process as moving from a stable “hedge” profile to a riskier “speculative” profile, and finally to a dangerous “Ponzi” profile.

Similarly, a country has three ways in which it can meet its debt commitments denominated in foreign currency: i) by obtaining foreign exchange through current account surpluses; ii) by using the stock of international reserves (obtained through previous current account surpluses); and iii) by obtaining access to foreign savings, i.e. borrowing. The first characterizes a hedge financial profile in which the cash inflows are sufficient to pay the foreign currency denominated liabilities. Any mismatch between inflows and outflows can be covered by reserves (its cushion of safety) or by borrowing; while the former can still characterize a hedge profile – as long as the cushion of safety is big enough to cover the shortfall for the necessary period of time – the latter is said to be speculative. In other words, the country borrows to cover a mismatch with the expectation that future revenues will be used to meet those debt obligations.

A situation in which further rounds of borrowing are necessary to meet those commitments is by definition a Ponzi scheme. It can only be sustained over time if it manages to keep fooling investors to continue to lend. Once a greater fool is not found and financial flows are reversed, the economy collapses in a Fisher-type debt deflation: as assets are liquidated to meet those financial obligations, their prices fall and the debt burden becomes increasingly heavier. The case of a country is different from a company, where outflows are often accurately expected, and it commonly leads to massive capital flight, currency devaluation, fall in public bond prices and increase in its premiums (i.e. interest rate payments). This last point illustrates the implications of accumulating foreign liabilities – reserves included – and implies the growth of negative net financial flows from borrowers to creditors through debt servicing. In general, from developing to developed countries.

The adjustment process punishes the borrower much harder than the lender. Greece presents a clear example. For the borrowing country, the standard imposed remedy is austerity: curtail of imports and public expenditure in order to forcefully meet those debts. Or, more often, to stir up enough confidence and access additional financial resources from private investors; in other words, continuing the Ponzi financing. Even in a case where interest payments on the borrowed funds are lower than the rate of capital inflow, the stock of debt would still expand, increasing financial fragility. A development strategy dependable on increasing usage of foreign savings is thus not feasible.

Of course, economic development is an extremely broad subject and we sure don’t want to commit the mistake of suggesting a “one-size-fits-it-all” policy a la neoliberal disciples. Nonetheless, a common issue for many developing economies is the lack of complexity and variety of its production structure – heavily dependent on primary goods – and the low price-elasticity of demand for its exports, which means that shifts in prices (exchange rate) do not do much to stimulate exports (increasing demand). As such, price adjustments might not always work as expected. This is one of the rationales behind the familiar “import substitution industrialization” strategy that tragically seems to have become the case for the UK and US.

These common characteristics affect the ability of emerging economies to face both up- and downswings of the international economy with countercyclical policies. While international liquidity is abundant in booming periods, it becomes extremely scarce during the slumps. Both capital floods and flights can be domestically disruptive for a developing economy, affecting its employment and output level, solvency, and – ultimately, its sovereign power. With scarce demand and international liquidity, the indebted economy falls into the debt-deflation spiral: it has to incur in a recession big enough to collapse imports at a faster rate than exports thus generating surpluses to clear off debt.

It should be clear that besides being completely inefficient – as opposed to the argument commonly used by “free-the-capital” defenders – the current economic system does little to stimulate demand. It is quite the contrary. Notwithstanding, after almost 10 years after the financial crisis, the world economy is still suffering the consequences of economic “freedom,” and the fighting tool has focused excessively on monetary rather than fiscal policy. Instead of cooperation, we are prone to have currency wars, protectionism, “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies and chronic debt accumulation.

These points of criticism are not novel, but they do deserve more of our attention. The same applies to their solutions, which are the focus of Part 2 of this article.

Italy is Hungry for Expansionary Fiscal Policy

In a meeting with Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande on August 22, the Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi proudly announced that Italy has the lowest public deficit of the last 10 years, and will continue with structural reforms to reduce it further. Monti has long aimed to “restore credibility” by cutting the public deficit, and now the Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan enjoys praise on his achievement of a deficit as small as 2.4% of GDP. The FED (Financial and Economic Document) goes so far as say this makes Italy “among the most virtuous countries in the Eurozone.”

A closer look at Italy’s economy, however, shows this “virtuosity” has no basis in reality. In 2015, 1.5 million households lived in absolute poverty. Another 4.5 million individuals saw stagnant incomes. The situation has not been this bad since 2005. In addition, the Migrantes foundation informs us that there has been a boom of italians who go abroad, 107,000 in 2015 (+6,2%). Especially youth from 18 to 34 years old (36,7%).
Source: [Ansa.it “Rapporto fondazione Migrantes”]

The percentage of serious material deprivation index is 11,5% for total households members. Official unemployment rate is at 11,9% whereas the real unemployment rate is well above the 20%. The inactivity rate is at 36,0 % and the fixed capital investment ratio is stuck well below the pre-crises (2007-08) levels.
Source: [“Rapporto annuale Istat, 2016”]

It is clear that Italy is stuck in a deep depression. And it’s not alone. Many other euro countries are suffering the same fate. Cutting public spending cannot help them recover. We turn to Keynes to see why it cannot, and consult the work of Minsky and Wynne Godley to see what can.

Keynes and Aggregate Demand

In The General Theory, J.M. Keynes explains the challenges blocking achieving and maintaining full employment in a market economy. He argues that the booms and busts associated with capitalism make this state of equilibrium very difficult to reach. When a bust occurs, and businesses expect their profits to fall, there’s no reason to expect a magical market-force to step in and fix employment while costs are being cut.

This applies to Italy, too. After years of austerity and a Global Financial Crises, aggregate demand levels have declined sharply most people feel uncertain about the future. Additional demand for labor is close to zero and the private sector is pessimistic. Investment and spending is not sufficient to employ the unemployed. Cutting down government expenditure is not going to to help. It will simply make it worse.

Minsky and Fiscal Policy

A follower of Keynes, Hyman Minsky explained how any analysis of a monetary capitalist economy must start from the analysis of balance sheets and its relative financial interrelations ‘measured’ in of cash flows. If balance sheets and especially the relative financial relations are not taken into account within an analysis of an essentially financial and monetary economy, that analysis fails to reflect the full reality.

Minsky’s alternative analysis shows that in case of crisis, a nation needs a “Big Government” (The Treasury Department) and a “Big Bank” (The Central Bank) to step up. These institutions must focus on serving as an “Employer of Last Resort” and a “Lender of Last Resort”, respectively. This way, they can prevent wages and asset prices from dropping further, and tame the market economy. In the Euro-zone, this has not been realized. The Treasury Department is constrained, leaving them unable to reach full employment. Meanwhile, citizens continue suffer under austerity.

Wynne Godley and the Government Budget

Wynne Godley’s sectoral balance approach sheds more light on this Minskyian alternative. He shows the economy consists of two sectors: The government sector, and the private sector (all households and businesses).** The private sector can accumulate net financial assets only if the other sector, government, runs a budget deficit. That is, only if the flows of the government spends more than it receives in taxes. It is impossible for both sectors to run a surplus at the same time.

And as a simple matter of macro-accounting, for aggregate output to be sold, total spending must equal the total income generated in the production process. So given households’ decisions to consume and given firms’ decisions to invest, there will be involuntarily idle labour for sale with no buyers at current wages, if the government deficit spending is too small to accommodate the net desire to save of the private sector.

What Renzi and Padoan are Really Saying

We can now see what Renzi and Padoan are really congratulating themselves for. Having done nothing to lift a struggling private sector out of the recession, they patting themselves on the back for worsening it’s social and economic situation. Renzi may claim he will go to Brussels to “sbattere i pugni sul tavolo”, but his executives continue to respect the Stability and Growth pact regime, and decrease the deficit further.

From Wynne Godley, we know that further decreasing the government deficit corresponds to further deterioration the private sector surplus. So when the officials say they “need to put public accounts in order,” they are actually saying they will put households and business accounts in dis-order. So when they say that Italy has the lowest budget deficit of the last 10 years, they are actually stating that the government is draining more financial assets from the private sector than it has in a decade.

When they call Italy virtuous for keeping a smallest deficit, they assign virtue to the nation that most effectively perpetuates poverty and social disarray. When Renzi says that his non elected executive “will continue […] the reduction of the deficit for our children and grandchildren”, he is instead telling us that his government is going to reduce the net desire to save of the current population, to keep involuntary unemployment and part-time working levels high and to firmly deteriorate the (net) financial and real wealth of the future generations.

Unless Italy changes its approach and adopts expansionary fiscal policy, it will not serve the well-being of the society and its economy. The main goal of full employment will never be attained and maintained. Work will lack moral and economic dignity, public sector goods will fall short in quantity and quality, and basic human rights will be violated. Not only will policy goals fail to be achieved, they will be even farther out of reach. One thing is certain: either Renzi and his ministers don’t know what they’re doing, or they are doing it in bad faith. I am afraid of it may be both.

* To be as precise as possible, Italian public budget deficit has been systematically reduced from 1991, that is the year when the Treaty of Maastricht was ratified which, among other things, established the respect of the parameter of the 3% to the public deficit and 60% to the (flawed) public debt/gdp ratio.
** I do not take into account the foreign sector balance sheet, because the substance of my brief argument won’t be undermined.