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Not such a Great Equalizer after all

Because it has no regard for borders, the coronavirus has been referred to as the Great Equalizer. But its impact is not equal by any stretch of the imagination. While China, Europe, and Northern America may recover relatively fast, emerging market economies are less resilient. The combined health, economic, and financial tolls they now endure may cause them to face the greatest recession in decades.

By Jack Gao | When COVID-19 hit, China’s strong state and centralized public administration allowed it to suppress the domestic spread. In Europe, welfare systems and appropriate policy responses made sure workers have less to worry about when economies reopen. The United States (despite Trump’s handling leaving much to be desired) enjoys a unique status of its own. The American economy and “exorbitant privilege” of the US dollar mean that policy responses can be put forth in short order, and with relatively few negative repercussions. For most emerging market economies, however, none of this can be taken for granted. The coronavirus is shaping up to be the “perfect storm” that many feared. It could sink the developing world into a deep economic recession.

No Doctors and No Food

Let’s start with public health. While the increase of new deaths in the epicenters—US, UK, Italy, Spain—appears to be slowing, the virus rages on in major developing nations. Russia, India, Mexico, and Brazil continue to report well above a thousand new daily deaths, and many of them are still on an upward trajectory. In India, a brief relaxation of the lockdown was met with a jump in deaths, underscoring that the fight to contain the virus will be an uphill battle.

Although health systems are being tested everywhere, the ones in developing countries were already under strain before COVID-19 reared its head. For example, the average number of health workers per 1000 people in OCED countries is 12.3. In the African region, this ratio is only 1.4.

As if the health crisis is not crushing enough, the United Nations warns of a “hunger pandemic” as an additional 130 million people could be pushed to the brink of starvation this year, with the vast majority of them in developing countries. The coronavirus may cross borders easily, but the suffering it causes is not equal across countries.

Locked Down and Out of Work

If the human toll of the pandemic is appalling, the economic damages to countries are unprecedented as well, as countries implement lockdown and “social distancing” to combat the virus. In the latest World Economic Outlook growth projections by the IMF, emerging market economies as a whole are expected to contract 1% this year, for the first time since the Great Depression. Literally all developing countries may be in economic decline as a result of COVID-19, with India and China eking out paltry growth. Still, these headline numbers mask the true extent of economic hardship.

Take working from home, for example. Economists have documented a clear relationship between the share of jobs that can be done at home and the national income level. In a developed country like the United States, some 37 percent of jobs can be performed at home—education, finance and IT being at the top of the scale. In some developing economies, less than 10 percent of jobs can be done remotely.

On top of all this, global remittances are collapsing. The amount of money transferred to migrants’ home countries may fall by 20 percent as workers see dwindling employment. This is terrible news for countries like Lesotho, where remittances are as much as 16% of GDP.

Where’d the money go?

The global financial system exacerbates these struggles with its core and periphery topology. During good times, foreign capital flows into emerging markets, looking for higher yields. But in bad times, when that capital is needed most, it swiftly disappears. This dynamic is now on full display. As investors started to realize the true scale of the pandemic and major central banks initiated new rounds of monetary easing, emerging economies saw capital flight as investors rushed to safer assets. An estimated 100 billion portfolio dollars fled emerging markets in the first quarter alone.

In the face of such severe dollar shortages and liquidity crunch in developing countries, the Federal Reserve had to expand central bank liquidity swaps and launch a new lending facility to come to the rescue. The impact of such international measures is still an open question. But with currency depreciation, higher borrowing costs, declining official reserves, and falling commodity prices, it appears that the financial stress emerging economies are under may be difficult to reverse.

The Triple Whammy

This way, developing countries face a health-blow, and economic-blow, and a financial-blow, all at once. An emerging market economy faced with just one of those would have resulted in a crisis. But amid COVID-19, all emerging economies were are confronted with all three crises at the same time. The damage done by this “triple whammy” could plague the developing world for years to come.

Jack Gao is a Program Economist at the Institute for New Economic Thinking. He is interested in international economics and finance, energy policy, economic development, and the Chinese economy. He previously worked in financial product and data departments in Bloomberg Singapore, and reported on Asian financial markets in Bloomberg News from Shanghai. Jack holds a MPA in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School, and a B.S. in Economics from Singapore Management University. He has published articles on China Policy Review and Harvard Kennedy School Review.

Coronavirus Needs Not Kill Globalization

By Jack Gao | The COVID19 crisis is shaping up to be the most severe challenge the world has to confront since World War II. At present, almost 800,000 cases have been reported from virtually every country in the world, with the death toll nearing 40,000. Not only is much of the global economy frozen as we fight the virus, but national borders are also being shut down to contain its spread. As this battle goes on, many are already predicting that the world may never be the same again.

The knee-jerk reaction is to substantially roll back on the current globalization regime, so global pandemics may be eliminated for once and for all. But this reflex towards nationalism completely misses the point. Crises like this one reflect on the perversion of current globalization, not on globalization per se. We should not throw the baby out with the bathwater, but instead, take the crisis as an opportunity to improve on the version of globalization that prioritized some objectives but neglected others.

First of all, a more divided world in no way guarantees global pandemics will no longer happen. One only needs to turn to the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic that claimed 100 million lives or the even more lethal Black Death episode, both when the world was more divided, for some evidence. Periodic outbreaks of infectious diseases have plagued humanity throughout history, and, more than anything, it was progressing in science and healthcare that accounted for the gradual decline in fatality and damages, in spite of advances in globalization. In fact, we could reasonably argue that better health outcomes, nutrition access, sanitation facilities wrought by economic development are important reasons we have fewer and less deadly pandemics today, thanks to globalization. It’s wishful thinking that less globalization will result in fewer pandemics.

Second, when crises do strike, we are much better positioned to respond to them as a globally connected community. Although leaving much to be desired, information sharing has proved key to containing the coronavirus outbreak. China alerted the WHO by the end of last year of unusual pneumonia in Wuhan; within days, Chinese scientists posted the genome of the new virus, allowing virologists in Berlin to produce the diagnostic test of the disease for worldwide access. We often take for granted communications of this kind today, which we can ill-afford if balkanization was to rule the day.

Even as borders are shut to reduce human flow at the moment, global commerce continues to play a crucial role to ensure the supply of medical products and equipment as we fight the pandemic. For instance, the crisis may have already subsided in China, but Chinese companies are currently working around the clock as ventilator orders pour in from the rest of the world. Similarly, at least a few dozen pharmaceutical companies from around the world are racing to develop vaccines and treatments for the virus, knowing that they’ll have ready access to a global marketplace to recoup their investments. Just imagine how much harder this battle would be if countries were left to their domestic supply chains or scientific knowledge.

Finally, while much is still unclear about how the current outbreak unfolded, from the evidence we do have, it is national mishandling or in some cases deglobalization factors that contributed the lion’s share to its unbridled spread. China’s earlier misstep on information reporting, America’s testing debacle and obsession with travel bans, and UK’s initial flirtation with herd immunity are just a few examples of national blunders that hastened the transmission of the virus, which have little to do with globalization. Meanwhile, in a bid to have America go it alone, Trump’s elimination of epistemologist based in China, staff cuts at the CDC, and heightened tariffs on Chinese medical products may well have made this health crisis worse than it has to be.

Each crisis is an opportunity in disguise, the coronavirus is no different. It should be taken as a reminder that our disregard to some objectives and narrow-minded pursuit of others have tilted the world off-balance. In a globalization solely focused on promoting international trade and financial flows and centered around organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, this outbreak caught the incumbent international regime completely off-guard. Either in funding, capacity, or power, the World Health Organization has been no match to its counterparts charged with commercial and financial affairs. Seen in this light, the outbreak should serve as a rude awakening to a world economy that prioritizes economic integration over public health, environmental, and climate concerns.

As the fight to contain the coronavirus continues, many believe this crisis will bring an end to globalization as we know it, some may even work hard to make sure this is so out of self-interest. However, it bears emphasizing that a balkanized and disintegrated world is neither feasible nor desirable. The coronavirus does not have to kill globalization, instead, it is our chance to rebalance the world economy to better serve collective social goals and tackle future challenges as a coordinated global community.

Currency manipulation accusation against China not just “wrong now”, but fundamentally flawed

By Alexander Beunder. Investigative journalist. Platform Authentieke Journalistiek, the Netherlands.

Now that the dust has settled around the latest U.S.-China trade war spat, here’s something the Trump regime may want to evaluate before the next round: the fact that many economists and analysts refused to side with Trump and Mnuchin when they accused China of “currency manipulation”.

Initially, the story of Chinese currency manipulation was echoed around the world, when the Chinese yuan dropped 1,4% to the dollar on Monday, August 5. After US president Donald Trump responded by tweet that China was guilty of “currency manipulation”, the Wall Street Journal and others described how Beijing was “weaponizing the yuan”. China was obviously responding, some analysts said, to new import tariffs on Chinese products which Trump had announced a week before. The press paid even more attention to the story because of the diplomatic drama around it, as US Treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin rushed to officially declare China a “Currency Manipulator” and said to bring the matter to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It’s an accusation Trump (but before him, Obama) has been repeating for years. China’s central bank is supposedly keeping the value of the yuan to the dollar artificially low – by buying and holding on to dollar reserves – to make its exports cheap for the rest of the world. This creates an “unfair competitive advantage”, in the words of Mnuchin. Thanks to its cunning currency manipulation scheme, the argument goes, China enjoys a persistent trade surplus – exporting more than importing – while the U.S. suffers a trade deficit, hurting businesses and workers.

But fact-checking Trump’s statements has become a healthy habit among journalists. Several analyses quoted economists who disagreed with the latest accusations by Trump and Mnuchin. As The New York Times business correspondent Alexandra Stevenson noted, “many economists believe [China’s] currency should be weakening versus the dollar”, due to slow growth and the trade war with the U.S.. Another source, U.S.-economist Dean Baker, noted the 1,4% drop was large but “not that unusual” and can happen “without government intervention”. Even the annual review of China’s economic policies by the IMF, released after Monday’s accusations, concluded there is no sign of currency manipulation.

Still, several established correspondents agreed that the accusation was valid in the past. “China kept its currency weak a decade ago”, Stevenson wrote, but the yuan has now “strengthened to a level widely believed to be close to fair value”. Her colleague Eduardo Porter at The New York Times shared a similar view in an article which headlined, “Trump Isn’t Wrong on China Currency Manipulation, Just Late”. Bloomberg correspondent Noah Smith drew the same conclusion, noting China enjoyed a large trade surplus in the 2000s, but the “the country’s current account deficit has largely vanished”, after a peak in 2007.

Flawed economics

However, there may be something more fundamentally wrong with the currency manipulation accusation, and not just with the recent application of it by Trump and Mnuchin.

New York-based economist Anwar Shaikh and London-based economist Isabella Weber have been arguing for several years that the whole currency manipulation argument is based on flawed economics. Shaikh, an economics professor at the New School of Social Research in New York, and Weber, a lecturer in economics at Goldsmiths, University of London, published a working paper on the topic last year titled “Debunking the Currency Manipulation Argument”.

If they’re right, even the belief that China was guilty of currency manipulation a decade ago becomes questionable.

To understand what’s wrong with the currency manipulation argument we have to go back to the underlying trade theories, Shaikh and Weber explain. As currency manipulation can not be observed directly, economists look at other economic phenomena which, according to standard trade theory, are indicators of currency manipulation. A persistent trade surplus is the most important indicator because, according to standard trade theory, free trade would automatically eliminate trade imbalances. Hence, wherever a persistent trade surplus exists, it must be the result of currency manipulation, the argument goes.

The Chinese trade surplus, always positive since 1994, has been the central pillar of the currency manipulation argument, Shaikh and Weber note. Not just for academic economists; the U.S. Treasury uses persistent trade surpluses as official, legal criteria to determine whether a country is guilty of currency manipulation to gain an “unfair competitive advantage”.

But the proof is in the pudding, in this case, standard economic trade theory. If the theory is incorrect – which it is, according to Shaikh and Weber – the whole narrative collapses.

What’s wrong with the trade theory? The theory goes back to a famous model of the British economist David Ricardo (1772-1823), Shaikh and Weber explain. In Ricardo’s model and modernized versions of it, free trade ensures that, over time, no trading partner would enjoy a trade surplus or suffer a trade deficit. Imagine a country which would initially be more competitive in, let’s say, all sectors. Free trade would result in high exports and low imports (a trade surplus) attracting a massive inflow of money from foreign buyers. Such an inflow of money creates domestic inflation or an increase in the exchange rate, damaging competitiveness and eliminating the trade surplus. In a weaker, deficit country the opposite would happen: an outflow of money creates domestic deflation or a drop in the exchange rate, boosting competitiveness and exports and eliminating the trade deficit.

But the theory is fundamentally wrong, Shaikh and Weber argue. The “natural” result of a world in which trading partners enjoy different levels of competitiveness is not balanced trade. The “natural” result of free trade in such a world, they argue, is imbalance – trading partners with persistent trade surpluses and deficits.

Relying on classical economists like Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) and Roy Harrod (1900 – 1978), Shaikh and Weber present their alternative trade theory: in their version, the magical price or exchange-rate movements which would equilibrate trade in Ricardian models won’t happen. For instance, in a surplus country, large inflows of money due to excessive exports will not create domestic inflation or a rise in the exchange rate, because there’s something else that these flows of money do: move back to where they came from. Any oversupply of money a surplus country would receive would initially be saved in local banks and decrease the domestic interest rate. This would push capital towards other countries where it enjoys higher returns – indeed, to the deficit countries where the interest rate has increased due to an outflow of money.

Hence, a likely outcome of free trade is that surplus countries become creditors, and deficit countries become borrowers, and there are no automatic price or exchange-rate movements which would balance trade accounts.

This is, Shaikh and Weber note, an accurate description of the financial relation between the US and China, as China has become the largest creditor of the US. The only peculiarity, they explain, is that China’s public central bank is doing the lending (buying dollar assets) because Chinese capital controls prevent private investors from fulfilling this role. But these operations “might only mimic what would be the outcome of free capital and trade flows”, Shaikh and Weber explain. To label these monetary operations as the main instrument of a cunning currency manipulation scheme, as Mnuchin and others do, is unwarranted in their view.

So, if Shaikh and Weber are right, global imbalances in trade are simply natural outcomes of the free market, not of government interference. And if that’s the case, the currency manipulation arguments holds no water, as “we cannot infer from trade imbalances and from China’s purchase of reserves that the currency has been manipulated”.

No, Shaikh and Weber can’t exclude the possibility that China has intervened in the value of the yuan for purposes of competitiveness. Their main point is that the conventional criteria used by academics and the US Treasury to determine this – trade surpluses and deficits – tell us very little.

Perhaps more importantly, their message is to look at free trade itself to understand the roots of the trade deficit of the US and trade surplus of China. The real reason is surprisingly simple: “It is the lower costs in China that drive its trade surplus”, Shaikh and Weber conclude. It’s not Chinese currency manipulation which, as Trump complained in 2015, “makes it impossible for our companies to compete”. It’s simply Chinese competitiveness. It’s an argument which may be harder to swallow for those convinced of the everlasting power and competitiveness of the US economy.

Politics, not economic science

However convincing their debunking of the economic evidence may be, Shaikh and Weber are well aware that in the political arena the economic evidence plays a secondary role. U.S. presidents like Trump repeat the accusation of currency manipulation because of politics, not economic science, they note.

It’s been a “general pattern” in US foreign policy for some time, Shaikh and Weber write, to accuse trading partners of currency manipulation when they are running a trade surplus with the US, typically followed by the “demand that they enter into bilateral negotiations on a wide array of market liberalization policies”. Booming economies like Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore faced the same accusation of currency manipulation in the late eighties and nineties, Shaikh and Weber note. China has repeatedly been accused of currency manipulation by the US Treasury since the nineties, Weber adds by email, with increased intensity “since the rapid expansion of the US-China trade imbalance following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001”.

So the return of the currency manipulation argument today, at a time when the US and China are fighting over the terms of a new trade treaty, is not surprising. But it is alarming, Weber says, as the unfounded accusation “is another step towards escalating the trade war”.

This article was also published by Rethinking Economics.

The Tragedy of “The Tragedy of the Commons”

How should society manage its common-pool resources like fisheries, forests, and grasslands?

The problem, as presented in an Econ 101 course, is that these systems lack the proper incentives for sustainable use. Without private property or government regulation, people inevitably overuse and exploit them. This is the “tragedy of the commons” —famously formulated in a seminal 1968 paper by ecologist Garrett Hardin, and taught to thousands of economics undergraduates every year. There’s just one problem: Tragedy of the commons fails to explain real-world behavior.

Hardin’s argument runs something like this. First, he invites us to “picture a pasture open to all.” In this scenario, herdsmen of the pasture, if they are rational, self-interested agents, will figure that the benefits they receive from adding one additional cattle to the pasture outweigh the costs from overgrazing that are shared by all the other users. Each herdsman continues to add cattle to the pasture, but in this way, the resource is inevitably depleted.

For this reason, Hardin argued that “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush.”

Scholars—many outside the economics discipline—have attacked this argument for its unrealistic assumptions and lack of evidence. One prominent critic is Elinor Ostrom. Elinor Ostrom is a lifelong researcher of the commons and Nobel Laureate in economics. Ostrom said that Hardin confused a joint property commons with an “open-access regime,” where restrictions on use are completely absent. Open-access regimes sometimes do exist (e.g., fishing on the high seas). However, in the real world, common-pool resources are often governed by rules and norms that their users develop. This means Hardin’s “pasture open to all” does not accurately map how the commons operate in practice.

There is ample empirical evidence for the sustainability of commons regimes—as defined by Ostrom.

The very existence of the commons, particularly where resources are scarce, proves neither private property nor state coercion is a prerequisite for their viability. In the words of Ostrom and her colleagues: “although tragedies have undoubtedly occurred, it is also obvious that for thousands of years people have self-organized to manage common-pool resources, and users often do devise long-term, sustainable institutions for governing these resources.” Commons are not always successful, but they are far from doomed to a tragic fate.

Take, for instance, the grasslands in northern China, Mongolia, and Southern Siberia. State-run and private methods of resource management implemented in Russia and China are not nearly as effective in conservation as the traditional Mongolian group-property institutions. Around three-fourths of grassland in Russia, and more than one-third in China has shown signs of degradation, compared to just one-tenth of grasslands in Mongolia.

The water commons in Bali provide another example.

Subak, the traditional institution for irrigation management, has been sustainable for centuries without state regulation or private ownership. With water flowing downhill, the position of upstream farmers seemingly puts them in a prime position to free-ride. It is diverting more water for their own crops, but in reality, the opposite occurs. Farmers, upstream and downstream, are able to create a synchronized cropping arrangement in which damage from pests is minimized and downstream farmers retain access to water. In the end, crop yields are increased while water is used sustainably by all.

The voluminous literature on the commons documents countless similar examples. In the West, these include the cod fishery in Newfoundland (before it collapsed due to government mismanagement) and the lobster fishery in Maine. Digital and intellectual domains can fall under commons management as well. Wikipedia and the Creative Commons license exist only because people are able to cooperate and discourage free-riding.

Policymakers, unfortunately, sometimes fail to see the nuances of these sustainable systems.

Under “tragedy of the commons” assumptions (no communication, self-interested, rational agents, etc.), arrangements like those found in Mongolia and Bali simply can’t exist. As a result, technocrats, looking to promote sustainability and growth. It has often designed policies that backfire because they fail to take into account the complexity of local conditions.

Case in point:

Bali in the 1970s. On advice from the Asian Development Bank, the Indonesian government, in an attempt to boost crop yields, instructed farmers to plant rice as often as they could—disrupting the synchronized cropping schedule. Pest populations exploded as a result, and crop losses were massive. In this example, simplistic and detached development policy had disastrous consequences for the Balinese farmers.

Thus we see a genuine understanding of the commons is imperative for coherent policymaking. Scholars have long shown that Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” is an inaccurate representation of reality. Policymakers ought to adopt a more realistic view of the commons, and professors should jettison this fallacious model from their Econ 101 courses. A failure to do this and embrace the real world would, indeed, be the real tragedy.

Written by Jimmy Chin
Jimmy is an undergraduate studying economics and Asian studies at UNC-Chapel Hill. He hopes to continue his studies in graduate school and has interests in economic development, political economy, and China. Other sources of enjoyment for him include reading philosophy, writing, and hiking.

Germany Does Have Unfair Trade Advantages

In one of Donald Trump’s rants, he claimed the reason why there are so many German cars in the U.S. is that their automakers do not behave fairly. The German economy’s prompt response was that “the U.S. just needs to build better cars.” However, this time, probably without even realizing it, Donald Trump was on to something – Germany’s currency setup does give it unfair trade advantages.

While China is commonly accused of currency manipulation to provide cheap exports, the IMF has recently decided the renminbi (RMB) is no longer undervalued and added it in its reserve currency basket, along with other major currencies. However, an IMF analysis of Germany’s currency found “an undervaluation of 5-15 percent” for the Euro in the case of Germany. Thus for Germany, the Euro has a significantly lower value than a solely German currency would have.

Since the Euro was introduced, Germany has become an export powerhouse. This is not because after 2000 the quality of German goods has improved, but rather because as a member of the Eurozone, Germany had the opportunity to boost its exports with policies that allowed it to maintain an undervalued currency.

Germany and France are the largest Eurozone economies. Prior to joining the Eurozone, both countries had modest trade surpluses.

In the above figure we can see how following the implementation of the Euro, the trade balances of Germany and France completely diverged. The French moved to having a persistent trade deficit (importing more than they export), while Germany’s surplus exploded (exporting much more than they import). After a brief decline in the surplus in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, it is now again on the rise.

In the early 2000s Germany undertook several national policies to artificially hold wages down. These measures were seen as a success for Germany globally. By being part of the Eurozone and holding down wages, the Germans could export at extremely competitive prices globally. Had they not been part of the Eurozone, their currency would have appreciated, and they would not have the same advantages.

In the aftermath of the European debt crisis, Germany took a tough stance on struggling debtor countries. Under German leadership, the European Commission imposed draconic austerity measures on countries such as Greece to punish them for spending irresponsibly. Spearheaded by Germany, The EU (along with the IMF) offered a bailout to Greece so that it could pay the German and French banks it owed money to.

This bailout came with strict conditions for the Greek government that was forced to impose harsh austerity. The promise was that if the government cut its spending, the increased market confidence would help the economy recover. As a member of the Eurozone, Greece had very limited monetary policy tools it could use. Currency devaluation was no longer an option, the country was stuck with a currency that was too strong for its economy.

Meanwhile Germany prospered and enjoyed the perks of an undervalued currency. Being able to supply German goods at relatively low prices, Germany’s exports flourished. At the same time, Greeks, and other countries at the periphery of the union, were only left with the choice to face a strong internal devaluation, which meant letting unemployment explode and wages collapse until they become attractive destinations for investment.

Germany consistently broke the rules of the currency area, without ever being punished. When it first broke the deficit limits agreed upon by Eurozone members in 2003, the European Commission turned a blind eye. Germany is often considered to have set an example for other EU nations by practicing sound finance, and having a growing, healthy economy.

Greece, on the other hand is blamed for spending too much on social services, and many of its problems are blamed on being a welfare state. When you compare the actual numbers, however, Greece’s average social spending is much less than that of Germany. Between 1998 and 2005, Greece spent an average of 19 percent of GDP, while Germany spent as much as 26 percent.

To address these vast differences in the trade patterns of the EU nations, the European Commission introduced the so-called “six-pack” in 2011. These regulations introduced procedures to address “Macroeconomic Imbalances.” However, as found in the Commission’s country report “Germany has made limited progress in addressing the 2014 country-specific recommendations.”

Germany’s trade competitiveness comes at the price of making other members of the Eurozone less competitive. This is something that Germany needs to be aware of when responding to the problems other economies are facing. Currently Germany is demanding punishments for countries whose have few policy tools available to stimulate growth as Eurozone members.

However, Germany should keep in mind that the Euro is preventing the currency adjustments that would take away its trade competitiveness. Without a struggling EU periphery, there wouldn’t be a flourishing Germany.