Is Cryptocurrency Neutral?

“Money is pre-eminently a sanctuary, a haven for resources that would otherwise go into more perilous uses.”

Gurley & Shaw

Cryptocurrencies, which first emerged in the wake of the global financial crisis, offered a vision of “money” free from central bank and intermediaries’ control. The idea is that crypto liberates both private parties and non-major central banks from the fundamental need to be as close as possible to the Fed, the ultimate controller and issuer of the world’s means of the final settlement. In other words, crypto flattens the monetary hierarchy and creates a structural break from Money View’s claim that money is inherently hierarchical. In this essay, I argue that cryptocurrency is not flattening the “existing” monetary system. It creates a parallel, unstable monetary arrangement based on personnel, such as Elon Musk, rather than institutions, including central banks, and false economic prophecies. First, it assumes “scarcity of money” is the source of its value. Second, it “eliminates intermediaries,” such as dealers and banks, and relies on crypto exchanges, that act as brokers, to set prices. And third, it aims at stabilizing the crypto prices by guaranteeing “convertibility” while liberating itself from the central banks who make such guarantees possible under distress.

Crypto is built on a virtual hierarchy. When it comes to instruments, though, the system is mostly flat. Different cryptos are treated equally. Yet, it remains hierarchical when it comes to the relative position of its players. Similar to the original monetary system, different agents belong to different layers of the hierarchy. In contrast to it, a few high-net-worth individuals rather than institutions are at the top of it. However, the most fundamental problem is its economic foundations, which are mostly misguided monetary prophecies.

The Crypto market is built on weak foundations to support the “value,” “price,” and “convertibility” of the virtual currency. To preserve the value of the virtual currency, advocates often point to the limited supply of bitcoin and the mathematics which governs it in stark contrast to fiat money’s model of unlimited expansion regardless of underlying economic realities. It’s an unpopular position with Money View scholars who don’t view scarcity as a pressing issue. Instead, the fundamentals such as liquidity or convertibility determine the value of these monetary instruments. However, the convertibility guarantor of the last resort is the central bankers, who are totally circumvented in the Crypto mania.

The degree of liquidity or “moneyness” depends on how close these instruments are to the ultimate money or currency. Ultimately, the Fed’s unlimited power to create it by expanding its balance sheets puts the currency at the top of the hierarchy. The actual art of central banking would obviously be in response to shocks, or crises, in the financial and economic environment. During such periods, a central bank had not only to ensure its own solvency but the solvency of the entire banking system. For this reason, they had to hold disproportionate amounts of gold and currency. The point to emphasize is that while they stood ready to help other banks with cash and gold on demand, they could not expect the same service in return.

Further, central bankers’ unique position to expand their balance sheets to create reserves allow them to accommodate liquidity needs without the risk of being depleted. Yet, if a central bank had to protect itself against liquidity drain, it has tools such as discount-rate policy and open market operations. Also, central bankers in most countries can supply currency on-demand with reciprocal help from other banks. In this world, the Fed was and will remain first among equals.

The mistake of connecting the value of money to limited supply is as old as money itself. In 1911, Allyn Young made it tolerably clear that money is not primarily a thing that is valued for itself. The materials that made money, such as gold, other metals, or a computer code, are not the source of value for money. The valuable materials merely make it all the more certain that money itself may be “passed on,” that someone may always be found who is willing to take it in exchange for goods or services. The “passing on” feature becomes the hallmark of Allyn Young’s solutions to the mystery of money. Money’s value comes from holders’ willingness to pass it on, which is its purchasing power. It also depends on its ability to serve as a “standard of payment” or “standard of deferred payments.” Therefore, any commodity that serves as money is wanted, not for permanent use, but for passing on. 

What differentiates the “means of payment” from the “purchasing power” functions is their sensitivity to the “macroeconomic conditions.” Inflation, an essential barometer of the economy, might deteriorate the value of the conventional monetary instruments relative to the inflation-indexed ones as it disproportionally reduces the former instruments’ purchasing power. Yet, its impact on their function as “means of payments” is less notable. For instance, we need more “currency” to purchase the same basket of goods and services when inflation is high, reducing currency’s purchasing power. Yet, even in this period, the currency will be accepted as means of payment. 

Young warned against an old and widespread illusion that the government’s authority or the limited quantity gives the money its value. Half a century later, Gurley and Shaw (1961) criticized the quantity theory of money based on similar grounds. Specifically, they argued against the theory’s premise that the quantity of money determines money’s purchasing power, and therefore value. Such a misconception, emphasized in the quantity theory of money and built in the crypto architecture, can only be applied to an economic system handicapped by rigidities and irrationalities. In this economy, any increase in demand for money would be satisfied by deflation, even if it will retard the economic development rather than by growth in nominal money. Paradoxically, similar to the quantity theory of money, crypto-economics denies money a significant role in the economy. In other words, crypto-economics assumes that money, including cryptocurrency, is “neutral.” 

Relying on the “neutrality” of money, and therefore scarcity doctrine, maintain value has real economic consequences. Monetary neutrality is objectionable even concerning an economy in which the neoclassical ground rules of analysis are appropriate on at least two grounds. First, the quantity theory underestimates the real impact of monetary policy in the long run. The theory ignores the effects of the central bank’s manipulation of the nominal money on permanent capital gains or losses. These capital gains and losses enduringly affect the aggregate spendings, including spending on capital and new technologies, and hence come to grips with real aspects of the economy in the long run.

Second, monetary neutrality overlooks the role of financial intermediaries in the monetary system. In this system, financial intermediaries continuously intervene in the flow of financial assets from borrowers to lenders. In addition, they regulate the rate and pattern of private financial-asset accumulation, the real quantity of money, and real balances desired, hence any demands for goods and labor that are sensitive to the real value of financial variables. In the quantity theory of money, financial intermediaries that affect wealth accumulation and the real side of the economy are reduced to a fixed variable, called the velocity. 

To stabilize the prices, crypto economists rely on a common misconception that crypto exchanges set prices. Yet, by design, the crypto exchanges’ ability to set the prices and reduce their volatility is minimal. These exchanges’ business model is more similar to the functions of the brokers, who merely profit from commissions and listing fees and do not use their balance sheets to absorb market imbalances and therefore stabilize the market prices. If these exchanges acted like dealers, however, they could set the prices. But in doing so, they had to use their balance sheets and be exposed to the price risks. Given the current price volatility in the cryptocurrency market, the exchanges have no incentive to become dealers.

This dealer-free market implies that the exchange rate of a cryptocurrency usually depends on the actions of sellers and buyers. Each exchange merely calculates the price based on the supply and demand of its users. In other words, there’s no official global price. The point to emphasize is that this feature, the lack of an official “market price,” and intermediaries— banks and dealers–, is inherent in this virtual system. The absence of dealers, and other intermediaries, is a natural consequence of the virtual currency markets’ structural feature, called the decentralized finance (DeFi). 

DeFi is an umbrella term for financial services offered on public blockchains. Like traditional intermediaries, DeFi allows clients to borrow, lend, earn interest, and trade assets and derivatives. This service is often used by clients seeking to use their crypto as collateral to increase their leverage and return. They borrow against their crypto holdings to place even larger bets in this market. In the process, they expose the lenders to the “credit risk.” In non-crypto segments of the financial market, credit risk can be contained either through intermediaries, including banks and dealers, or swaps. Both mechanisms are absent in the crypto market even though the risk and leverage are intolerably present.

In the market for monetary instruments, intermediation has always played a key role. The main reason for all the intermediation for any financial instrument is that the mix of securities, or IOUs, issued by funds-deficit agents is unattractive to many surplus agents. Financial intermediaries can offer such attractive securities for several reasons. First, they pool the funds of many investors in a highly diversified portfolio, thereby reducing risk and overcoming the minimum denominations problem. Second, intermediaries can manage cash flows. Intermediaries provide a reasonable safety in the payments system as the cash outflows are likely to be met by cash inflows. The cryptocurrency is not equipped to circumvent intermediaries.

Historically, major banks with their expertise in analyzing corporate and other credits were a natural for the intermediary business, both in the traditional market for loanable funds and the swaps market. The advantage of the swaps is that they are custom-tailored deals, often arranged by one or more intermediaries. Banks could with comfort accept the credit risk of dealing with many lesser credits, and at the same time, their names were acceptable to all potential swap parties. The dealers joined the banks and became the modern intermediaries in the interest rate, FX, and credit default swaps market. Similar to the banks, they transferred the risks from one party to the other and set the price of risk in the process. DeFi cuts these middlemen, and the risk-transfer mechanism, without providing an alternative.

The shapers of crypto finance also rely on “stablecoins” to resolve the issue of convertibility. Stablecoins have seen a massive surge in popularity mainly because they are used in DeFi transactions, aiming to eliminate intermediaries. They are cryptocurrencies where the price is designed to be pegged to fiat money. They are assumed to connect the virtual monetary system and the real one. The problem is that the private support to maintain this par, especially during the crisis, is too invisible to exist. Most recently, the New York Attorney General investigation found that starting no later than mid-2017, Tether, the most reliable Stablecoin, had no access to banking anywhere in the world, and so for periods held no reserves to back tethers in circulation at the rate of one dollar for every Tether.

The paradox is that the stability of the crypto market and DeFi ultimately depends on centralized finance and central bankers. Like traditional banks, DeFi applications allow users to borrow, lend, earn interest, and trade assets and derivatives, among other things. Yet, it differs from traditional banks because it is connected to no centralized system and wholesale market. Therefore, unlike banks, DeFi does not have access to the ultimate funding source, the Fed’s balance sheet. Therefore, their promises to maintain the “par” between stablecoins and fiat currencies are as unstable as their guarantors’ access to liquidity. Unless Elon Musk or other top influencers in the virtual hierarchy are willing to absorb the imbalances of the whole system into their balance sheet, the virtual currency, like the fiat one, begs for the mercy of the Fed when hit by a crisis. The question is whether Elon Musk will be willing to act as the crypto market’s lender and dealer of last resort during a crisis?

Those who have long positions in crypto and guarantee convertibility of the stablecoins, like traditional deficit agents, require constant access to the funding liquidity. Central banks’ role in providing liquidity during a crisis is central to a modern economic system and not a mere convenience to be tolerated. Further, the ongoing dilemma to maintain the “par” between deposits and currencies has made the original payment system vulnerable. This central issue is the primary justification for the existence of the intermediaries and the banks. Without fixing the “par” and “convertibility” problems, the freedom from intermediaries and central banks, which is the most ideologically appealing feature of crypto, will become its Achilles Hill. The Crypto market has cut the intermediaries, including central banks, banks, and dealers, in its payment system without resolving the fundamental problems of the existing system. Unless crypto backers believe in blanket immunity to a crisis, a paradoxical position for the prodigy child of the capitalist system, crypto may become the victim of its ambitions, not unlike the tragedy of Macbeth. Mcbeth dramatizes the damaging physical and psychological effects of political ambition on those who seek power for its own sake. 

Elham Saeidinezhad is lecturer in Economics at UCLA. Before joining the Economics Department at UCLA, she was a research economist in International Finance and Macroeconomics research group at Milken Institute, Santa Monica, where she investigated the post-crisis structural changes in the capital market as a result of macroprudential regulations. Before that, she was a postdoctoral fellow at INET, working closely with Prof. Perry Mehrling and studying his “Money View”.  Elham obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield, UK, in empirical Macroeconomics in 2013. You may contact Elham via the Young Scholars Directory