Category: (Un)employment

There’s no shortage of ideas on how to create jobs, but ours is the only one without a detour. We suggest the government serve as an employer of last resort in times of crises. Jobs (not welfare) are what an economy needs in a downturn.

Don’t Be Afraid of Robots: Technology is What We Make of It

Rapid technological change, if it is even happening, does not necessarily need to lead to mass unemployment or even major disruptions in people’s lives. In all cases, new technology is what society makes of it — that is, it should be used to broadly improve lives and work, not reorient the world around the technology itself or redistribute wealth upwards. Ride-hailing services like Uber and the promise of self-driving cars illustrate both sides of this point; polices like a job guarantee provide a path forward. 

Illustration: Heske van Doornen

Don’t Be Afraid of Robots: Technology is What We Make of It

By Kevin Cashman

There is a lot of talk of the rapid development of technology leading to changes in the way people work as well as mass automation and thus mass unemployment. However, the data generally don’t support this story (the most recent data being a notable, but very limited, exception). Nevertheless, the story has currency among the public and politicians, in part due to the novelty and allure of technology — and the political power of its promoters. Throughout recent history, the promises of revolutionary technology have captivated imaginations but also come up far short. Instead of flying cars, there are apps for refrigerators and ordering cat food over the internet.

It is important to note that the gains from technological advancements do not necessarily need to go to the rich or lead to mass unemployment. If shared fairly, the gains could lead to social benefits, such as increased social services, and broad individual gains, such as more leisure time. And there can be concerted action to help those directly affected by technological change. While there are many policies that could be implemented, a job guarantee — where the government provides jobs to all those that need them — is the simplest and most straightforward way to deal with job loss. If people lose their jobs due to factors outside of their control, why not simply provide them with new jobs?

If the gains go to the top, it is important to point out that this is because of deliberate policy. It is not a natural outcome. The rich and their allies in politics promote this redistribution to the top as inevitable — as the “future of work,” for example — whether or not advancements in technology pan out or not. Since advancements in technology do not fundamentally necessitate a change in social relations, this is intentionally deceptive at worst and wishful thinking at best. To see this dynamic, looking at particular jobs and industries is instructive, for example, in taxis and buses and trucking.

The ability to use smartphones and the internet to mediate services is not particularly revolutionary or unique but it does provide some benefits. Uber, the ride-hailing company, brought investment and these ideas to the taxi industry and quickly took over a large part of the market, despite many issues with its service and sustainability. In Uber’s case, appealing to the political power of affluent residents in cities and the supposed innovation of its app was enough to negate its blatant disregard for regulations, questionable safety record, exploitation of drivers, and unprofitability. In this sense, Uber’s investment allowed it to provide some benefits to its relatively wealthy passengers at the expense of the disabled, regular taxi drivers, and others. Most importantly, because it subsidizes every ride (Uber loses money on every ride taken), it was able to undercut the regulated taxi industry. The government’s lack of interest in maintaining fairness in the taxi industry effectively led to Uber being handed the market.

How could this have been different? The taxi industry on a whole is not an industry with large margins or much investment. In part, this is due to underlying characteristics of the industry as well as regulation, including those aimed at limiting the number of taxis operating in a city (which is good policy). To realize the benefits of technology, taxi commissions or groups of taxi drivers in various places could have developed their own app and infrastructure to facilitate ordering of cabs on the internet. This would have required substantial organization and money, which could have been facilitated and provided, respectively, by the government. The result could have been an app that allowed taxi authorities to continue to maintain standards for safety and operation and also provide the seamless service that certain groups of consumers desire. Indeed, competitor apps are being developed this way and existed before Uber, but they must now claw market share away from Uber. This is quite difficult because Uber is still subsidizing rides and keeping prices artificially low.

Let us now assume that rapid technological advancement is inevitable: self-driving cars and buses are finally right around the corner, as has been promised for years. (Indeed society could be on the cusp of this sort of technology, although the challenges shouldn’t be understated.) There would be massive benefits if self-driving vehicles are implemented successfully: increased mobility for the elderly, many fewer accidents, lower operating costs, increased productivity when in transit, etc.

Along with these benefits, there would be significant disruptions to the labor market. Ideas around how to approach these changes were discussed in a recent report, Stick Shift: Autonomous Vehicles, Driving Jobs, and the Future of Work.1 It discusses two questions that are central to evaluation rapid disruptions to the labor market: How fast will the technology develop? How much of an impact will it have?

Regarding the first question, and assuming that these technological hurdles are overcome,2 the report notes:

If the technology is successfully developed, the rate of the adoption and popularization of autonomous vehicles will depend greatly on whether necessary infrastructure is built, and whether and how regulation responds to these advances in technology. One of the inevitable debates will be between those who wish to ensure that autonomous vehicles are safe and reliable and those who want to get them to market as soon as possible. The outcome of this debate could greatly determine how the labor market is affected. Thorough vetting of the technology, along with phased rollouts, would allow time for workers to adjust to incoming shocks, and would dampen those shocks as well.

If the government were to assume the costs of building infrastructure for self-driving vehicles instead of the companies that are selling them, it would be fair for the government to also take a pro-active approach and develop a process to adequately assess the safety of those vehicles. This would somewhat mitigate the effects on the taxi industry and on bus drivers, especially in the early years of their use.

Proponents of self-driving vehicles also often forget to mention that technology will replace individual activities of workers but not necessarily all of the activities that encompass their jobs. Truckers, for instance, perform many other activities besides simply driving:

…in the trucking industry, there are many tasks that are difficult to imagine autonomous-vehicle technology being able to manage, which may limit their adoption or consign them or the driver to a secondary role. This includes many things that truck drivers are required to know, such as how to inspect the vehicle and cargo, perform maintenance and fix emergency problems, put on tire chains and deal with unpredictable weather, refuel the vehicle safely, and carry dangerous materials safely, to name a few.

If self-driving trucks took over the trucking industry, this suggests there would be many more support jobs in the trucking industry.

The other question is more pertinent considering our assumptions. How much of an impact technology will have on society is entirely up to society. The question is then not how much of an impact will self-driving cars have on society but where does society need self-driving cars and how do self-driving cars fit with social goals? There is a convincing argument that cars — self-driving or not — should have much less of a role in cities in the future. While taxis could have a role to play in the future, for example, public transportation and good urban design should be the focus, thus eliminating much of the need for taxis. In this vein, employment in the taxi industry could decline, but in addition to more social benefits from less vehicle use, employment would increase in association with an increase in investment in public transportation.

The social aspects of occupations are also important to consider when asking whether it might be desirable to transition to self-driving vehicles:

There is also the question of more socially oriented driving jobs. Bus drivers are one example. City bus drivers preserve order and safety on buses, provide information, ensure payment, and are generally considered community members and authority figures. School bus drivers have specific responsibilities related to the safety of the children they supervise. For these reasons, it may not be desirable or necessary to replace bus drivers, completely at least, even if the buses were fully autonomous.

In this sense, the elimination of these jobs would be akin to cuts in public services, and they would also eliminate some social benefits. Social aspects of jobs are rarely considered — but they are very important.

Here, a jobs guarantee would be useful, since it is a policy that prioritizes the social aspects of jobs and since social benefits are not prioritized in the private job market. Returning to the example of bus drivers, buses could be self-driving in the future but the “driver” need not be replaced. Rather, the position could be reoriented in a purely social role.

 

Whether technology will bring small changes, as in the case of Uber, or large changes, as in the case of self-driving vehicles, who benefits is entirely up to society. Gains from technology can be shared broadly with the right policies — just a few of which were described here — so there is no need to inherently fear the robots. A jobs guarantee is one of those policies, and it is perhaps the most important. (And it’s gaining traction in the mainstream.)  A broad coalition, focused on the appropriate use of technology and promoting a job guarantee, could keep the actual threat — those wanting to harness the benefits of technology for themselves — at bay. Whether or not robots and mass automation are around the corner, it’s good policy, too.

Reimagining “Right-to-Work”

“Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.” This is Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared by the UN in 1948. It sounds like a pretty good right to me. I recently learned that in America, we have some states with “right-to-work” laws. That dumbfounded me. Why did unemployment exist in those states if they had a right to work?

It only took a few minutes of research to find out that the “right-to-work” laws some states have are nothing like the fundamental human right. What these laws actually do is defend a worker’s right not to be required to join a labor union to work at a company. This “right-to-work” doesn’t allow more choice, it allows less. Where’s the option to have a union that doesn’t allow freeriders? If you don’t want union benefits, you can work for a company without a union. You still have your choice, but this law has destroyed mine. These laws really promote the right to work for less money, the right to work at a business with a racist union, the right to destroy what unions could and should stand for.

Research from the Economic Policy Institute shows that states with “right-to-work” laws have hurt unionization rates, and hurt the power of unions that do exist. In such states 7% of workers are represented by a union contract, versus 17% in non “right-to-work” states. Wages are lower in states with these laws in place, which makes sense as unions allow collective bargaining for better wages. Nationally, unionized workers are making 27% more than non-unionized workers. “Right-to-work” has been a disaster for the labor movement, those who historically have won us better pay for shorter hours and better working conditions. Those who won us the weekend. Those who won women the right to vote. Those who won us the 8 hour work day.

To reinvent the labor movement we have a lot of ground to cover. One way to start would be with reimagining the “right-to-work” to be much more like the fundamental human right envisioned by the UN in 1948. This actual Right to Work, a Job Guarantee, would transform the labor market. It’d be up to communities to decide what jobs to guarantee as they see fit, but surely our communities could come up with something better than a new fast food joint. If you’re guaranteed a job serving your community, wages will go up across the board, as entry-level workers get real choice. Capitalists would be forced to make burger flipping more attractive than planting trees.

The real human right to work would mean you could quit working for your abusive boss and cross the street and get hired. We could make job guarantee jobs come with awesome benefit plans, that capitalists are forced to match. We could have contracts with our employers that require “just cause” to be fired, rather than the uneven “at-will” employment contracts we all toil under today. We could have unions that represent all of the workers in our businesses rather than just a small subset. It’s going to take a lot of work to get there, but coalescing around a shared demand, a good job for everyone, is a great start.

We can see the work that needs to be done. We need care workers to serve our aging population. We need police officers that actually serve our communities. We need solar panels harnessing the free energy of the sun. We need to capture the carbon capitalists have polluted the environment with. We need affordable housing so we don’t have people living on the streets. We need the right to build these things together, including everyone willing and able. We need to take care of those who aren’t able, for whatever reason. If we reimagine a true right to work, the unimaginable becomes possible.

Why You’re Not Getting a Raise

By Nikos Bourtzis.

 

Much of the developed world has experienced stubbornly low real wage growth since the financial crisis of 2007. Currently, the British people are seeing their earnings decline in real terms. Even in Germany, where unemployment keeps falling to record lows, wage growth is stagnating. This phenomenon has squeezed living standards and has been one of the main culprits behind the rise of anti-establishment movements. Faster pay rises are desperately needed for the global recovery to accelerate and for ordinary people to actually be a part of it. This piece explains why rising labor compensation has been relatively minuscule during the current economic upturn and how this phenomenon could be remedied.

A bit of history

The lack of meaningful pay rises is not a phenomenon that started with the financial crisis of 2007. It can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s, when monetarism started sweeping into academia and politics. The stagflation of the 1970s, the simultaneous rise of inflation and unemployment, led some governments to abandon the Keynesian policies of the past because apparently these policies could not deal with the stagflation. Monetary policy became the preferred tool to control inflation, together with a revived notion that markets, if left to their own devices, would bring the best social outcomes. The Thatcher and Reagan governments are some of the most famous examples of States adopting and implementing these beliefs. The first institution targeted for deregulation was the labor market. Wages increases were frozen and employment protection was scaled back, because it was believed that demand and supply forces would restore full employment. However, unemployment in the UK exploded after Thatcher came into office in 1980, increasing  to over 10% and never returning to its post-World War II lows of between 1% and 2%.

Labor unions are one of the most important institutions regarding pay rises. In most industrial countries, they are responsible for wage and working conditions negotiations between employers and employees. Union membership in OECD countries grew until the mid-1970s but then started dropping. With the rise of neoliberal governments in the West, organized labor came under attack. Under the free-market ideology, unions disrupt economic activity with strikes and demand higher-than-optimal wages. Thus, their power needed to be kept in check. What is more important, though, is the shifting of ideas in what the goals of the State should be. In the post-War period, an expressed purpose of governments was to keep aggregate demand at full employment levels. The UK government, for example, stated full employment as its purpose after the War in its Economic Policy White Paper in 1944. That goal changed with the rise of neoliberalism.

When the commitment to keep employment levels high and stable was abandoned, and labor markets were deregulated, unemployment spiked in most countries and has never fallen at levels where it can be stated that full employment exists. Even during strong upturns unemployment levels in most countries did not dip below 4%. As a result, labor unions, and workers in general have lost their biggest bargaining chip. When there is full employment, and thus jobs are abundant, workers have more power to demand higher wages and better working conditions. With the neoliberal policies of the Reagan administration, real wages in the US got decoupled from productivity, meaning that workers stopped receiving their fair share of the output produced. The same phenomenon has been observed in many other industrialized countries, such as the UK. The policies introduced in the 1980s were pretty much sustained and expanded up until 2008.

 

The Financial Crisis: A turn for the worse

The situation became even worse after the financial crisis erupted. For example, in both the US and the UK the growth of wages slowed even more, as shown in the following figure, even as the headline unemployment returned to pre-crisis levels.

Moving towards a low headline unemployment rate, though, does not mean full employment is being achieved. In the US, the U-6 measure of the unemployment rate, which adds the underemployed to the headline rate, shows that the real unemployment rate is at 8.6%. Far from full employment! In the UK, it has been reported by the Office for National Statistics that the number of people employed in zero-hour contracts has risen by 400% since 2000 but most of the rise happened after the financial crisis. Thus, the employment situation is worse than before the crisis which leads to a further decline in wage growth.

 

Why is high wage growth important for the recovery?

It is essential to point out that one of the main reasons the current economic recovery has been weak is low wage growth. Wage income is the main propeller of consumer spending, which accounts for more than 60% of GDP in industrialized countries. Low wage growth means low consumer spending, thus low GDP growth and employment. Currently, households are borrowing to keep their living standards stable and that is what’s keeping consumer spending going. This process, though, is unsustainable and will not last long. When households cannot afford to borrow anymore another financial crisis will almost certainly occur. That’s why governments need to do everything in their power to restore wage growth.

What can be done?

The power of organized labor has been decimated since the 1980s. If workers cannot actually have a say in what happens in the workplace then they cannot fight for fair wages. This is why unions need to be strengthened and supported by governments. Employers should be forced to negotiate wages through collective bargaining and union coverage should be expanded above the current 50% OECD average. This will level the playing field between powerful employers and the currently weak labor class.

As mentioned before, productivity and real wages have been delinked since the 1980s. That’s where the minimum wage could potentially help. In the US, the real minimum wage fell after 1980 and has stayed relatively flat since then. With the liberalization “mania” sweeping the western world, governments are freezing public sector pay rises and Greece even cut the minimum wage in the name of restoring public finances and growth. That’s the exact opposite of what should be done to restore growth. Wages drive consumption and growth, cutting them can only depress the economy. Hiking the minimum wage will help sustain consumption based on wages, employment growth and, thus, wage growth.

A sure way to speed up wage growth again is fiscal stimulus. Government spending lifts aggregate demand directly and effectively. If enough spending is injected into the economy, it will create enough jobs to bring full employment. The momentum and labor scarcity created by the stimulus will force wages up and give workers and labor unions more bargaining power. A Job Guarantee Program, if ever implemented, would effectively set a wage floor in the economy, since any person working at a lower wage than the Job Guarantee offers will be given work in the public sector.

The “curse” of low wage growth is not something new and it definitely got exacerbated with the financial crisis. Even though unemployment is currently falling in many countries, it is still way above full employment levels. With workers’ rights under attack for some time now, unions do not have the power they once did to promote strong pay growth. If the current recovery is to accelerate, and for ordinary people to participate in it, wage growth has to rise substantially. The only way to do this is for labor unions to be strengthened and governments to once again commit to full employment.

About the Author
Nikos Bourtzis is from Greece and recently graduated with a Bachelor in Economics from Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He will be pursuing a Master in Economics and Economic analysis at Groningen University. Research interests are heterodox macroeconomics, anti-cyclical policies, income inequality, and financial instability.

Think Uber’s Problems Stop at Its Management and Culture? Think Again.

Keep track of all of Uber’s problems with The Big List of Uber’s Controversies. 

In February 2017, Susan Fowler published a blog post detailing the sexual harassment and gender discrimination she experienced during her time as an engineer at Uber, the ride-hailing company. Although this was not the first time that Uber had been accused of creating a workplace where pervasive sexism and discrimination thrive, Fowler’s piece struck a chord. It built on a wave of criticism of the company from an earlier public relations disaster — Uber’s missteps following protests of President Trump’s racist executive order at John F. Kennedy Airport starting on January 28th and the resulting #DeleteUber campaign — and emboldened others to report sexual and other misconduct at the company (215 complaints about its corporate workplace have been filed).

While the criticisms levied at Uber are generally applicable to Silicon Valley as a whole, public ire was now focused on Uber, which was having a public relations crisis seemingly every week. The one-time $70 billion-valued private company (five times more valuable than the grocery store Whole Foods, which has 431 supermarkets, and was recently acquired by Amazon) was under immense pressure from even investors too. In response, it agreed to two investigations, both led by law firms. One investigated the workplace complaints that had been lodged against the company, leading to the firing of over 20 employees as well as disciplinary action against others. The second’s task was to investigate Uber’s corporate culture and develop recommendations to restructure the company to try to address the root causes of the problems. This team was led by former Obama administration Attorney General, and former Uber advisor, Eric Holder.

The report from Holder’s team, released a few days ago, came up with 13 pages of recommendations, all of which were adopted by Uber’s board of directors. In general, they seek to bring Uber in line with the practices of a company of its size. Some of these are common sense: developing internal controls and processes in a variety of ways, eliminating bias by performing blind reviews, reducing the unusually high amount of power of key executives, giving the board of directors more power, creating oversight and audit committees, using compensation as a carrot and stick, etc. Other recommendations include ensuring that people with children can participate in company events, which is laudable. Where the proposal fails is in its recommendations for changing values and emphasizing diversity, which include training for staff, developing programs to attract qualified diverse candidates, and reforming the list of the company’s core values (from something that a frat boy would write to, no doubt, corporate-speak clichés). It also included symbolic changes, like renaming Uber’s “War Room,” the “Peace Room”.

While revamping Uber’s structure and setting a bunch of (corporate) priorities might seem like a positive change at the company, it’s important to keep a few things in mind. One is that the problems that Uber is facing with regards to its culture and diversity are pervasive in Silicon Valley. Uber might be especially bad in these areas right now, but the typical solutions are unlikely to make much of a difference at the company because they haven’t made much of a difference at most tech companies. There are complicated reasons for these failures, and there should be little confidence that these tired and hollow strategies will work.

Another is that Uber is a private company, with control intentionally held closely among certain people, like CEO Travis Kalanick, who is most responsible for Uber’s reprehensible culture. As the CEO and founder, he ultimately controls much of what happens at the company, whether the Holder recommendations are adopted, and whether they are taken seriously. The most important result from the Holder investigation — Kalanick’s decision to take leave and take on a supposedly diminished role at the company — was undoubtedly due to pressure from the investigation but still entirely Kalanick’s own decision (and he’s still the CEO). Lastly, while the recommendations wisely agreed to use compensation as a way to incentivize and punish managers for transgressions, in practice, out-of-control pay of CEOs and executives, regardless of performance, is a systemic problem among not only tech companies, but companies in general. Kalanick’s poor performance as head of Uber should lead to a pay cut, but it likely won’t.

Thus, the Holder report might have some good ideas about how Uber could be run better, although it is unlikely that Uber will fundamentally change. (Indeed, at the board of directors meeting to discuss the results of the report, an Uber board member made a sexist remark.) But what this conversation about Uber misses are the more fundamental questions about Uber and its business. The narrative that has emerged about the company since the beginning of this year is that Uber’s problems start and stop at its management (specifically, Kalanick) and culture, when they don’t.

The Big List of Uber’s Controversies is a compendium of the problems and controversies that have plagued the company since its founding in 2009. Many of these are related to the problems the company is very publicly dealing with now; others are not. The goal of the list is to point out that Uber’s problems are pervasive and fundamental to the company’s operations, yet not necessarily unique to the company (although Uber might be an outlier with regard to how poorly it is managed and structured). To that end, the controversies are divided into six categories: Business Practices; Social Costs; Misuse of Data and Software; Corporate Culture; Passenger Issues; and Driver Issues.

While the 79 controversies and problems currently on the list touch on many different and unique issues, there are themes that give some insight into the inner workings of the company and its problems, and demonstrate that Uber’s problems run much deeper than its culture or even the company itself.

  • Uber hemorrhages massive amounts of its investors’ money every year and does not have a viable business model, absent major changes in the industry or the creation of a monopoly;
  • Uber’s success depends on attracting more investment and growing quickly, as well as anti-competitive practices: it has not created efficiencies or value that would justify its poor financial performance;
  • Uber uses misleading research and fantastic technology forecasts to distract from the dismal failure of its core business, taxi service;
  • Uber has large and sophisticated lobbying, public relations, and research departments, often involving former Obama administration officials, that deliberately misleads (and outright lies to) reporters, investors, regulators, and the public in order to justify and give cover to flagrant violations of the law, defend exploitative conditions, and paper over the problems with its business model;
  • Uber erroneously claims that it is a technology — not a taxi — company, and that the business conducted on its platform is “sharing” in order to evade responsibility;
  • Uber has inadequate internal controls for its data and software tools, leading to improper, and possibly illegal, access and use by employees, including to surveil critics and regulators;
  • Uber’s growth-at-any-cost mentality and poor management has led to a culture that ignores problems and creates a toxic culture and workplace for its employees — significantly and negatively impacting its drivers and passengers as well;
  • Uber’s past behavior suggests it has a complete disregard for the safety of its drivers and passengers until it is pressured to take action;
  • Uber manipulates its drivers, entices them to enter into exploitative arrangements (including their misclassification as independent contractors), opposes their unionization, and exerts undue influence over their working conditions, consistently lowering their pay; and
  • Uber’s operation has significant social costs with implications for public safety, public finance, access for those with disabilities, discrimination, investment in public infrastructure, and the regulated taxi industry as well as the taxi driving occupation.

Recent criticism of Uber is undoubtedly a good thing, but as this list demonstrates, its problems extend far beyond the individuals that run it or its corporate culture. With these problems, the fundamental question should not be whether Uber can reform its workplace culture, or whether Kalanick should stay on as CEO, or if he is overly important to the company. Rather it should be whether Uber, and companies like it, should be tolerated at all. In Uber’s case, it is unclear whether it is any better than regulated taxis broadly. Individuals might like Uber’s service — and that’s fine, and also to be expected, considering their rides are all subsidized by Uber’s investors — but policy should not cater what certain segments of the population want, especially if they don’t understand how the company operates.

Another important point is that Uber’s reckless behavior has been tolerated and excused because of its ascending position in the market. But as the clear industry leader today, that is part of the reason why it is now in the crosshairs, even though other ride-hailing companies suffer from some of the same problems as Uber. (Lyft eagerly capitalized on Uber’s misfortunes following the JFK protests, for example.) Importantly, they too have not developed ways to be profitable or more efficient than regulated, fleet-based taxis. Even Juno, the supposedly fair and ethical ride-hailing company that gave its drivers equity in its business, sold them out when it was acquired.

So, while some have suggested that the solution is simply to stop using Uber (and, ostensibly, to use competitors like Lyft or Gett), this is no solution at all. The solution is making sure that these companies are subject to the same regulations as traditional taxis, as well as that they comply with labor and other laws, all of which was unsurprisingly absent from the Holder report. This is the innovative idea that is also a solution to many of Silicon Valley’s problems, regardless of the industry.

Uber might not be able to survive if it started caring about the safety of its passengers, the exploitation of its drivers, or the social costs it shifts onto the rest of us (it’s in trouble already), but maybe it shouldn’t. As politicians plot with Silicon Valley to take over public infrastructure and to revamp the fundamental nature of work, maybe Silicon Valley shouldn’t either.

What is the Minimum Wage that Will Employ Everyone?

It is official, the unemployment rate in the US has dropped to its lowest level in 16 years. Economists all around the country must be tapping themselves in the back and buying each other drinks in congratulations, right? Wrong. Despite the official drop in joblessness, we have a decline in labor participation, an increase in the “skill gap” in the labor force (i.e. unemployed workers’ skills do not match those needed by open jobs) and, arguably most importantly, wages that fail to rise fast enough.

For starters, the latest reports show that the year-over-year wage growth rate has been stagnating; it reached 2.5 percent since last year, which is just marginally above inflation. It is difficult to determine exactly why people drop out of the labor force, but we can speculate that some do so because of the lack of pay increases. Whatever the reason, the dropout is a significant part of the declining unemployment rate—e.g. the May report shows that 429,000 people dropped out of the labor force. A nation with a population that is actively leaving the labor force and that deals with stagnant wages is a nation facing serious socioeconomic problems.

The problem at hand, then, is a question economists have been dealing with for ages: how can we increase earnings and employment at the same time? Common economic understanding would argue that we have to choose between higher wages and more jobs. The main argument against minimum wage hikes is that it would increase unemployment. That claim is factually untrue (just look at Seattle) and there are a number of ways to address the issue. At The Minskys we have tackled this topic several times, and shown that a decent minimum wage does not have to reduce the number of jobs out there. One way to have both is with a Job Guarantee (JG) program.

One of the more interesting consequences of a JG program is that it would create a de-facto minimum wage without the need of actually raising the minimum wage. The JG wage would become the minimum wage for the entire economy. Workers receiving less than the JG wage would be inclined to take a JG job, and employers would have to raise their salary offers in order to keep their workforce. Given the impact of the pay offered by the program, it is important that the JG wage rate be thoroughly discussed.

The JG literature has a large number of works focused on the topic of wages. Some suggest the pay to vary with skill-level. Others advocate for JG wages to be the same as they would be in the market.  But having multiple compensation packages would make the logistics and application of a JG program much more complicated.

To find the best wage rate for JG jobs, a few parameters should be considered. First, the JG framework is to create jobs that provide at least a minimum “subsistence” rate, so that workers can  live a decent life. As such, it is clear that the JG wage should at least be the current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. Second, the goal of the JG is not, and should never be, to replace the private sector. So, the JG wage should not exceed the average wage paid in the private sector ($25.31 in 2016). This creates an upper limit.  

With these lower and upper limits in place we can raise the floor or lower the ceiling, ultimately arriving at the proper wage rate paid by this full employment policy. Recent polls show that Democrats, Republicans and Independents—in their majority—all support raising the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour, which suggests that there may be widespread political support to increasing the minimum wage.We can raise the lower limit further after we consider the per capita income in the US, which would put the fair minimum wage at $12.00 an hour. The lower limit of $12 an hour is appropriate since it is marginally above the poverty rate of $11.53 for a household with two children where only one of the parents is employed.

A good point within that range is the $15.00 hourly wage rate. Legislation regarding this wage rate has recently been approved in cities such as Seattle, Los Angeles, and the state of New York. There is also a movement by workers demanding that it becomes the floor in the fast food and retail industries. It seems appropriate, therefore, to follow these cities and movements by determining the going wage rate for a JG program to be set at $15.00 an hour. After all, a national JG cannot pay less than locally established minimum wages. On the other hand, the guarantee of a job in, for example, Seattle paying $15.00 per hour, while surrounding areas are offering lower pay could saturate one area in detriment of another.

As previously discussed, the JG wage would become the minimum wage to the entire economy. Consequently, workers who currently earn less than the $15.00 an hour rate would receive a raise. In total, accounting also for the ripple effects faced by workers in the $15.00 to $19.00 range, roughly 64.7 million workers would receive a wage increase, which means 43.5 percent of the labor force would see their wage income go up. To avoid inflationary pressures, allow for seamless implementation, and contain possible—albeit historically improbable—negative employment effects from the minimum wage hike, the transition to this wage through the implementation of the JG program will have to be done incrementally.

The Job Guarantee is an effective way to solve the three major problems currently facing the American labor market: the skill gap, the dropout of workers from the labor force, and most importantly the stagnant wages. We have empirically observed that wage increases not only do not increase unemployment, but they also serve as a catalyst for economic growth and towards social equity. The US economy has plenty of needs that can be fulfilled by giving well-paying jobs to its unemployed. The $15/hour wage is not only fair, it is a necessary measure to ensure the prosperity of this nation.

Brazil Suffers Under a Leader that Believes in Fairies

Brazil’s current economic policy follows the logic of a fairytale. And unless President Temer wakes up to reality, the Brazilian people will continue to suffer the consequences.

In conservative circles, the solution advocated for economic recovery is a reduction in government spending. The argument behind it is that a large government deficit lowers the market’s confidence in its ability to repay. This lower confidence then drives private investment away.

By the same logic, if the government cuts down the deficit, markets are reassured of its commitment to be a good payer. This newly gained confidence drives up private sector investment and the economy grows.

While this may sound like a great way to boost a struggling economy, it’s not. To expect that a reduction in public spending will lead to an increase in private spending in the middle of a recession is like believing in an economic “confidence fairy.” Picture a creature dressed in dollar bills, fluttering eyelashes at private investors while the government takes a step back. With enough fairy dust, investors regain confidence, and the economy turns into a sparkly paradise. It sounds nice, but it’s not real.

The idea of expansionary austerity is a dangerous one. While most of the arguments against government deficit rest upon flawed economic theory, the confidence fairy has its backbone solely on psychological factors that play into private investment decisions. However, what a depressed economy needs is a boost in aggregate demand, many times driven by public investment. Even fairy-enthusiasts, as the IMF, have expressed increasing skepticism towards the ability of austerity to expand an economy.

There are plenty of recent examples that cast doubt on the confidence theory. Take the low growth trap of the world economy, for instance. Several countries struggled with low growth for almost a decade despite their efforts to reduce their budget deficit. As monetary policy played an excessive role, fiscal policy ― and by effect aggregate demand ― was ostracized. New investments do not take place in a depressed economy regardless of the interest rates level or the government debt; in Minsky’s words, investment does not take place as long as the demand price of capital is lower than the supply price of capital.

Nevertheless, Brazil’s Michel Temer continues to be captivated by the fairytale. Amid continuous involvements in the corruption scandals, Temer introduced ambitious austerity measures to cut government spending and reduce the fiscal deficit. Placing his faith in the confidence fairy, he portrays his policies as the only path to recovery and growth ― as if there were a certain magic debt number to achieve.

But thus far, Temer’s policies have failed miserably. Expecting to see the fairy do wonders, 2016’s 3.6% decline in GDP was “unexpected” to Temer’s team. That’s a harsh reality to wake up to, especially since 2015 showed a similar decline in growth. For 2017, the economy is expected to grow 0.5 percent;  but growth projections keep getting adjusted downward, and a third year of recession is only half a percentage point away.

Brazil’s collapse in domestic demand is visible in the economy’s capacity utilization. Averaging 73.5 percent in 2016, it’s reached the lowest level since the early 1990s, when the country was plagued by hyperinflation. At this rate, Brazil will have to get through a long period of idle capacity until new private investments can foster demand. Furthermore, the efforts to reduce the government deficit seem to have been futile. The budget deficit has actually surged due to the reduction in tax revenues and the increasing burden of interest rate payments.

Despite everything, Temer isn’t giving up on the confidence fairy yet. Earlier last month, he announced a cut of $42.1 billion reais (approx. US $13.5) in the government budget, nearly a fourth of which on the Growth Acceleration Program for social, urban, and energy infrastructure investment. Other significant cuts were made to the ministries of defense ($5.7 billion reais), transportation ($5.1 billion reais), and education ($4.3 billion reais).

As you may expect, none of this helps to create jobs. On April 28, it became known that the unemployment rate reached a record-high 13.7% for this year’s first quarter. Since the last quarter of 2016,  2 million more people lost their jobs. The number of unemployed now adds to 14.2 million, and that’s more than double the record-low rate of 6.2% in 2013.

Unlike the President, the people of Brazil know they can’t count on fairy dust. Last week, workers went on a general strike, during which millions of Brazilians protested against the austerity agenda. As much as 72 percent of the population opposes the reforms that are being discussed today, and government approval rates are as low as 10%.

But Temer ignores all cries of concern and keeps going steady. Two of his the structural reforms have already been initiated. Real government spending is frozen for the next 20 years, and labor market is under flexibilization. A third, more complex one is the pension reform, whose main proposal is to increase the minimum retirement age and time of contribution. Although the subject is too extensive to be covered in here, it’s worth mentioning that the pension reform disregards some of the social inequalities in the country (e.g. conditions of rural and poor workers) and it solely focus on curbing the long-term system’s expenditure instead of dealing with the falling revenues that collapsed in recent years due to tax breaks and the crisis.

Together, these reforms dismantle any efforts at building a social welfare system in Brazil. Crucial areas for public investment such as education and health will suffer.

Right now, it’s more clear than ever that Brazil’s story is not a fairytale, but a living nightmare. And there’s no confidence fairy that can fix it. As Skidelsky puts it, “confidence cannot cause a bad policy to have good results, and a lack of it cannot cause a good policy to have bad results, any more than jumping out of a window in the mistaken belief that humans can fly can offset the effect of gravity.”

The Automation Grift: From Flying Cars to Ordering Cat Food on the Internet – Part 2

It’s conventional wisdom among pundits that automation will cause mass unemployment in the near future, fundamentally changing work and the social relations that underpin it. Part 1 of this series contrasted this extreme rhetoric with the data that should support the inevitable robot apocalypse, and found that these predictions are likely motivated by politics or outlandish assessments of technology, not data. Part 2 assesses the technology behind these predictions, and follows a thread from the mid-20th century onwards. Subsequent parts will examine the political economy of automation in both general and specific ways, and will also discuss what the future should look like — with or without the robots.

The Automation Grift: From Flying Cars to Ordering Cat Food
on the Internet – Part 2
By Kevin Cashman

Part 1 of this article made a case that macroeconomic data does not suggest that there is rapid automation occurring broadly in the economy nor in large industries or sectors. Other indicators, like slack in the labor market, support that assertion. It pointed to periods of rapid automation in the past as well, and found these were times with generally low unemployment and healthy job growth.

Regardless of the data past or present, there are still claims that society is on a precipice, facing mass unemployment due to wide-scale automation. Many say that the technology in the near future is different than developments that occurred in the past, and that instead of slow or moderate change that the economy can adapt to, the rate of change will be so profound that suddenly millions will be out-of-work.

There are good reasons to be suspicious of this narrative. First, it is very difficult to predict how technology will develop and affect the world, and if it will be viable or even necessary in the first place. Second, adopting new technology — for example, automating a process and replacing workers — and more importantly, the threat of adopting new technology, gives power to employers and capital instead of workers. This weaponization of technology needs to be credible in order to be taken seriously; hence, it relies on the broader narrative that rapid automation is happening. The first point will be considered now; the second, in Part 3.

The (False) Promises of Technology

Predicting how technology affect the future is a difficult endeavor. The flying cars, spaceships, and moon bases that many were sure would arrive by the year 2000 never materialized. Anthropologist David Graeber posits that technological progress did not keep up with imaginations because capitalism “systematically prioritize[s] political imperatives over economic ones.” In a capitalist system like that in the U.S., if political threats do not align with technological advancement like they did during part of the Cold War, flying cars will stay in science fiction books, he says. As the perceived threat from the Soviet Union fell away, neoliberalism’s project shifted to cementing itself as the only viable political system, at the “end of history.”

More recent predictions have remained as bold as they were in the past, but reflect this change in focus. Audrey Watters, an education technology writer, details many in her excellent presentation, “The Best Way to Predict the Future is to Issue a Press Release.” She makes the case that narratives are spun about technology for mostly political reasons or for self-interest, rather than around higher, collective ideals. Bold predictions today are about the destruction and privatization of educational institutions, technology as consumption, or mass unemployment as human labor fades into obsolescence. Pointing to the dismal track record of those who analyze technological trends — based on methods that include opaque and ill-suited taxonomies and graphs, like the one-way hype cycle — she suggests that we are actually in a period of technological stagnation. “[T]he best way to resist this future,” she says, “is to recognize that, once you poke at the methodology and the ideology that underpins it, a press release is all that it is.”

Recent evidence from the dot-com bubble lends itself to these observations. Over-enthusiastic predictions of how the Internet would fundamentally change nature of shopping — not quite a lofty aspiration to begin with — led in large part to the bubble, which popped when it became clear that these companies’ business models did not work. (For example, individually shipping very heavy bags of pet food is expensive, a fact lost on the “innovative” owners of, and “savvy” investors in, Pets.com.) As neoliberalism was busy fashioning itself as the only ideology left standing, it served as the basis for allocating capital in unproductive ways. Whereas the ballooning of the finance sector over the last forty years is sustainable inasmuch as bankers are able to make money by creating and protecting the illusion of their usefulness, the dot-com era was a hard landing for companies that tried the same approach but ultimately could not drum up enough business to survive.  

But even if past predictions are incorrect and past technological advances were limited (or had an economic potential that was much less than anticipated), the technology that is developing today could still could be extraordinary and kick off a period of very rapid automation, right? Before going further it is important to define what sort of technological developments could lead to these sorts of changes in the labor market. Often general advances in technology, or things like Moore’s law or speculation about the singularity, are used as evidence that the conditions that underlie the economy are shifting today. Here it is worth quoting directly from Economic Policy Institute’s State of Working America:

“We are often told that the pace of change in the workplace is accelerating, and technological advances in communications, entertainment, Internet, and other technologies are widely visible. Thus it is not surprising that many people believe that technology is transforming the wage structure. But technological advances in consumer products do not in and of themselves change labor market outcomes. Rather, changes in the way goods and services are produced influence relative demand for different types of workers, and it is this that affects wage trends. Since many high-tech products are made with low-tech methods, there is no close correspondence between advanced consumer products and an increased need for skilled workers. Similarly, ordering a book online rather than at a bookstore may change the type of jobs in an industry — we might have fewer retail workers in bookselling and more truckers and warehouse workers — but it does not necessarily change the skill mix.”

The takeaway from this should be that some technological advances that seem significant are not necessarily things that threaten jobs, change their pay or working conditions, or point to a jobless future. Technology can create new consumer products — let’s say smartphones — that seem like they fundamentally change the foundation of the economy. But they actually only shift jobs to the companies making smartphones, and don’t mean that workers making consumer products are somehow unnecessary. More significant developments like the technology behind the car or airplane can make entire industries obsolete but also can create an entire ecosystem of industries that generate wealth. Still other advancements can reduce the costs of products to a large degree so that they are increasingly used as inputs in other industries, benefiting both supplier and buyer.

These sorts of technological development are usually conflated with each other, and with the kind that is supposed to lead to mass automation and job loss. That kind of development is when very expensive robots or software replace humans completely, without spawning new industries and jobs. Two commonly cited examples are self-driving cars and delivery services. Delivery robots and drones might capture imaginations (and make for good PR) but that doesn’t mean that the economics behind them lead to a situation where workers will be replaced anytime soon.1 Self-driving car technology is massively hyped, but many think they won’t arrive in even a lifetime. Labor platforms, like TaskRabbit, a marketplace to find help with errands or odd jobs, or Uber, the taxi app, are other Silicon Valley “innovations” often lumped in with this discussion. But they don’t threaten to reduce the total number of jobs at all: they shift jobs to their platforms.

This doesn’t mean that more original uses for technology couldn’t significant impact specific sectors. However, it’s likely that, in general, technology that does affect jobs will complement those positions, replacing or changing the specific tasks that workers do, but not going as far as replacing them in all cases. For jobs that are replaced wholesale, it shouldn’t be assumed that they will disappear overnight. There still need to be decisions, investment, and planning involved in replacing workers with (usually expensive) alternatives, which are all things that take time. This has certainly been the case in manufacturing. One interesting table from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that supports this point details the fastest declining occupations. Even extrapolating out ten years, the BLS assumes that there will be significant employment in these occupations. And any changes will vary by specific industry and occupation. Even then, many “low-skill” or low-paying jobs, especially in the service sector, are not conducive to automation very much at all. (And the robots must have forgotten that those were their targets, since many of the fastest growing jobs require no formal education or only a high school degree.)

There’s really no definitive way to tell either way if the robot apocalypse is upon us. But the precedence for wildly inaccurate predictions; the history of technology companies being unable to deliver on extravagant promises; the fact that the technology that would threaten jobs today is more suited toward slow, incremental changes like in the past; and that the orientation of our political system is toward prioritizing political, rather than economic imperatives, strongly suggests that the robots are probably much farther off than is conventionally accepted.

Is the recent deluge of talk of disruptive technological change, ubiquitous automation, and mass unemployment a continuation of the trends and mistakes that Graeber and Watters have highlighted? It seems so, and might even be approaching the lunacy of the dot-com era. Venture capitalists pour billions of dollars into unprofitable companies with questionable business models, which are in turn valued at billions of dollars. Many of the most popular and “innovative” businesses are simply delivery services, transportation companies, or in the consumer goods industry. How many different delivery services does society need? How many different taxi apps does it need? Does anyone really need a $700 juicer, especially if it isn’t even necessary? How are these ways of doing business adding value to the economy, let alone the beginning of a jobless future? More ambitious technology has proven to been a bust, especially in biotechnology.2 One also has to question the value of recent technological assessments and predictions when many of the economic and political commentators that are doing that prognosticating couldn’t see the dot-com bubble or even the massive housing bubble that preceded the Great Recession.

The reality is that companies that are seen as the forebearers of mass automation are often unoriginal, repackaging old ideas and existing technology and using political power, venture capital money, and a lot of press releases to survive. Like Graeber said, these “innovations” seem to be more in line with boosting the prevailing economic and political ideology. Old, obsolete ideas3 like flying cars have been resurrected; for example, as part of a public relations and investment strategy to distract from Uber’s myriad scandals and disastrous finances.

If anything, the novelty of this new era of technology seems to come from the lessons business have learned from the survivors of the dot-com bubble, like eBay, Google, and Amazon:4 mainly, that business models don’t need to make sense as long as a company is able to take over a big slice of the market and change the terms of that market. In this way, vague ideas about technology and the usefulness of Silicon Valley — promoted by neoliberal icons like Elon Musk, Steve Jobs, and Mark Zuckerberg — are used as a smokescreen for anti-competitive and anti-worker practices that seek to change the economic landscape.

Part 3 will explore an underexamined consequence of this debate: how it affects the social relations between employers, workers, and the government that are a foundation of the economy.

About the Author
Kevin Cashman lives in Washington, DC, and researches issues related to domestic and international policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Follow him on Twitter: @kevinmcashman.

The Automation Grift: Robots Are Hiding From The Data But Not From The Pundits –Part 1

It’s conventional wisdom among pundits that automation will cause mass unemployment in the near future, fundamentally changing work and the social relations that underpin it. But the data that should support these predictions do not. Part 1 of this article contrasts this extreme rhetoric and the data that should support the inevitable robot apocalypse, and finds that these predictions are likely motivated by politics or outlandish assessments of technology, not data. Part 2 assesses the technology behind these predictions, and follows a thread from the mid-20th century onwards. Subsequent parts will examine the political economy of automation in both general and specific ways, and will also discuss what the future should look like — with or without the robots.

The Automation Grift: The Robots Are Hiding From The Data But Not From The Pundits – Part 1

By Kevin Cashman

The Rhetoric

Few things are more breathlessly written about than automation and how it will affect society. In the mainstream discourse, technology writers, policy wonks, public relations hacks, self-stylized “futurists,” and others peddle their predictions and policy prescriptions, as if they are letting the rest of us in on a secret rather than following in a long history of over-enthusiastic predictions and misplaced priorities. Others view automation as a panacea for social problems. Either way, mass unemployment is usually at the center of this narrative and how workers, especially poorer workers, will become outmoded in the age of robots. In the waning days of the Obama administration, the White House joined the frenzy, publishing a report warning about the dangers automation posed to workers as well as the benefits of technology.

This report cited (and further legitimized) a 2013 report that boldly claimed that 47 percent of occupations were at risk from automation in the next two decades. Since its release, this study has been cited close to 900 times. Other predictions are just as bold. One is that the entire trucking industry will be automated in the next ten or so years. “Visionaries” like Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking, and Elon Musk use their stardom to add to the fears of these claims — and push for policies that don’t make much sense, like taxing robot workers or creating a basic income that is an excuse to eviscerate our other social programs and do other bad things. Still others blame automation for causing past problems, like the loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S., when they are easily explained by political decisions, not economic realities.

With all this interest and all these forecasts, you’d think there would be evidence that automation is affecting the economy in a significant way. Indeed, economists have determined a measure for “automation”: productivity growth. As productivity growth expresses the relationship between inputs (e.g. robots, people, machines) and outputs (i.e. goods and services), it should be a decent and measurable proxy for automation. More automation and robots would result in greater outputs for fewer inputs, which would show up clearly in the data. This is because replacing humans with robots only makes economic sense if it saves money or increases output. In both of these scenarios, productivity would increase.

The Data

So what do the data points say? They show that productivity growth on an economy-wide scale has been very low for the past ten or so years, at a rate that is a bit over 1 percent annually. (In fact, multifactor productivity — productivity of all combined inputs — decreased 0.2 percent in 2016, the first decline since 2009.) The previous ten years — the mid-1990s to mid-2000s — was a period of moderate productivity growth, or just over 3 percent annual productivity growth. From the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, there was another period of slow growth. And before that, there was a sustained period of moderate growth post war until the mid-1970s: the so-called “Golden Age” of prosperity. These data points do not support the assertion that automation is happening on a large scale.

It is important to note that productivity growth and automation are constantly happening, and that automation can affect small industries or occupations in big ways. It can also replace individual tasks but not entire jobs themselves; for example, you may order your food on a computer at a restaurant rather than talk to a waiter, who would still deliver your food. These things may not show up in the data because they do not represent fundamental changes to the entire economy. In other words, automation on a small scale is not evidence that automation will cause a sea change in how work is done: it is normal.

Other macroeconomic indicators support the low rate of productivity growth seen today. The labor market has still not recovered to pre-recession levels, levels which were depressed compared to the highs of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Growth in wages and employment costs have also been relatively low. Since these indicate that there is still considerable slack in the labor market (i.e. in general it is easy to fill open positions, and there are many more applicants than open positions) there is less pressure to automate. After all, why would businesses en masse invest in automation on a significant scale if they can find desperate workers willing to be paid minimum wage?

History also provides useful data points. Technological change and its effects on the labor market have been consistently overstated in the past, which is acknowledged by even mainstream economists. If anything, this is evidence that automation is good for the economy because it creates jobs, in net, and it creates new sectors of the economy. It also can increase living standards by, for example, shortening work weeks or improving conditions of work (and together with organized labor, this happened in the “Golden Age,” which is how it got its moniker).

Supporters of the robots-are-taking-all-of-our-jobs myth usually ignore this evidence. They’ll say that productivity growth cannot take into account the changes that are happening and that automation will have catastrophic effects on the labor market either way. While there are legitimate debates to be had on how to measure automation, the reality is that despite all the spilled ink, the robot boosters do not have history or the data on their side. It is only their analysis of the technology that supports their assertions. They think that there is something extraordinary about the technological change that is happening now and it will be transformative, in contrast to the slow and steady automation that occurred in the past, where benefits were realized over a long horizon.

Part 2 assesses the technology behind these predictions.

About the Author
Kevin Cashman lives in Washington, DC, and researches issues related to domestic and international policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Follow him on Twitter: @kevinmcashman.