Category: Global Economy

Despite its new rhetoric, the IMF still promotes failed policies

An event titled Income Inequality Matters: How to Ensure Economic Growth Benefits the Many and Not the Few is not exactly what comes to mind when one thinks of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Yet, in April, at the latest Spring Meetings, managing director Christine Lagarde, along with the IMF’s chief economist, discussed the urgency of addressing rising income inequality and the need for redistributive policies. While IMF staff in Washington were expressing their concern with inequality, people in Ecuador, Argentina and Tunisia were taking to the streets to protest against anti-worker austerity policies their governments are implementing as part of the IMF programs.

In the 1980s and 1990s, when a series of debt crises plagued the developing world, the IMF lent money to those countries as part of what it called structural adjustment programs (SAPs). These programs, part of what is now referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’, aggressively promoted an agenda of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, along with sharp cuts to social spending.

SAPs protected creditors and opened the doors for multinational corporations to do business in these countries, while the brunt cost of the adjustments was borne by people.

As the growth and development that was promised as a result of these programs never materialized, the IMF slowly lost some of its influence. The painful memories of the social costs that resulted from SAPs have made the IMF an extremely unpopular institution.

In recent years, the IMF has made substantial efforts to rebrand itself and create the image of an institution concerned with inclusive growth and social indicators. The IMF’s research department has dedicated a significant amount of time and space to the issue of rising inequality. This included research that showed that the fiscal consolidation and liberalization of capital accounts – policies that are at the core of IMF programs – increase income inequality.

The Fund has also examined the effect of the labor market policies it promotes and their contribution to the decline in the share of income captured by labour.

Yet, while its research department tackled questions on how to pursue both growth and inclusion, the Fund’s loan programs have not incorporated these concerns.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, the IMF re-emerged as a major player on the global scene. The IMF stopped using the name SAP, but the structure of IMF loan conditions and the policy demands remained very similar, with the failure of previous programs all but forgotten.

To make matters worse, the IMF continues a trend of underestimating the depth of recessions caused by the austerity policies it promotes, which prolongs economic crises and increases debt burdens as economies shrink.

The IMF’s latest loan agreement with Ecuador has the typical features of a structural adjustment program. It demands massive cuts in government spending, which directly target public sector employees, along with a series of neoliberal institutional reforms.

The program continues to impose failed policies that are shown by the IMF’s own research department to increase inequality and have high social costs.

To go along with the IMF’s new image, the program does include a floor on social spending, along with a modest increase in spending on social assistance for the first year. However, the spending floor, which establishes a minimum amount of the budget to be allocated towards social assistance programs is set at a low level, which is unlikely to keep up with the increased needs that will arise from Ecuador’s recession.

The case of Argentina, which entered an agreement with the IMF in the summer of 2018, has already shown the inadequacy of social spending floors. As the economic crisis has continued to worsen throughout the program, poverty in Argentina has skyrocketed, increasing from 25.7 percent in mid-2017, to 32 percent by the end of 2018, a staggering 6.3 percentage points.

Argentina also serves as an example of the failure of IMF austerity programs, where growth projections had to be adjusted downwards by over 3 percent for a single year only 3 months after the initial agreement was signed

An in-depth study of all IMF loans approved in 2016 and 2017 has shown that 23 out of a total of 26 programs imposed austerity measures. The number of conditions attached to loans also continues to increase. Furthermore, the study has shown the inadequacy of social spending floors, which do not provide enough funding, even for the provision of basic healthcare.

The IMF has changed its rhetoric on inequality and social inclusiveness, but its operations continue to impose the same harmful policies of the past. While some symbolic steps have been taken on how to operationalize research on inequality, they have yet to be incorporated into lending agreements.

If the IMF is truly concerned about growth that benefits ‘the many,’ it needs to stop promoting policies that have time and time again hurt working people.

 

This article originally appeared in Equal Times.

The financial crisis was a Minsky moment but we live in Strange times

This is the story of Susan Strange and Hyman Minsky, two renegade economists who spent a lifetime warning of a global financial crisis. When it hit in 2008, a decade after their deaths, only one rocketed to stardom.  

By Nat Dyer.  

When Lehman Brothers went belly up and the world’s financial markets froze in the great crash of 2008, the profession of economics was thrown into crisis along with the economy. Mainstream, neo-classical economists had largely left finance and debt out of their models. They had assumed that Western financial systems were too sophisticated to fail. It was a catastrophic mistake. The rare economists who had studied financial instability suddenly became gurus. None more so than Hyman Minsky.

Minsky died in 1996 a relatively obscure post-Keynesian academic. He was only mentioned once by The Economist in his lifetime. After 2008, his writings were pored over by economists and included in the standard economics textbooks. Although not a household name, Minsky is today an economic rockstar named checked by the Chair of the Federal Reserve and Governors of the Bank of England. One economist summed it up when he said, “We’re all Minskites now”. The global financial crisis itself is often called a “Minsky moment”. But not all radical economic thinkers were lifted by the same tide.

Susan Strange was more well-known than Minsky in her lifetime (see Google ngram graph below). One of the founders of the field of international political economy, she taught for decades at the London School of Economics. Alongside her academic work, she raised six children and wrote books for the general public warning of the growing systemic risks in financial markets. When she died in 1998 The Times, The Guardian and The Independent all published an obituary for this “world-leading thinker”.

The two renegade economic thinkers, although working in different disciplines, had much in common. They both gleefully swam against the tide their entire careers by studying financial instability. They were both outspoken outsiders who preferred to teach economics with words rather than equations and were skeptical of the elegant economic models of the day. They were big thinkers haunted by the shadow of the 1930s Great Depression. They both died a decade before being vindicated by the 2008 financial crisis. And, they read each other’s work.

The New York Times called Susan Strange’s 1986 Casino Capitalism “a polemic in the best sense of the word.” Calling attention to financial innovation and the boom in derivatives, the book argued that, “The Western financial system is rapidly coming to resemble nothing as much as a vast casino.” Minsky, in his review, said that the title was an “apt label” for Western economies. Strange provided a much-needed antidote, he said, to economists “comfortable wearing the blinders of neoclassical theory” by showing that markets cannot work without political authority. He probably liked the part where Strange praised his ideas too.

Casino Capitalism hailed Minsky’s ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ way before it was fashionable. Strange singled out Minsky as one of a “rare few who have spent a lifetime trying to teach students about the working of the financial and banking system” and whose ideas might allow us to anticipate and moderate a future financial crisis. Minsky’s concept of ‘money manager capitalism’ has been compared to ‘casino capitalism’.

But, put Susan Strange’s name into Google News today or ask participants at meetings on economics about her and you don’t get much back. They will sometimes recognise her name but not much more. Outside a small group, she’s a historical footnote, better remembered for helping to create a new field than the force or originality of her ideas. It is as if two people tipped the police off about a criminal on the run but only one of them got the reward money.

So, why did Strange’s reputation sink after the global financial crisis when Minsky’s soared?

Professor Anastasia Nesvetailova of City, University of London, one of the few academics who has studied both thinkers, believes it is due, in part, to their academic departments. “Minsky may have been a critical economist but he was still an economist,” she told me. Strange studied economics, but then worked as a financial journalist before helping to create the field of international political economy, now considered – against Strange’s wishes – a sub-discipline of international relations. Economics is simply a more prestigious field in politics, the media and on university campuses, Nesvetailova said, and Minsky benefited from that. “Unfortunately, [Strange] remains that kind of dot in between different places.”

As we live through a political backlash to the 2008 crisis and the IMF warns another one might be on the way, Strange’s broader global political perspective is a bonus. In States and Markets, she sets outs a model for global structural power which brings in finance, production, security and knowledge. Her writings predicted the network of international currency swaps set up by the Federal Reserve after the global financial crisis, according to the only book written about Strange since 2008. Her work foreshadowed the global financial crime wave. And, she argued repeatedly that volatile financial markets and a growing gap between rich and poor would lead to volatile politics and resurgent nationalism, which is embarrassingly relevant today. The financial crisis may have been a ‘Minsky moment’ but we live in Strange times.

This global political economic view explains why Strange criticised Minsky and other post-Keynesians for thinking in “single economy terms”. Most of their models look at the workings of one economy, usually the United States, not how economies are woven together across the world. This allows Strange to consider “contagion”: how financial crises can flow across borders. It’s a more real-world vision of what happens with global finance and national regulation. Her greatest strength, however, also reduced her appeal in some quarters as it means Strange’s work is less easy to model and express in mathematics.

Minsky found fault in Strange too. She should have more squarely based her analysis on Keynes, he said and showed the trade-off between speculation and investment. Tellingly, his critique is at its weakest when engaging with global politics. Strange unfairly blamed the United States for the global financial mess, Minsky wrote, even though it was no longer the premier world power. Minsky was only repeating the conventional view when he wrote that in 1987 but it was bad timing: two years later the Berlin Wall fell ushering in unprecedented US dominance.

In her last, unfinished paper in 1998 Strange was still banging the drum for Minsky’s “nearly-forgotten elaboration of [John Maynard] Keynes’ analysis”. Now it’s her rich and insightful work that is nearly forgotten outside international relations courses. A jewel trodden into the mud. Just as Minsky is read to understand how “economic stability breeds instability”, let’s also read Strange to appreciate her core message that while financial markets are good servants, they are bad masters.

 

About the author

Nat Dyer is a freelance writer based in London. He has an MSc in International and European Politics from Edinburgh University. He was previously a campaigner with Global Witness, an anti-corruption group. He tweets at @natjdyer.

 

Google Ngram showing the frequency of references to Susan Strange (red) and Hyman Minsky (blue) from 1940 to 2008

Strange was more referenced in her lifetime than Hyman Minsky. Google Ngram’s search only goes up to 2008. After 2008, we would likely see a hockey stick spike for Minsky and Strange continuing to fall.

The CFA Franc Zones: Neocolonialism and Dependency

French geopolitics in Africa is interested in natural resources. Initially, the franc zone was set as a colonial monetary system by issuing currency in the colonies because France wanted to avoid transporting cash. After these countries gained their independence, the monetary system continued its operation and went on to include two other countries that were not former French colonies. At present, the CFA franc zones are made up of 14 countries. The fact that even today the currency of these regions is pegged to the euro (formerly French franc) and that reserves are deposited in France shows the subtle neocolonialism France has been pursuing unchecked. It is a currency union where France is the center and has veto power. This is supported by African governing elites who rely on the economic, political, technical, and sometimes military support provided by France. It is no wonder then that these former colonies are not growing to their full potential because they have exchanged development through sovereignty for dependency on France. This article investigates the set up of the CFA franc zones, its ties to French neocolonialism and its ability to further breed dependency in the former colonies of West and Central Africa.

 

The CFA Franc Zones

The first franc zone was set up in 1939 as a monetary region with a  the French franc as its main currency. In 1945, the Franc des Colonies Francaises d’Afrique (CFA franc) and the Franc des Colonies Francaises du Pacifique (CFP franc) were created. After independence, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Guinea left. The Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Community (WAEMU) are known as the two CFA franc zones. WAEMU has eight members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau (a former Portuguese colony joined in 1997), Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Their common currency is the “franc de la Communaute Financiere de l”Afrique (CFA franc), which is issued by the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) located in Dakar, Senegal. CEMAC has six members: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea (a former Spanish colony joined in 1985) and Gabon. Their common currency is “franc de la Cooperation Financiere Africaine”, which is issued by the Bank of the Central African States (BEAC) located in Yaounde, Cameroon. It is worth mentioning that the BCEAO and the BEAC were headquartered in Paris until the late 1970s.

Since 1948, the two CFA francs were pegged at the rate of 50 CFA francs per French franc. In 1994, the CFA francs went through devaluation, 50 percent to be exact. At present, the arrangement of France to the two unions are a fixed peg to the euro, a convertibility guarantee by the French Treasury and lastly, a set of legal, institutional and policy requirements. The CFA franc zone links three currencies: the two unions and the euro. The CFA franc is fixed at 655.957 per euro. WAEMU and CEMAC each have their own central banks that are independent of each other. The CFA francs can be converted to the euro, but cannot directly be converted into each other. The money is sent to France as an operations account in the French Treasury by the two central banks. Furthermore, “at least 20 percent of sight liabilities of each central bank must be covered by foreign exchange reserves, at least 50 percent of foreign exchange reserves must be held in the operations account and increasing interest rate penalties apply if there is an overdraft. France is also represented on the board of both institutions.” In “Colonial Hangover: the Case of the CFA”, Pierre Canac and Rogelio Garcia-Contreras explain,

“The functioning of the Operations Accounts is critical to maintaining the convertibility of the CFA francs at the official exchange rate while, at the same time, allowing the regional central banks to maintain some monetary autonomy. The Operations Accounts are credited with the foreign reserves of the BCEAO and the BEAC, but can be negative when the balance of payments of the CFA zone members is unfavorable. When this is the case, the French treasury lends foreign reserves to the two central banks. This special relationship with the French treasury allows the two African central banks to maintain the fixity of the exchange rate while allowing them to have some limited control over their monetary policy. The amount of borrowing allowed is unlimited although subject to several constraints in order to limit the size of the debt. First, the central banks receive interest on their credit in the Operations Account, while they must pay a progressively increasing interest rate on their debit in the account. Second, foreign reserves other than French francs or euros may have to be surrendered – a practice called ‘ratissage’, or additional reserves may have to be borrowed from the IMF. Third, the French treasury appoints members to the boards of the BCEAO and BEAC in order to influence their respective monetary policies and to ensure their consistency with the fixed parity. The autonomy of both African central banks is curbed by the French authorities, thereby prolonging the colonial relationship between France and its former colonies.”

Apparently, representatives from France fill important positions in the Presidency, Ministry of Defense, Central Bank, Treasury, Accounting and Budget Departments, and Ministry of Finance, which allows them to have oversight and influence policy decisions. One French scholar observed that ministries from Francophone African states make around 2000 visits to Paris in an average year. Adom shows the money kept at the French treasury earns no or very low interest for the franc zone nations. In 2007, the former Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade had stated that the funds can be used to boost investment, economic growth and alleviate poverty in the member countries instead of sitting in France.

After the 1994 devaluation, the two CFA francs were pegged at the new rate of 100 CFA francs per French franc. The reason for the devaluation was accounted to loss of competitiveness as the French franc appreciated against the currency of major trading partners. These zones competitiveness was in the French market, but not to world markets. In the 1980s, there was a fall in the price of raw materials and a depreciation of the dollar. As a result, the growth and export of these nations were impacted. The governments of these zones were facing budget deficits, which they financed by borrowing from abroad until the IMF refused to lend them any more money in 1993. As for trade between the unions, it is low due to an external tariff. Capital flows between these unions is highly restricted. The hope that a monetary union would increase trade among the CFA franc zones never materialized.

 

Neocolonialism and France 

Kwame Nkrumah stated, “…imperialism… claims, that it is “giving” independence to its former subjects, to be followed by “aid” for their development. Under cover of such phrases, however, it devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism. It is this sum total of these modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about “freedom”, which has come to be known as neo-colonialism.”

In “Government accounting reform in an ex-French African colony: The political economy of neocolonialism”, P.J.C. Lassou and T. Hopper state, “colonialism does not cease with the declaration of political independence or the lowering of the last European flag. Decolonization is a formal facade if former colonies cannot acquire the socio-economic base and political institutions to manage themselves as sovereign independent countries. The modern manifestation of colonial and imperialist traits is commonly labeled neocolonialism, which is sometimes linked to ‘dependency’. Neocolonialism occurs when the former colonial power still controls the political and economic institutions of former colonies.”

France is carrying out neocolonialism by disguising this arrangement as a monetary union. These nations gave up their sovereign right to France. Neocolonialism is an impediment to development within African nations. France’s intervention was carried out through economic, political and militaristic ways. The ‘Accords de Cooperation’ was signed by African leaders who gained power with France’s help at independence. On the other hand, the ‘Accords speciaux de defence’ provided France power to intervene militarily to protect African leaders who protected France’s interests. Lastly, the economic accords require former colonies to export their raw materials such as oil, uranium, phosphate, cocoa, coffee, rubber, cotton … etc to France while importing industrial goods and services primary from France. Furthermore, these nations reduce or ban their raw material exports when French defense interest require.

Lassou and Hopper stress that accounting is a neglected part of development policies, especially in Francophone Africa. They share that “market-based reforms when applied in the South generally and Africa specifically…promote neocolonialism, enabling former colonial powers to retain control over political and economic institutions of former colonies to the advantage of multi-national corporations and trade whereby ‘Southern’ countries export cheap raw materials to ‘Northern’ countries and import high value-added goods and services in return.”

According to the Human Development Index, out of 187 countries, the last three and seven of the worst ten countries are from Francophone Africa. France’s neocolonialism approach is extremely subtle and paternalistic. The former French President, Jacques Chirac, said, “ We forget one thing: that is, a large part of the money that is in our [I.e., the French’s] wallet comes precisely from the exploitation of Africa [mostly Francophone Africa] over centuries.” In 2008, he went on to say, “without Africa France would slide down into the rank of a [third] world power.”

 

Dependency Theory and Francophone Africa

Africa, Asia, and Latin America have pursued sustainable development since gaining independence. However, a few countries succeeded in actually developing their economies. In the 1950s, Raul Prebisch and other economist came up with the dependency theory, which explains why “economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in poorer countries.” Prebisch suggested that poor countries (periphery nations) exported raw materials to the developed countries (center nations) and imported finished goods. Moreover, there is a dynamic relationship between dominant and dependent states. Andre Gunder Frank claimed that the capitalist world system was divided into two concentric spheres: center and periphery. The advanced center countries need cheap raw materials from the underdeveloped periphery as well as a market to send their finished products.

It has been decades since African countries gained independence. However, this independence was replaced by a dominance-dependence relationship known as post-colonialism. A dominance-dependence occurs “when one country is able to participate in a definitive or determining way in the decision-making process of another country while the second country is unable to have the same participation in the decision-making of the first country.” Furthermore, the foreign and domestic policies of the independent African nations continue to be influenced by outside powers, especially their former colonizers. The post-colonial relationship when it came to former French colonies is the dominant role held by France.

French colonialism was one of state colonialism. It was one of direct rule where native chiefs assisted French administrators, which led to the rise of local elites who were educated in the French system. The former colonies were indoctrinated with French culture, language, and law. In the time of independence, sub-Saharan colonies decolonized in a non-violent way while former British colonies gained their independence through war, a violent way that loosened the relationship towards Great Britain. Because freedom from France was carried out through non-violence, it came naturally for local elites to take power and continue their strong ties with France.

Through the CFA franc zone, France is able to control the money supply, monetary and financial regulations, banking activities, credit allocation, and budgetary and economic policies of these nations. In addition, it breeds corruption and illegal diversion of public aid between France and its former colonies. For instance, conditional French public aid has forced these African states to spend the ‘aid’ money on French equipment, goods or contracts with French firms, especially construction and public work firms.

S.K.B. Asante points out that regional integration approaches do not remove the neocolonialism and dependency the African continent faces. He states, “none of the regional schemes have adequate provisions for attacking the all-embracing issue of dependency reduction nor have the efforts made towards this objective had any significant impact…the problem of dependency poses difficulties for African countries attempting a strategy of regional integration. Dependency serves as an obstacle to de-development it not only limits the beneficial effects of integration in both national and regional economy.”

 

Economic Performance of the CFA Franc Zones

France is the main trading partner of the CFA franc zones. CFA franc zones, unlike other African nations, have avoided high inflations due to France. The two zones between 1989 and 1999 had 33 percent of imports and 40 percent of Foreign Direct Investment from France. These regions are highly dependent on France. Despite their ties to France, these CFA franc zones remain extremely poor. The two regions had a population of 132 million in 2008 where 70 percent are in WAEMU and 30 percent are in CAEMC. Their total GDP is equal to 4 percent of the French GDP. These regions are “producers and exporters of raw materials, including oil, minerals, wood and agricultural commodities, and agricultural commodities, they are highly sensitive to world price fluctuations and the trade policies of their trading partners, mainly the EU and the US. Their industrial sectors are rather underdeveloped.” Non-oil producing nations within the CFA franc zones have very low GDP per capita.

According to Assande Des’ Adom, even after the currency was devalued, the CFA franc zones still suffer from currency misalignments. Adom points out, “the current monetary arrangements between the former colonies and France were designed based essentially on the economic interest of the latter. A prominent Ivorian economist goes even further to explain how franc zone’s member countries indirectly finance the French economy through these peculiar monetary arrangements.”

The CFA franc zone is challenged by globalization, volatile oil and raw material prices in addition to regional security problems. It can be argued that the “dependency and neocolonial practices surrounding the relationship between France and former colonial possessions in Africa is the inability of CFA countries to build up monetary reserves.” In today’s world, control of a country is carried out through economic and monetary ways. Nkrumah had warned

“The neocolonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state may be secured by payment towards the cost of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.”

In conclusion, the CFA franc zones continue to be dominated by the political will, economic interest, and geopolitical strategy pursued by the French republic. It seems some elite leaders do not wean away from France’s influence. President Omar Bongo of Gabor said, “France without Gabon is like a car without petrol, Gabon without France is analogous to a car without a driver.” The previous quote can be applied to almost all of the franc zone nations. The set up of the currency unions benefits France more than its members. French colonialism is preventing the development of these nations and causing them to be dependent.

 

International Trade and Globalization: Are Benefits Truly Mutual?

By Aabid Firdausi.

 

The euphoria around international trade and the general consensus regarding capitalism’s inevitable sustenance among countries of the Global South is at least partly due to the absence of an alternative after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The politics of capitalism, with its expansionary dynamics, has assumed a truly “global” avatar by aggressively pursuing a neoliberal globalization agenda. Thus, we see much hype around the numerous trade treaties that governments around the world sign, claiming they would boost economic growth and create jobs. However, a critical examination of mainstream trade theories reveals several insights as to why there has been a hegemony of thought when it comes to attitudes around globalization.

The idea that “free” trade and globalization imply mutual benefits and prosperity for all the parties involved is simply accepted as common sense. Mainstream trade theories argue that if nations engage in international exchange, then all parties will be better off. Although this seemingly innocuous assumption is based on an unrealistic worldview, it has deep implications when translated into practice. This article provides a basic understanding of some of the areas that theories in mainstream international economics conveniently ignore.  

It is pertinent that we pause and critically question what we are told, taught, and made to believe – for nothing that is promoted with such great fanfare by economic elites can be free of costs. When it comes to trade treaties,  the devil often lies in the details, which often reveal policies that lead to the further immiseration of the working class and the peasantry, especially in the Global South. First, it is extremely important to understand trade in a historical perspective and how it has changed with different epochs within capitalism. The North-South trade in many instances was first a colonial tragedy (the British colonization of India, for example) and has now become a neo-colonial farce. This manifests itself in the myriad ways in how multinationals shape spheres of public and private actions from land-grabbing to a homogenization of consumption patterns.

Secondly, international trade theories blatantly disregard the asymmetric power relations that exist in the global political economy. Despite the dichotomous classification of nations on the basis of the degree of development, trade theories often assume that transactions between two unequal nations tend to benefit both. While it is naïve to discard any benefits at all from the process, it is essential that we ask who frames these trade policies and what sections of society receives the lion’s share of the benefits.

Third, mainstream theories often categorize labor and capital as homogenous and lump them together as factors of production. In reality, as it is obvious, labor and capital are far from homogenous. A critical reader looking at these flawed assumptions that most theories rest upon could easily conclude they would better suit interregional trade on an extremely local basis, than an international basis! The variations in factors on a local level would be significantly smaller than the variations and imbalances that exist on a broader scale.

Fourth, I would argue that trade theories commit a grave injustice in its treatment of labor, which shows the class nature of most theories and the subsequent policies that are influenced by it. Cheap labor is often hailed as a virtue of the Global South – and this is projected as an open invitation to set up sweatshops for global capital in the name of manufacturing competitiveness. Thus, the hegemonic narrative around the potential for trade is essentially dehumanizing in nature. Such trends that have been persistent since the vigorous promotion of mathematical economics have largely dissociated the discipline from the wider branch of social science.

Fifth, there exists a systematic misdiagnosis of the power relation between capital and labor. This is perhaps most evident in the asymmetries observed in the globalization of capital and the globalization of labor.  While the former has largely been internationally mobile, the latter has not been so. Though this can be partially explained by the existence of the state and its territorial boundaries, it would be foolish to discard the class dynamics of this asymmetric transnational mobility.

Finally, the after-effects of (primitive) accumulation have largely been ignored in mainstream theories. The presence of regional endowments that creates a fertile land for foreign capital and the subsequent invitation of the so-called job-creating corporations ignore the displacement of the livelihoods of the peasantry. This dispossession that Marx referred to as the primitive accumulation has been rampant in the Global South. However, the compensation and rehabilitation provided to the dispossessed have largely been inadequate. This raises larger questions about what development actually is and whose interests it serves.

Thus, it is important that we see through the haze and understand the basis and implications of mainstream theories on trade, and who they truly favor. What is taught in classrooms shapes to a large extent convictions and the worldview of a large number of students. There is a pressing need to promote and develop alternative streams of thought that are “social” in nature amidst the contemporary backlash against capitalist globalization. It is necessary that an interdisciplinary perspective on globalization in general and international trade, in particular, is cultivated in academic institutions in the Global North and South. Only then can we undo the hegemony of the “globalization benefits all” narrative.

 

Aabid Firdausi is from India and is a Master’s student at the Department of Economics, University of Kerala. He is interested in understanding the socio-spatial dynamics of capitalism from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Trump’s Cuba Policy Will Hurt, Not Help Cubans

In a speech showing no regard to Cuban’s historical sensitivities, Trump announced from Miami that he was “canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba.” By that he meant reversing from Obama’s policy of engagement with Cuba to the old sanctions-based approach. The decision has been extensively criticized, from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, in Austrian-economics outlets and on  Cuba’s socialist state media. Even some Republican members of Congress opposed and distanced themselves from this policy, and The American Conservative said Trump was reversing to a “failed,” “brain dead” policy which “will end up strengthening [Castro].”

The stated goal of the policy is to enforce compliance with the Embargo and the tourism ban, take a tougher stand on human rights abuses in the island, and to contribute to the economic, political empowerment of the Cuban people. Despite all the Cold War-style rhetoric in his speech, Trump is not actually “canceling” the whole deal with Cuba. According to the White House policy fact sheet, the embassies will remain open, maintaining diplomatic relations between the two countries, and Cuban-Americans’ travel and remittances are not impacted by the policy. As American University professor William LeoGrande recently put it, the plan is  a “compromise between Cuban-American hard-liners’ demands that he reverse every aspect of Obama’s opening, and the pleas of U.S. businesses that he not shut them out of the Cuban market.”

However, the new policy approach will not exactly economically empower the Cuban people, since Cuban private sector entrepreneurs will be hit the hardest by a key policy change—the enhancement of the travel ban for American citizens. While Americans can still travel to the island in groups through a licensed tour company, prohibiting travel under the individual people-to-people license is likely to reduce the number of American visitors—the same citizens that Paul Ryan once praised as “our best ambassadors” of democratic values—which will result in the opposite of the intended policy goal.

Cuban Entrepreneurs Will Take The Hit

The more immediate effects of Trump’s measures will hit Cuban private businesses in the tourism industry. A recent survey found American travelers are directly supporting Cuban entrepreneurs economically. According to the survey, 76 percent of American visitors stayed at casas particulares (privately-owned houses), 99 percent ate at privately-owned restaurants, 85 percent traveled in private taxis, and 86 percent bought art, crafts, or music from independent artists. As a result of a lower number of American visitors, we can expect Cuban Airbnb hosts—Cuba is Airbnb’s “fastest-growing country…with over 22,000 listings,” bar and restaurant owners and their employees, taxi drivers, etc. to see their incomes reduced. This hurts the very same people the policy claims to “empower.”

In the first half of 2017, Cuba received some 285,000 American visitors, an increase of 145 percent with respect to the same period in 2016. As a result of the enforcement of travel restrictions, the number of American visitors and the economic support they provide to the private sector could be greatly reduced. Cuban economist Pedro Monreal estimates direct losses to the Cuban private sector on the range of $14.7 to $20.8 million, in the second half of 2017 alone—and not including the spillover or multiplier effect that the private sector’s incomes may have in Cuba.

Additionally, the language in the regulations expands the definition of Cuban government officials ineligible to receive remittance payments from the U.S, which could potentially exclude a million Cubans from receiving remittances. These private transfers—typically to family members—are the lifeblood of the Cuban private sector economy, both as one of the main sources of funds for entrepreneurs to invest in their businesses and of income for national consumers. Thus, restricting these transfers will affect the standard of living of remittance recipients and also severely obstruct the development of a vibrant private sector on the island.

Cuba’s External Debt Commitments

Cuba has made efforts to renegotiate its outstanding external debt—on which the government defaulted in the 1980s—and to resume servicing its obligations in order to regain access to international finance. President Castro has already taken steps to improve the country’s creditworthiness by promising to honor the commitments resulting from agreements reached during the renegotiation of debt owed to other governments and private sector creditors. The most important agreement was with the Paris Club and its Group of Creditors of Cuba, in December 2015. The Group derogated the accumulated interests and brought down the total stock of debt from $11.1 billion to $2.6 billion—the original principal, to be paid over a period of 18 years. The first installment was already paid in October 2016, amounting to some $40 million. However, by depriving the Cuban government of foreign-currency income from the tourism industry, Trump might also be damaging the ability of the government to repay a debt owed to a number of U.S. ally countries. Moreover, damaging Cuba’s creditworthiness also affects the possibility of extending Cuba credits for the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities, which is key to make U.S. exports more competitive vis-à-vis other foreign suppliers, and would provide the “greatest” boost to agricultural exports to Cuba.

Back to Cold War Politics amid Recession and Economic Reforms

The Cuban government had been implementing austerity for the past six years as part of a process to “update” Cuba’s economic system by reducing the role and size of the state in the economy. This process included tight controls over fiscal expenditures and massive layoffs from the state economy. For example, Cuban official statistics show that from 2010 to 2015, government employment was reduced at a rate of 117,000 jobs a year; removing around 585,600 jobs from the economy in that period. The assumption was that those workers would be absorbed by an expansion of the private and cooperative sectors—which indeed increased their ranks by 461,000 jobs, around 79 percent of the reduction in government employment. Thus, Trump’s measures will be affecting the most dynamic job-creator sector of the Cuban economy.

This comes at a time when Cuba is trying to shake off an economic recession from last year—when GDP contracted 0.9 percent—and is beginning to make payments to its international creditors for the first time in more than two decades. Thus, Trump’s measures do not only jeopardize the expansion and profitability of the private sector, it also threatens the economic and social development of the nation, in general, and, in particular, the ability of the leadership to successfully restructure and revitalize the economy so that it works for the many—while at the same time escaping a looming recessionary episode and fulfilling external debt commitments. All of which, again, will have a disproportionately negative effect on the Cuban people.

Cuba: Caught-up Between “Trumpian” Politics?

The decision to roll back the policy of engagement with Cuba once again shows Trump’s frequent inconsistencies. This policy is not about putting America first, as it hurts American companies doing business with Cuba and restricts the right of U.S. citizens to travel freely. It is not about human rights, as Trump deals with a number of countries with abysmal human rights records—e.g. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Philippines. And, it is not about economically empowering the Cuban people, as they will be the first to feel the effects of a worsening economic environment, standing to lose some $21 million this year. Instead, this foreign policy seems to be all about American internal politics. About the vote Trump needed from Miami’s Rep. Mario Díaz-Balart for the healthcare bill to pass Congress. About renting Marco Rubio’s loyalty during the Senate Intelligence Committee’s hearing of former FBI Director Comey. And, it is about Trump’s crusade to destroy all of President Obama’s signature policies—whether it is climate change, health care, labor laws, or Cuba.

Hidden in Plain Sight: Illicit Financial Flows

The importance of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) in the context of economic development has slowly come to grasp people’s attention. The World Bank defines IFFs as “money illegally earned, transferred, or used that crosses borders.” Since 2006, the Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington, DC-based think tank, has done extensive research on IFFs. Their studies emphasize that the developing world lost $7.8 trillion in IFFs between 2004-2013—whereby $1.1 trillion was lost in 2013 alone. Studies have shown there is a strong correlation between IFFs and higher levels of poverty and economic inequality. The United Nations just passed its first resolution on combatting IFFs, as it is pertinent to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This article explores further how IFFs occur, their role in keeping economies from developing—especially in the African continent, and some suggestions to tackle them.

Illicit financial flows are often mistaken as capital flight. This assumption is false because capital flight could be entirely licit. We can group the IFFs in three categories: commercial activities, which account for 65% of IFFs; criminal activities, estimated to be about 30%; and corruption, amounting to around 5%. Trade mis-invoicing is the most common way illicit funds leave developing nations, averaging 83.4%. Trade mis-invoicing means moving money illicitly across borders by misreporting the value of a commercial transaction on an invoice that is submitted to customs. It is carried out by under-invoicing exports and over-invoicing imports. Under-invoicing the value of exports means writing the price of a good as being less than the price actually paid, in order to show reduced profits and then pay less in taxes. Once the good is exported, it will be sold at full price and the excess money will be put in an offshore account. Over-invoicing the value of imports is when the price of a good is listed as being higher than the seller actually intends to charge the client. The excess money is deposited in the importer’s offshore bank account. There is the misconception that IFFs are largely due to corruption when in fact they account only for 5%, as mentioned above. With invoice manipulation of prices, there is no need for bribing anymore.

Another scheme used in IFFs is misreporting the quality or quantity of the traded products and services. According to a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission, in 2012, Mozambican records showed a total export of 260,385 cubic meters of timber, while Chinese records alone show an import of 450,000 cubic meters of the same timber from Mozambique. Other strategies consist of creating fictitious transactions (which consists of making payments on goods or services that never materialize), transfer mispricing (which involves the manipulation of prices), and profit shifting (which is popular among corporations looking for favorable tax rates).

 

Role of IFFs in Keeping Economies from Developing

Illicit Financial Flows act as a barrier to economies from developing and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Illicit financial outflows—facilitated by secrecy in the global financial system—are bleeding developing countries dry. UNCTAD emphasizes that developing countries will need $2.5 trillion every year until 2030 to achieve their goals on health, nutrition, education and the rest. But pledged capital inflows are only around $1.2 trillion. Preventing or even reducing IFFs can fill this funding gap. Seven out of the past 10 years, IFFs were greater than Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) given to poor nations.

The IMF estimates that developing nations lose $200 billion from tax revenues per year due to IFFs, while OECD countries lose $500 billion. Specifically, the United States (US) loses $100 billion annually. Tackling IFFs is in the interest of the US. Even though both developed and developing countries are victims of IFFs, developing countries suffer greater losses.

When it comes to most significant volume of IFFs, Asia is leading by 38.8% of the developing world over the ten years of this study. However, when IFFs are scaled as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa tops the list averaging 6.1% of the region’s GDP.

At the Seventh Joint  Annual Meetings of the ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and  Economic  Development  and  African  Union  Conference  of  Ministers of  Economy  and  Finance  in  March  2014  in  Abuja,  Nigeria, a Ministerial Statement was issued, which states that:

“Africa loses $50 billion a year in illicit financial flows. These flows relate principally to commercial transactions, tax evasion, criminal activities (money laundering, and drug, arms and human trafficking), bribery, corruption and abuse of office. Countries that are rich in natural resources and countries with inadequate or non-existent institutional architecture are the most at risk of falling victim to illicit financial flows. These illicit flows have a negative impact on Africa’s development efforts: the most serious consequences are the loss of investment capital and revenue that could have been used to finance development programmes, the undermining of State institutions and a weakening of the rule of law.”

Former South African president Thabo Mbeki stated at a High-Level Panel on IFFs “Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the world.” The amount of IFFs out of Africa were between $854 billion and $1.8 trillion over the period 1970-2008, according to estimates by GFI. There is a campaign to end IFFs, “Stop the Bleeding”, led by Trust Africa Foundation. Mr. Mbeki stressed that Africa can no longer afford to have its resources depleted through IFFs. On the other hand, illicit financial transfers by African elites paint a different picture. It shows that African elites lack confidence in their own economies. Because they have the privilege to go abroad for education and healthcare, they are less likely to invest in their own countries.

Curbing IFFs

When searching the literature on IFFs, the focus seems to be on developing nations, which are the source. However, there is little focus on the destination countries like Switzerland, Ireland, United Kingdom, etc. A paper by GFI titled “The Absorption of Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2006”, discusses that there are two types of destinations for money leaving the developing world. These are offshore financial centers and non-offshore developed country banks. The greatest challenge is getting the money back from the destination countries.

The OECD and the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) surveyed frozen assets held by OECD countries and how much of them were returned to the countries of origin . Between 2010 and June 2012, $1.4 billion of corruption-related assets were frozen and only $147 million was returned.

During the Arab Spring, banks and governments froze billions of dollars held by previous leaders along with their associates from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. However, following the Arab Spring, only few assets have been returned and the process of recovering stolen assets is very cumbersome. In order to recover stolen assets, there needs to be solid enough proof that these assets were in fact gained through corruption to begin with.

Illicit financial flows is an issue that plagues the developing world. Nations are denied tax revenues that could be geared towards providing necessities, employment, and economic growth. Nations should hold their financial institutions accountable if they participate in tax evasion activities. There is a need for the creation of financial supervision agencies focused on IFFs. Another suggestion would be the development of a global trade-pricing database so that customs officials are not tricked by false prices. Lastly, the Bank of International Settlement should publish data on international banking assets by country of origin and country of destination in order to better comprehend where IFFs are headed.

Written by Mariamawit F. Tadesse

Germany Does Have Unfair Trade Advantages

In one of Donald Trump’s rants, he claimed the reason why there are so many German cars in the U.S. is that their automakers do not behave fairly. The German economy’s prompt response was that “the U.S. just needs to build better cars.” However, this time, probably without even realizing it, Donald Trump was on to something – Germany’s currency setup does give it unfair trade advantages.

While China is commonly accused of currency manipulation to provide cheap exports, the IMF has recently decided the renminbi (RMB) is no longer undervalued and added it in its reserve currency basket, along with other major currencies. However, an IMF analysis of Germany’s currency found “an undervaluation of 5-15 percent” for the Euro in the case of Germany. Thus for Germany, the Euro has a significantly lower value than a solely German currency would have.

Since the Euro was introduced, Germany has become an export powerhouse. This is not because after 2000 the quality of German goods has improved, but rather because as a member of the Eurozone, Germany had the opportunity to boost its exports with policies that allowed it to maintain an undervalued currency.

Germany and France are the largest Eurozone economies. Prior to joining the Eurozone, both countries had modest trade surpluses.

In the above figure we can see how following the implementation of the Euro, the trade balances of Germany and France completely diverged. The French moved to having a persistent trade deficit (importing more than they export), while Germany’s surplus exploded (exporting much more than they import). After a brief decline in the surplus in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, it is now again on the rise.

In the early 2000s Germany undertook several national policies to artificially hold wages down. These measures were seen as a success for Germany globally. By being part of the Eurozone and holding down wages, the Germans could export at extremely competitive prices globally. Had they not been part of the Eurozone, their currency would have appreciated, and they would not have the same advantages.

In the aftermath of the European debt crisis, Germany took a tough stance on struggling debtor countries. Under German leadership, the European Commission imposed draconic austerity measures on countries such as Greece to punish them for spending irresponsibly. Spearheaded by Germany, The EU (along with the IMF) offered a bailout to Greece so that it could pay the German and French banks it owed money to.

This bailout came with strict conditions for the Greek government that was forced to impose harsh austerity. The promise was that if the government cut its spending, the increased market confidence would help the economy recover. As a member of the Eurozone, Greece had very limited monetary policy tools it could use. Currency devaluation was no longer an option, the country was stuck with a currency that was too strong for its economy.

Meanwhile Germany prospered and enjoyed the perks of an undervalued currency. Being able to supply German goods at relatively low prices, Germany’s exports flourished. At the same time, Greeks, and other countries at the periphery of the union, were only left with the choice to face a strong internal devaluation, which meant letting unemployment explode and wages collapse until they become attractive destinations for investment.

Germany consistently broke the rules of the currency area, without ever being punished. When it first broke the deficit limits agreed upon by Eurozone members in 2003, the European Commission turned a blind eye. Germany is often considered to have set an example for other EU nations by practicing sound finance, and having a growing, healthy economy.

Greece, on the other hand is blamed for spending too much on social services, and many of its problems are blamed on being a welfare state. When you compare the actual numbers, however, Greece’s average social spending is much less than that of Germany. Between 1998 and 2005, Greece spent an average of 19 percent of GDP, while Germany spent as much as 26 percent.

To address these vast differences in the trade patterns of the EU nations, the European Commission introduced the so-called “six-pack” in 2011. These regulations introduced procedures to address “Macroeconomic Imbalances.” However, as found in the Commission’s country report “Germany has made limited progress in addressing the 2014 country-specific recommendations.”

Germany’s trade competitiveness comes at the price of making other members of the Eurozone less competitive. This is something that Germany needs to be aware of when responding to the problems other economies are facing. Currently Germany is demanding punishments for countries whose have few policy tools available to stimulate growth as Eurozone members.

However, Germany should keep in mind that the Euro is preventing the currency adjustments that would take away its trade competitiveness. Without a struggling EU periphery, there wouldn’t be a flourishing Germany.

Using Minsky to Better Understand Economic Development – Part 2

The work of Hyman Minsky highlighted the essential role of finance in the capital development of an economy. The greater a nation’s reliance on debt relative to internal funds, the more “fragile” the economy becomes. The first part of this post used these insights to uncover the weaknesses of today’s global economy. This part will discuss an alternative international structure that could address these issues.

Minsky defines our current economic system as “money manager capitalism,” a structure composed of huge pools of highly leveraged private debt.  He explains that this system originated in the US following the end of Bretton Woods, and has since been expanded with the help of  financial innovations and a series of economic and institutional reforms. Observing how this system gave rise to fragile economies, Minsky looked to the work of John Maynard Keynes as a start point for an alternative.

In the original discussions of the post-war Bretton Woods, Keynes proposed the creation of a stable financial system in which credits and debits between countries would clear off through an international clearing union (see Keynes’s collected writings, 1980).

This idea can be put in reasonably simple terms: countries would hold accounts in an International Clearing Union (ICU) that works like a “bank.” These accounts are denominated in a notional unit of account to which nation’s own currencies have a previously agreed to an exchange rate. The notional unit of account – Keynes called it the bancor – then serves to clear the trade imbalances between member countries. Nations would have a yearly adjusted quota of credits and debts that could be accumulated based on previous results of their trade balance. If this quota is surpassed, an “incentive” – e.g. taxes or interest charges – is applied. If the imbalances are more than a defined amount of the quota, further adjustments might be required, such as exchange, fiscal, and monetary policies.

The most interesting feature of this plan is the symmetric adjustment to both debtors and creditors. Instead of having the burden being placed only on the weakest party, surplus countries would also have to adapt their economies to meet the balance requirement. That means they would have to increase the monetary and fiscal stimulus to their domestic economies in order to raise the demand for foreign goods. Unlike a pro-cyclical contractionist policy forced onto debtor countries, the ICU system would act counter-cyclically by stimulating demand.

Because the bancor cannot be exchanged or accumulated, it would operate without a freely convertible international standard (which today is the dollar). This way, the system’s deflationary bias would be mitigated.  Developing countries would no longer accumulate foreign reserves to counter potential balance-of-payment crises. Capital flows would also be controlled since no speculation or flow to finance excessive deficits would be required. Current accounts would be balanced by increasing trade rather than capital flows. Moreover, the ICU would be able to act as an international lender of last resort, providing liquidity in times of stress by crediting countries’ accounts.

Such a system would support international trade and domestic demand, countercyclical policies, and financial stability. It would pave the way not only for development in emerging economies (who would completely free their domestic policies from the boom-bust cycle of capital flows) but also for job creation in the developed world. Instead of curbing fiscal expansion and foreign trade, it would stimulate them – as it is much needed to take the world economy off the current low growth trap.

It should be noted that a balanced current account is not well suited for two common development strategies. The first is  import substitution industrialization, which involves running a current account deficit.  The second is export-led development, which involves  a current account surplus. However, the ICU removes much of the need for such approaches to development. Since all payments would be expressed in the nation’s own currency, every country, regardless it’s size or economic power, would have the necessary policy space to fully mobilize its domestic resources while sustaining its hedge profile and monetary sovereignty.

Minsky showed that capable international institutions are crucial to creating the conditions for capital development. Thus far, our international institutions have failed in this respect, and we are due for a reform.

Undeniably, some measures towards a structural change have already been taken in the past decade. The IMF, for example, now has less power over emerging economies than before. But this is not sufficient, and it is up to the emerging economies to push for more. Unfortunately, the ICU system requires an international cooperation of a level that will be hard to accomplish. Aiming for a second-best solution is tempting. But let’s keep in mind that Brexit and Trump were improbable too. So why not consider that the next unlikely thing could be a positive one?